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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the functions and structure of the recently 
restored Chinese education inspection system, and proposes practical 
suggestions for its future development by adapting relevant experiences 
drawn from the practice of Her Majesty's Inspectorate in England. 
After analysing briefly the background of the restoration of the 
Chinese inspectorate and revealing its intention to learn from HMI, the 
thesis addresses the question: "How much can the Chinese inspectorate 
learn from HMI and how can those HMI experiences which are 
transferable be adapted in the light of the Chinese conditions"? 
To answer this question, the study looks first into HMI's functions 
and the ways of performing these functions, its relationships with 
various educational partners, and its organisational structure in 
historical as well as contemporary administrative perspectives. This 
section attempts not only to describe HMI's experiences but also to obtain 
a better understanding of the educational and administrative context 
which have a decisive influence on the operation of HMI. 
An analysis of these aspects in the Chinese context is then carried 
out, using mainly the author's own research findings. 
A considerable part of the thesis is devoted to discussing the 
feasibility of using HMI as a model. The differences and similarities 
between the two inspection systems as well as between the two 
educational administration systems, and other major factors including 
ideology of government, standards of economic development, and 
territory size have been identified and examined in order to decide the 
extent to which and the ways in which the Chinese inspectorate can 
benefit from learning from HMI. 
In the final part of the thesis, several important issues and 
shortcomings in the present Chinese inspection system are identified, 
based on the comparisons with HMI as well as on the field work 
findings. Practical proposals for the future development of the Chinese 
inspection systems are put forward. In addition, as the first substantial 
piece of research in English on the system of educational inspection in 
China, the thesis suggests some areas for further research. 
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Chapter 1: Background 
CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND  
1.1 The Restoration of the Chinese Inspectorate 
The years from 1966 to 1976 were a disastrous period for the Chinese 
people in which endless political movements, dominated by ultra-left 
ideology, seriously damaged the national economy as well as cultural 
development. The education service was no exception. Its sole aim was 
to serve the so-called class struggle and proletarian dictationship. 
Advocates of economic development would be accused of admiring 
capitalism. The political turmoil finally ended at the end of 1976, when 
the "Gang of Four" was overthrown and a new generation of politicians 
came into power. They saw the need to end the class struggle and the 
urgency of accelerating almost every aspect of national development, 
particularly economic development. In 1979, shortly after the fall of 
"Gang of Four", the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
announced the shift of its work focus from the "class struggle" to the 
economic construction of the nation. The goal of "Four Modernisations" 
(industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and technology) 
was set up and the economic reform was launched on a spectacular 
scale at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Radical economic reform characterised by looser central control and 
broader local and individual initiatives made great demands on the 
education system, which had to respond in order to produce an 
appropriate labour mix for economic growth. It became increasingly 
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obvious that a revolutionary reorganisation of the education service 
would be essential to economic success. 
In brief, economic reform demanded a qualified labour force with a 
well balanced ratio of professional, skilled and semi-skilled workers and 
a reasonable subject combination. However, the educational system at 
that time could only offer, either professionals with higher education 
qualifications, or secondary school graduates who were academically 
but not technically qualified. In other words, the system could not 
provide people with vocational training who could quickly acquire work 
skills on joining the labour force. This weakness demanded rapid 
expansion in secondary vocational education from low levels to that 
necessary to meet the economy's needs. In addition, too much attention 
had been paid to natural science subjects in higher education 
institutions. Modern and social science subjects like economics, 
computing, business studies and law only occupied marginal positions. 
Therefore, the remedy lay not just in expanding higher education as a 
whole, but also in increased investment in subjects like those mentioned 
above. 
It was believed that, apart from the restructuring of existing 
education sectors and the adjustments within each of the sectors as a 
result of the economic reform, the most important task for the education 
system was to ensure that every child received a satisfactory education. 
By doing so, it could provide the basis of a quality labour force from the 
very beginning --- primary education. Therefore, making nine year basic 
education compulsory gradually became the agenda of the State 
Education Commission (SEdC), the highest educational administration 
authority in the country. Several circulars were issued during the first 
2 
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half of the '80s. Finally in April 1986, the National People's Congress, 
the nation's highest legislative body, adopted the most significant 
educational legislation since the foundation of socialist China in 1949 --
"The Law of Compulsory Education". 
The Law and other relevant documents issued by the SEdC planned 
to achieve the task in three steps. The first was to ensure that 
economically and culturally advanced areas (25% of the whole 
population) fully implemented the nine year compulsory education by 
1990. The second step was to let the middle-level areas (about 50% of the 
country) realise compulsory primary education (six years) by 1990 and 
junior secondary (three years) education by 1995. The last 25% of the 
country comprises economically backward areas which were expected to 
make primary education universal by the end of this century. Due to its 
historical significance as well as practical necessity, the compulsory 
education law, passed by the highest body of state power, was given great 
value by the SEdC and became one of its top priorities. 
In reality, education was treated as a "soft task" and had always been 
neglected in many places. Compared with other sectors like industry 
and transport, education received much lower priority. In many places, 
funds earmarked for education were often diverted to other uses, leaving 
the provision of education in a poor state. Even in the places where the 
funds had been allocated to the education sector, diversion of funds still 
existed. For example, "Hei Long Jiang Daily" (Hei Long Jiang is the 
name of a province) announced in 1985 that educational expenditure had 
increased by 21.2% compared to the previous year, but in reality, 
considerable funds had been secretly spent in a way which benefited the 
education authorities instead of the schools themselves. One county 
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education bureau used the money set aside for school capital 
construction to buy a large building as its office. 
Apart from the problem of diverted education funds, there was also a 
worrying dropout rate in the compulsory education age-group, caused by 
reasons such as parents wanting the child to earn money as early as 
possible, or because what the child was taught could not be applied to 
actual life, the child felt it was useless to go to school and became a child 
labourer instead. This phenomenon was more serious in rural areas, 
where the new "contract system" was in operation whereby farmers 
were totally responsible for their output; and in coastal areas where the 
economy was rapidly developing and labourers were desperately needed. 
In a report produced by the central inspectorate, an intake of students in 
a junior secondary school lost 67% of its students after three years in 
school. 
In addition to these problems, there was also the problem of many 
good teachers giving up their profession and entering other vocations as 
a result of low pay. In some places teachers could not even get paid 
regularly. Furthermore, due to the extremely competitive selection 
system, many schools put undue emphasis on the proportion of students 
entering schools of higher grade and neglected and got rid of the 
academically poor students even before graduation. 
All these and other pressing problems breached the legislation and 
relevant national regulations, and seriously imperilled the 
accomplishment of compulsory education. Although the SEdC and local 
education authorities noticed the problems long before and issued 
various circulars to try to remedy the situation, they failed to do so 
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because there were not enough people available to go to lower level 
education authorities and schools to enforce the legislation and 
regulations. This may be because the administrators were too busy to go, 
or too lazy to go, or that the areas were too wide to cover. Allowing this 
trend to grow meant the possible failure of this first most important 
piece of educational legislation. Therefore, an enforcement force seemed 
increasingly desirable. 
It became more difficult to ensure the implementation of the Law 
when educational administration began to change to let the 
governments at various local levels be responsible for administering 
universal education. Early in 1985, the "Decision on Educational 
Reform" was passed, which marked the beginning of a radical 
education reform. In the document, the CCP and the State Council 
(equivalent to the Cabinet) admitted that one of the current problems in 
educational administration was that "government authorities devote too 
much energy to the controlling of schools, especially higher education 
institutions.This causes the schools' lack of necessary freedom whilst 
those responsibilities which the government should have undertaken 
are not fulfilled properly" (CCP, 1985, p3). Therefore, one way to improve 
it was "at the same time of strengthening macro administration, to 
firmly delegate power and give more freedom to school management' 
(ibid). 
Since 1985, educational management has been undergoing various 
changes. The return of the "area dictates" principle has given various 
levels of local government greater responsibilities and freedom in 
managing educational service, especially the nine year basic education. 
It was stipulated in the law of compulsory education that local 
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governments (provincial, prefectural, county and township 
governments) should be totally responsible for making the nine year 
education universal within their areas. In addition to the delegation of 
power among different levels of governments, the "Head Teacher in 
Charge" system began to transfer some power from education 
authorities to schools and give the latter more freedom in deciding 
school budgets and staffing. The new situation created new vitality as 
well as posing new questions. How are the lower level governments 
getting on with their compulsory education plans? Are they working 
within the framework of the legislation? Are there any cases of 
breaching the Law? Do they administer the education service in 
accordance with national educational principles and requirements set 
by the SEdC? Is educational development really geared to the economic 
needs of the locality? What changes have taken place as a result of the 
"Head Teacher in Charge" system? Are there any difficulties in 
redistributing power between the school and the education authority? 
What problems have the local governments and schools encountered in 
the process of reform and what are the best solutions? In brief, the 
fluctuating situation made it necessary to strengthen communication 
channels in order to keep the higher level education authorities well 
informed about current practice to enable them to guide development 
promptly. As ordinary administrators were absorbed in dealing with 
daily business, they could hardly spare much time visiting schools and 
lower level education authorities regularly. Therefore, an agency was 
needed, in the process of decentralisation, to take responsibility for 
ensuring the successful implementation of the legislation, and for 
monitoring the state of educational administration in education 
authorities as well as the educational standards in schools, i.e. to 
inspect and visit lower level authorities and schools regularly to see that 
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things were going well and that the provision of education was 
satisfactory. Furthermore, this group of people were expected to promote 
communication between higher and lower levels of education 
authorities, and between education authorities and schools, to help solve 
problems in practice. 
As a result of the delegation of power, lower level governments had 
taken over many responsibilities from their senior authorities, e.g. 
making plans for universal education, deciding its budgets for 
educational provision, appointing school heads and teachers, compiling 
references and supplementary materials for nationally unified 
textbooks. Therefore, education authorities directly senior to them could 
free themselves from very detailed administration, which they used to do 
before. Under these circumstances, education authorities, especially 
those at central and provincial level, saw the need for changing their 
roles. As a result, those education authorities were trying hard, having 
delegated some power to their junior authorities, to strengthen the 
function of overall planning and collaboration with financial and 
economic bodies, of forecasting short-term and long-term manpower 
needs, of research on developmental strategies, and of inspection and 
monitoring. 
In practice, however, the traditional educational administration 
placed emphasis on the implementation function of the authorities. i.e., 
to interpret and carry out the tasks assigned by the higher authorities 
and to report back. The functions of independent policy making and 
monitoring (especially within the broad framework of legislation) were, 
rather weak. Before the education reform, the feedback function and the 
implementation function were concurrently performed by the same 
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group of people, so the staff had not have sufficient time to go to the 
schools and lower level education authorities. (Zhu,1988,p19; 
Liu,1988,p72; Xia,1989,p7; Xiang, 1988,p2; Lu 1987,p2). No wonder the 
situation of " it will not stop even if you demand it to; it will not move 
even if you order it to"( i.e. loss of control) was widespread across the 
country. This insufficient monitoring and feedback function not only 
made it difficult for higher level education authorities to ensure 
implementation of policies, but also had unfavourable effects on their 
decision making. The statement made by one Chinese leader, Mr. 
Wanli, revealed the nature of the shortcoming: "Until now, we still have 
not established a strict decision-making system and procedure. We do 
not have advisory, commentary, supervisory and feedback systems to 
support decision making. Today, decision-making by experience and 
sometimes on assumptions is still very common. There is no method to 
examine the correctness of the decisions. Mistakes in decision-making 
cannot be discovered until big problems emerge." (Wan, 1986, Speech on 
a political reform meeting). 
In short, the delegation of power resulted in the necessity to change 
the functions of education authorities. Only when the function of more 
independent policy making and the function of monitoring and feedback 
were performed well, could the education authorities succeed in 
administering education in the new situation of decentralisation. 
To summarise, the need for overcoming resistance in implementing 
the compulsory education law, the need for ensuring that the local 
governments provide satisfactory education, and the necessity of 
changing the roles of education authorities after the delegation of power 
and strengthening the function of monitoring, evaluation and more 
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independent policy-making has been making educationists and 
administrators think of solutions. One of the possibilities was to set up a 
specialised inspection force to help perform these functions. 
As soon as this suggestion was proposed, questions emerged: What 
kind of inspectorate was needed? In what way could the inspectorate 
help to meet practical needs? Corresponding to the needs listed above, 
one would expect an inspectorate, first of all, to be a safeguard of 
legislation--- to enforce and to supervise the implementation of the law of 
compulsory education; secondly, to be a monitor of the state of education 
including its provision and its standards, so that it could broaden and 
speed up information flow to keep authorities informed in order to assist 
their policy making which was itself a new area of development; finally, 
in answer to the need for changing functions, one would expect the 
inspectorate to provide professional advice to decision makers in a less 
centralised situation. 
As there had been no specialised inspectorate in China for 30 years 
(since its abandonment in the late 1950s), people did not have experience 
of running this system. In addition, the background and conditions of 
the work of the inspectorate were very different from those of 30 years 
ago. Therefore, the Chinese administrators had difficulties in designing 
a new inspectorate. 
12 Learning From Foreign Inspectorates 
No doubt, one way of building an inspection system is through 
constant trial and error,"crossing the river by groping stones" --- the 
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Chinese equivalent of "muddling through". Another possible way, 
however, is to broaden the field of vision and to take a look at foreign 
systems. i.e., to use comparison as an instrument to assist 
policy-making, to look for some models in foreign countries as 
references for building one's own system. 
Among those countries from whom China is asking for help, 
(including Japan, Germany, Britain), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Schools in England (HMI) has the most frequent contact with China, 
and is certainly seen to have the most potential of further cooperation. 
As early as in May 1986, before the Chinese central inspectorate was set 
up, the SEdC sent two delegates to England to discuss an exchange 
scheme. In October 1986, two senior members of HMI and two local 
advisers were invited to China to introduce their systems of work at a 
national conference of inspection and evaluation attended by candidates 
for the Chinese inspectorate. They received a warm response. This 
initial exchange laid the foundation for the later development of the 
relationship between these two inspectorates. An exchange programme 
was proposed and agreed by both sides. The next year, the Chinese SEdC 
sent two people to attend the inspection course at University of London 
Institute of Education. They spent some time following HMIs and 
observing their work. Soon after they went back, they joined the 
inspector training force. Later in 1987, two HMIs flew to Beijing to give 
lectures for inspection training courses. In 1989, one Staff Inspector and 
one Chief Inspector of HMI were invited to visit four cities in China and 
to hold seminars on reporting inspection. In June 1990, a delegation of 
six, led by the head of the Chinese central inspectorate, paid a two week 
visit to England. They not only talked with HMIs and local advisers, but 
also observed the work of HMI with their own eyes. These frequent and 
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close contacts indicate that the Chinese inspectorate has a good opinion 
of HMI, and, probably, the intention to learn further from it. 
Undoubtedly, it is always worth looking at foreign experience and 
lessons to improve one's own work at home, especially at this stage of 
the Chinese inspectorate's infancy. However, one issue which arises is 
that since the social and educational systems in the two countries are 
quite different, how much can the Chinese inspectorate really learn 
from its English counterpart? 
The famous question "How far can we learn anything of practical 
value from the study of foreign system of education?" (Sadler, 1900) has 
become the classic question asked by almost every comparative 
educationist. As explained above, because of the differences in 
educational administration systems in the two countries, it is unwise 
and impractical for the Chinese to transfer as freely as they would like 
because what works in one social setting might not work in the other. 
Therefore, the central question "to what extent can the Chinese 
inspectorate learn anything of practical value from the HMI's 
experience?" can be split further into the following questions: What are 
the similarities between the two inspectorates which enable a useful 
comparative study? What are the major differences between the two that 
limit the imitation of the English experience? What experience of HMI 
can possibly be transferred to the Chinese inspectorate? To what extent 
can each 'transferable' merit be borrowed, and finally, how is the 
experience going to be adapted in the light of the Chinese domestic 
conditions? 
1 1 
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1.3 The Feasibility of Using HMI as a Model 
Obviously, this study is one of comparison, of selective borrowing in a 
contextual perspective. Looking at the growth of comparative education, 
one can see that there are several stages of development. The origin of 
comparative education is described by contemporary scholars as a 
"travellers' tale", i.e., to describe educational activities in other 
countries as part of a traveller's tale. The information contained in the 
tales was fragmentary and piecemeal, and usually was obtained 
casually rather than intentionally. The second stage was educational 
borrowing motivated by the desire to learn useful lessons from foreign 
practice. One distinctive feature of that educational borrowing was the 
assumption that "institutions, even whole systems, could be reproduced 
at will on foreign soil, given only that their existence abroad was known, 
that sufficient information about them was available, and that somehow 
or other the ground at home was prepared for their reception" (Noah & 
Eckstein, 1969, p32). In other words, borrowing was viewed as 
unconditional and unlimited. It was because of this situation that Sadler 
raised the question of how far we can learn anything practical from 
studying foreign systems (Sadler, 1900), which paved the way for the 
new era of comparative education --- seeking not only for descriptive 
information but also for the explanations. 
Subsequently, scholars tried to identify factors and forces that shaped 
the various educational systems. For example, the English scholar 
Hans suggested three groups of factors: natural, religious and secular, 
and various sub-factors within each group (Hans, 1950). He believed that 
an education system must be viewed and interpreted against the natural 
and social conditions in which it was embedded. At that time, scholars 
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frequently discussed the passivity of education in the social system, but 
they did not pay much attention to the methodology of comparative 
education. 
After the second world war, Bereday, who, like Sadler, was a bridge 
between two phases of comparative education, raised the question of 
methodology. Meanwhile, he himself proposed a methodology model 
which received some criticism (Bereday, 1964). In the following period, 
which we might call a "methodology searching period", many scholars 
including Holmes and King contributed their views (Holmes, 1965; King, 
1979). By the late '60s, there had been two types of methodological 
orientations, one more inclined to a philosophical and historical 
approach, the other more in favour of invoking the methods of the social 
sciences in comparative education in order to make it "scientific"(Noah 
and Eckstein, 1969). As a result of this fourth stage of development, there 
had been so many methodological models that many were finally 
convinced that there could not be only one method in comparative 
education. 
In the most recent phase of development (in the '70s and '80s), there 
has been an even wider variety of contributions, in terms of methods 
employed, motivation, and subjects of comparison. 
Reviewing the brief history of comparative education, one can see 
that from travellers' tale to blind copying, from searching for facts and 
forces to searching for methodology, and finally to the present pluralistic 
period, comparative education has come to a stage of diverse 
development in approach, aim, and subject. One may use comparative 
education as a means of discovering foreign systems, or as a way of 
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deepening the understanding of one's own educational system, or as a 
tool to assist policy making. One may use historical--philosophical 
approaches, or empirical methods, one may compare two or more 
countries, or two or more regions within one country, or quite often, the 
comparative educationists do not compare at all: they describe the cases 
in different countries, and leave the readers to make the comparison. 
It seems to the author that characteristics of each stage described 
above indicate only the new trend in ways of thinking about comparative 
education, or the relatively outstanding position of that trend in that 
particular period. For example, the third stage was characterised as 
searching for the explanation of foreign educational systems. This 
means that, during that period, looking for reasons was a new trend 
and perhaps more attention was paid to that type of work than to others. 
But it by no means suggests that other types of work did not occupy any 
position. Some people were still interested in borrowing and even 
describing foreign systems. This parallel--moving--phenomenon 
(although one of those several lines is perhaps more popular than 
others) is even vividly reflected in today's comparative education 
researches. Admittedly, there are many scholars who are keen on 
collecting cross-national data and participating in international 
cooperation, but an important dimension remains that of using 
comparative education as an instrument of assisting policy making. 
This is the case in this study. 
Since this study is designed to propose some tentative suggestions to 
the newly emerged Chinese inspectorate based on the examination of 
HMI practice, a discussion of the degree of adaptation of HMI 
experience is believed to be both necessary and appropriate at this stage 
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in order to lay down the foundation for the remainder of the study. The 
discussion is divided into three parts: (1), is borrowing desirable for 
China? (2), why HMI? (3), how much can the Chinese inspectorate learn 
from HMI? 
1.3.1 Is Borrowing Desirable for China? 
The heated debate on educational transfer might provide some 
answers to this question. As one research area in comparative 
education, the study of educational transfer represented by dependency 
theory and its opposite arguments opened up new perspectives on 
educational borrowing among different countries in the world, 
particularly among developed and developing countries. 
The original dependency theory was advanced to explain the lack of 
economic growth in former colonies. It argues that colonial 
relationships could still exist even after the colonies have gained their 
political independence, because they have already been led into a 
neocolonialist structure where foreign investment facilitates their 
primary products (including agricultural produce and minerals) 
instead of promoting their manufacturing abilities. These primary 
products are exported to the metropolis and manufactured there. By 
exporting these manufactured goods, the metropolis makes a great deal 
of profit. Thus, there is no opportunity for the third world to develop its 
economy within this centre-periphery relationship. This dependency, a 
stage in the process of industrialisation of ex-colonised nations, is 
regarded as undesirable by some theorists but desirable and inevitable by 
others. Applying the economic dependency theory, educational 
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dependency theorists suggest that because of the difficulty in breaking 
with past patterns of behaviour and established institutions, few former 
colonised countries have been able to escape from the influence of the 
educational system inherited from the colonial metropolis. Thus, a 
primary purpose of schooling in the developing societies is " to produce 
and reproduce a modern educated indigenous elite; and to incorporate 
indigenous peoples into the world market, producing those conceptions 
of work and patterns of consumption which are concomitant with the 
social and economic imperatives of the capitalist social order" (Ball, 
1981, p304). In other words, education is to incorporate people outside the 
advanced countries into the sphere of influence and control of these 
metropolitan countries. This is done by dominating book publications, by 
controlling most of the research fields, by hosting third world overseas 
students, and by transferring metropolitan educational practice to the 
peripheries. 
To sum up the theory, third world countries, despite the acquisition 
of their political freedom, are still suffering from the unbreakable 
economic and cultural ties with metropolitan nations. Their national 
development remains slow because de jure independence is subordinate 
to de facto dependence. Education is seen to contribute to neocolonialism 
by inculcating local elites with metropolitan values and by incorporating 
indigenous people under the control of the metropolis. In spite of its 
strong influence, this theory has come in for strong criticism. 
Acknowledging its success in discovering the mechanism of classical 
colonialism (as opposed to neocolonialism), scholars such as Mclean 
reject it as a satisfactory theory for explaining post-colonial and 
non-colonial development. (Mclean, 1983). In addition, it is criticised for 
its failure to identify the special characteristics of educational process as 
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a result of the direct borrowing and unmodified application of the 
economic dependency theory. It is further accused of oversimplifying the 
phenomenon of educational borrowing and calling every transplant 
"cultural dependency" (Ball, 1981). 
How can we assess the soundness of the idea of transplanting foreign 
experience to China from the perspectives discussed above? In other 
words, is borrowing desirable for China? The answer, the author 
believes, is "yes". The first justification for doing so is that China has 
survived for thousands of years and has never been completely colonised 
by any other nations. There have been many invaders who only 
succeeded in taking control of one part of this huge country for relatively 
short periods. Thus, China was by no means a colony of any metropolis. 
In addition to its political independence, the Chinese economy is 
self-reliant and does not depend on anyone. Moreover, compared with 
ex-colonies, its educational system, though influenced by other foreign 
models, is the product of its indigenous political, economic and cultural 
systems. Added to this is the fact that the Chinese are very proud of their 
history and culture. The borrowing of foreign experience is extremely 
unlikely to turn China into a cultural dependency of some industrialised 
countries, especially when there is no economic dependency. The second 
reason, as Mclean argues, is that educational borrowing is a worldwide 
phenomenon existing not only between developed and developing 
countries, but also between developed countries as well. (McLean, 1983, 
p32-33). Dependency is part of the price that has to be paid for being a 
part of the world system. "One cannot simultaneously be integrated into 
such system and preserve one's independence from it. This applies to 
any such system, capitalist or otherwise."(Hurst, 1984, p9). Some 
western countries learned some experience from the Chinese imperial 
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examination system and applied it to their civil service selection 
systems. But they are not dependent on China at all! Educational 
transfer is believed by the author to be both reciprocal (perhaps not so 
direct and straightforward) and necessary in order for a country to 
integrate itself as a member of a world community. Thirdly, dependency 
theory overestimates the influence of the metropolis by assuming that 
the peripheral countries were passive recipients and by neglecting the 
capacity of developing countries to adapt foreign practice. In addition, as 
mentioned briefly earlier, transferring educational experience and 
practice is not the same as transferring capital or technology. 
Educational transfer usually entails the involvement of government 
agencies. Government's political awareness of independence, especially 
that of the Chinese communist government, largely reduces the 
possibility of educational dependency. Finally, China has opened up her 
door to all the countries in the world. Its aim is to learn whatever is good 
from whichever country, advanced or less advanced. In order to re-enter 
the world educational community and catch up with the developed 
countries, it is inevitable and also imperative for China to acknowledge 
its backwardness and to learn from foreign experience to speed up its 
own development. Learning from all the countries in the world certainly 
will not result in China depending on a single nation or a group of 
nations. The task facing China is to achieve the integration of eclectic 
foreign experiences on Chinese soil and to assure greater benefits for the 
Chinese education system rather than to concern itself as to whether it 
is being culturally colonised. 
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1.3.2 Why HMI? 
Having agreed that borrowing is not dangerous but desirable for 
China, one needs to identify the experience from which it is worth 
learning. At this stage, it is important to be clear that the aim of this 
study is not to find a best model for the Chinese inspectorate, indeed, 
there is not one. Instead, it chooses one system in order to discover what 
can be learned and how it can be learned. Of course, some models might 
be more relevant to the Chinese situation than others because they have 
more in common. But no model is totally relevant and transferable to the 
Chinese setting. Thus, the feasibility of using any model would vary 
between zero and one hundred percent. In other words, there will 
always be something that can be learned. Since this study is carried out 
in England, the English educational inspection system naturally become 
the first consideration because of the better availability of information 
and the feasibility of field work. But equally there will always be some 
aspects of any system which can be improved even in their own 
environment and others which are inapplicable in a foreign country. 
One might ask "why choose HMI instead of local education authority 
advisory services as they both are English systems?" It will be perfectly 
legitimate to pick up LEA advisory services and study their possible 
applications to China. Regrettably, because of the limited time and 
resources, the author has to leave out the LEA advisory services and 
concentrate on HMI. But this is certainly an interesting area for further 
research. In addition, because HMI and the local advisory services are 
legally and organisationally separate systems, leaving out LEA advisory 
services will have little effect on the analysis of HMI practice. 
Nevertheless, because it is an important part of the quality control 
19 
Chapter 1: Background 
system in England, LEA advisory services, especially their relationship 
with HMI, will be briefly discussed in the following chapters. 
1.3.3 How Much Can the Chinese Inspectorate Learn from HMI? 
How far one system can assimilate the experience of the other 
depends partly on the degree of similarity between these two systems. 
Here, the system not only refers to the direct objects of the comparison, 
but the indirect factors that affect the two direct objects. In the case of the 
inspection systems, the differences outside the inspectorates matter as 
much as those inside, probably even more. It is believed by the author 
that the role of an inspectorate is directly determined by the educational 
system especially the educational administration system that surrounds 
it. It is also influenced by the political and economic conditions which 
determine the education system though less directly. 
Obviously, the amount that the Chinese inspectorate can learn from 
HMI cannot be expressed in a simple quantitative way. On the whole, 
because of the differences both inside and outside the two inspection 
systems, which will be revealed in the following chapters and be 
particularly discussed in Chapter Seven, the feasibility of using HMI as 
a model for China is limited. But one cannot deny that there is some 
applicable experience, modification of which would be very helpful in 
improving the Chinese inspectorate. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
RESEARCH METHODS 
The thesis examines the functions and the structure of the recently 
restored Chinese inspection system, and proposes practical suggestions 
for its future development, using the experience of HMI in dealing with 
similar issues for references. 
After the Introduction which analyses the background of the study, 
and questions the degree of feasibility of using HMI as a model, the 
thesis turns directly to HM Inspectorate. It looks into HMI's functions 
and the ways of discharging these functions, its relationships with 
various educational partners, and its organisational structure in 
historical as well as contemporary administrative perspectives. This 
examination is designed not only to draw HMI's experience, but also to 
obtain a better understanding of the educational and administrative 
context which has a decisive influence on the system of HMI. 
A scrutiny of the above mentioned aspects in the Chinese context is 
then conducted. After the examination, several shortcomings and 
issues in the present Chinese inspection system are identified. 
Before embarking on making suggestions to help improve these 
shortcomings, a lengthy analysis is carried out to decide the extent to 
which, and the ways in which the Chinese inspectorate can learn from 
HMI, by finding out the differences and similarities between the two 
inspection systems as well as between the two educational 
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administration systems, and other major factors. 
The final part of the thesis puts forward practical proposals for the 
future development of the Chinese inspectorate, based on the 
examination of relevant HMI experience. 
This thesis has three features. First, it is contextual. It takes into 
account the different social factors in the two countries: the political and 
economic conditions, and the educational administration systems, 
which have a significant influence on the two inspection systems. 
Second, it is practical. As a comparative study, it is not only concerned 
with understanding and explaining the dissimilar factors which shape 
the profiles of the inspectorates in both countries, but also designed to 
provide practical help to the Chinese administrators and inspectors to 
improve their work in the process of establishing and perfecting their 
inspection system. Finally, it uses triangulation. Triangulation is 
defined by Cohen and Manion as the use of two or more methods of data 
collection in the study of some aspect of human behaviour (1980, p254). 
They argue that single observation provides only a limited view of the 
complexity of human behaviour and of situations in which human 
beings interact. In other words, exclusive reliance on one method may 
bias or distort the researcher's picture of the particular slice of reality he 
is investigating. Therefore, when he employs different methods of data 
collection and they yield substantially same results, the researcher can 
have confidence in his results. Among various types of triangulation, 
the author adopted "methodological triangulation" to check validity of 
data, i.e., used different methods on the same object of study. Other types 
were obviously unsuitable such as the "time triangulation" which 
utilised longitudinal designs and the "investigator triangulation" which 
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involved more than one investigator. When deciding what methods 
should be used in this thesis, the following aspects were taken into 
account: (1), in order to fully understand the contemporary HMI system, 
one must consider its development as a historical process and trace its 
relationship with other social conditions and educational factors; (2), 
since the focus of study is the contemporary inspection systems, 
documents and other written material are essential sources of data; (3), 
since official claims sometimes do not necessarily match factual 
practice, the views of inspectors in the field, school teachers and 
administrators have to be explored. Because of the necessity of the 
information mentioned above, the author employed historical method, 
documentary method, survey and observation in her thesis. 
2.1 Historical and Documentary Method 
Cohen and Manion define the historical method as "the systematic 
and objective location, evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order to 
establish facts and conclusions about past events."(Cohen and Manion, 
1980, p31). 
While using the historical method, the emphasis of this study was 
not confined to a description and discussion of the history of the 
inspectorates (mainly the HMI system, since the one of China has only 
recently been restored). On the contrary, the interest lay in showing how 
the contemporary inspection systems had come about, and further, how 
the functions of the inspectorates and the ways of performing them were 
changed as a result of the changing circumstances surrounding them. 
It is believed by the author that a review of the growth of HM 
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Inspectorate and associated factors could help people, especially the 
author who is an overseas student with little knowledge of English 
history and English education history, not only to understand the 
current practice and issues, but also to predict future trends. 
Emphasis was put upon the development of HM Inspectorate between 
1944 and 1988. The changes before 1944 had comparatively less influence 
on the contemporary system. In addition, considering the difficulties in 
analysing constantly changing situations in the present educational 
system and the new but unstabilised relationships among various 
educational partners (as a result of the 1988 ERA), and the difficulties in 
examining HMI's changing practice, the author decided that the 
examination of HMI's functions and organisation should be focused on 
the system as it was before rather than after 1988. Nevertheless, 
although there are some changes in what the inspectors are specifically 
doing, the functions and organisations have not been altered much. 
Therefore, most of the discussion about HMI's practice around 1988 is 
still true today. 
As to the sources of historical research, various categories have been 
identified by researchers. Cohen and Manion, for example, divided 
sources into two parts: primary source including relics and those items 
that have had a direct physical relationship with the events happened, 
such as written and oral testimony and actual participants; and 
secondary source which is obtained from other persons or sources 
(Cohen and Manion; 1980, p38). Borg and Gall group sources into four 
parts: documents, quantitative records, oral records, and relics (Borg 
and Gall, 1983, p807). Within the document group, researchers further 
classify them, from different viewpoints, into those for personal use and 
24 
Chapter 2: Research Methods 
those for nonpersonal use. (Bailey, 1982, p303); deliberate (intended to 
keep records) and inadvertent (not-intended). (Fox, 1969, p412). 
As far as this research is concerned, among various historical 
sources, the main effort was devoted to documentary analysis due to 
limited time and resources. In fact, documentary analysis was the most 
important tool in the historical search in this study. The relics or oral 
records were relatively unimportant though they might have some 
value. Hence, the documents which the author dealt with belonged to 
two categories: those primary documentary sources such as inspectors' 
testimonies and biographies, minutes of committee meetings, 
government documents, inspectorate publications and reports; and 
those secondary documentary sources such as printed books, journals, 
dissertations, and newspapers. Moreover, other methods like 
interviewing former inspectors or inspectors with long commitment to 
the career were also employed to enrich the data. 
The documentary method not only had significant meaning in 
exploring history, but also played an indispensable role in the discussion 
of present issues. So the documents mentioned above, especially those 
government papers, inspectorate's reports, books and journals were still 
very important in the examination of the present practice. However, the 
documentary method could not retain its monopolistic position in the 
discussion of the present system as it had in the historical search. As 
current data were more accessible, other methods were also employed to 
collect more comprehensive and more in depth data. 
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2.2 Observation Method 
The observation research method is generally viewed as a technique 
of collecting information by watching and listening. 
This method has been used in the present study for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the search for documentary material had shown that 
secondary sources describing and analysing the work of the 
inspectorates were, to some extent, rather limited and fragmentary. 
This was especially true in the Chinese case because the inspection 
system had only recently been restored. As a supplement to the 
limitations of the documentary method, observation provided a 
first-hand and more detailed picture of the work of the inspectorates. 
Observing the inspections carried out by inspectors in England and in 
China helped the author to discover many aspects of their work. For 
example, how the inspectors organised their inspections, the attitudes of 
the teachers and the inspectors, inspection procedures and time 
allocation among various procedures --- aspects not contained in the 
documents. 
Secondly, observation in this study was also used to check the validity 
and reliability of documentary materials. On one hand, it helped to 
obtain a deeper understanding of what had been said in the documents, 
on the other hand, it could help point out those aspects that had proved to 
be unreal and provide the basis to replace them by firsthand data. 
Thirdly, with the help of observation, the author, a newcomer to 
research with no previous experience of being an inspector or a teacher, 
would be able to familiarise herself with inspection practice, which 
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further helped in the interpretation of other sources of information. 
Finally, related to the third reason, observation study served as a 
preparation for formulating appropriate questions in the surveys. 
Most researchers divide observation into two types: 
participant-observation and non-participant-observation (Bailey, 
1982,p248; Forcese and Richer, 1973, p143; Cohen and Manion, 1980, 
p99). But two researchers made interesting classifications. Bailey 
assumes two lines of continuum according to the degree of structure in 
the environment (natural or artificial), and the degree of the structure 
imposed on the setting by the researcher (structured or unstructured). 
Combining these two continuums gives four types of observation design: 
completely unstructured field study, unstructured laboratory analysis, 
structured field study, and completely structured laboratory observation. 
(Bailey, 1982, p250). In contrast to Bailey who is concerned with the 
environment and the form of observation, Borg makes the division based 
on the content that the observer records. He distinguishes three types of 
observational variable: descriptive (content recorded is factual and 
requires little inference to be made by the observer); inferential (content 
needs the observer's inference such as the number of people showing 
self-confidence); and evaluative (needs an evaluative judgment before 
recording, for instance, good answer or not). (Borg,1983, p468). 
Based on three variables mentioned above, (participant or 
nonparticipant observation; natural or artificial setting and structured 
or nonstructured design; and content variables), the author determined 
the type of observation that she wanted to conduct in this study. Firstly, 
because of the author's age, nationality, experience, and limited 
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research time, it did not seem possible to undertake participant 
observation. In practice, if the non-participant observation were 
designed carefully, similar results could be obtained. In other words, 
nonparticipant observation was considered to be more suitable and 
flexible for this study. Secondly, the observation setting must be as 
natural as possible since the aim of observation was to get a real view of 
actual behaviour during an inspection. Any possible reactions of the 
observed objects (teachers, inspectors) caused by the presence of the 
observer should be minimised. Thirdly, since what the author was 
looking for were actual facts about the various events and relationships 
during the inspection, the records most needed were those of description 
and inference. Finally, the structure of observation was neither 
completely structured as the author was not familiar with the 
observation setting, nor totally unstructured because some guidelines 
had to be prepared for the purpose of later analysis. To conclude, the 
author played the role of an outside observer in a natural inspection 
environment with a semistructured observation design. The main 
aspects observed included the procedure of an inspection, the inspectors' 
activities in the schools, the frequency and coverage of teachers met and 
the criteria for judging educational quality and so on. 
2.3 Survey Method 
Survey methods are useful for gathering verbal answers from the 
people being investigated. Interview and questionnaire are two main 
tools. 
Survey techniques have some advantages in collecting data about 
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people's expectations, opinions, attitudes, knowledge and other 
subjective orientations. The use of the survey methods in this study was 
mainly designed to obtain an evaluation of the work of the Chinese 
inspectorate in the eyes of administrators, teachers and inspectors 
themselves, as a supplement to the data from printed materials. 
Secondly, it was considered to be helpful to know the expectations of 
administrators and teachers and improve the inspection work in those 
directions. Since the purpose of this study is to improve inspection 
system in China, a large proportion of the field work was aimed at the 
Chinese inspectorate, and, of course, conducted in China. 
2.3.1 Interview 
Interview was adopted as a research method in this study for the 
following reasons: 
First, merely using documents to examine the functions of the 
inspectorates is likely to miss some important details. Interviews with 
inspectors to obtain knowledge and information about their work greatly 
enriched the overall data. 
Second, semi-structured interviews with the administrators and 
school teachers were the best tools among all research methods for 
collecting a wide range of ideas, expectations, and opinions in depth. 
During the interviews, the researcher would be able to explore 
intensively and ask questions exhaustively. 
Third, the major advantage of interview is its adaptability. Compared 
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with questionnaire, interview can get immediate feedback from the 
respondent. Based on this, the interviewer can probe for clarification of 
the response, ask new questions that emerged during the talk, and get a 
thorough and in-depth exploration of the topic. 
There are numerous ways of classifying types of interview. The most 
popular one, from the interviewer's standpoint, is represented by 
Phillips (1971). In his book, Phillips suggested three categories of 
interview: the standardised interview, the unstandardised interview, 
and the semistandardised interview. In the standardised interview, the 
interviewer is held to the specific words in the interview questions 
schedule. He is not free to adapt his question to the specific situation. In 
the unstandardised interview, the interviewer is free to develop each 
situation in whatever way he deems most appropriate for the purpose at 
hand. In the semistandardised interview, the interviewer may have to 
ask a number of specific major questions, but he may be free to probe 
beyond the answer to these questions. (Phillips, 1971, p128). Other 
authors have made similar classifications although slight differences 
exist. (Forcese, 1973, p169; Gorden, 1975, p60-61). 
In this study, data was needed to fill in some missing details of the 
work of the inspectorates, and to assess the attitudes of teachers and 
administrators towards the work of the Chinese inspectorate. Because it 
was important to be able to summarise and compare the responses, the 
interviews in this study composed the elements of both standardised 
interviews and semistandardised interviews. That is to say, most of the 
interviews comprised specific and fixed questions, but there was still 
some room for probing details and deeper ideas. 
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2.3.2 Questionnaire 
The main advantage of the questionnaire over the interview is that it 
enables responses to be generalised to an extent that cannot be achieved 
with a limited number of interviews. Considering that the expectations 
and attitudes of both school heads and administrators obtained from 
interviews and documents should be as representative as possible, the 
questionnaire method was adopted as a complementary tool to the 
interview. In addition to the advantage of economy, the questionnaire 
"provides a type of anonymity not provided by the interview" (Gorden, 
1975, p77). Some opinions about the work of the inspectorate which could 
not be expressed in the interviews for various reasons would be more 
likely to appear in response to the written questionnaire. 
The purpose of adopting the questionnaire was to find out and 
generalise the evaluations of the work of the Chinese inspectorate and 
suggestions for improvement, as little has been studied and published 
on these topics. Morevore, questionnaires made it easier to compare the 
differences and similarities between different evaluations by teachers, 
administrators, and inspectors in China. 
As to the method of selecting samples, the principle was to use a 
combination of cluster and stratified sampling. According to Bailey, 
stratified sampling is "separating the population elements into 
non-overlapping groups, called strata, and then selecting a simple 
random sample from within each stratum --- " (Bailey, 1982, p95). 
Cluster sampling is defined as"a simple random sample in which each 
sampling unit is a collection, or cluster, of elements."(Bailey, 1982, p96). 
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Applying this rule, the author chose the samples according to the 
following procedures: first, the whole country was stratified into two 
groups: urban and rural, thus each group was a cluster of urban 
regions or rural regions. Then, chose several units (several urban cities 
and several rural counties) from each cluster. Finally, each unit was 
stratified again by different subjects (teachers, administrators, 
inspectors). 
The questionnaires were designed for three groups of people: school 
head teachers, administrators and inspectors. Each group contained 110 
samples selected from 10 provinces. The response rates were 70%, 47% 
and 69% respectively. The detailed report of the field work is in Chapter 
Six and in the appendix. 
2.4 Summary 
The research methods employed in this study were historical and 
documentary methods, observation and survey. Each of them was 
particularly helpful in obtaining one particular set of data. A 
combination of them collected all the necessary information needed to 
conduct this study. 
As to historical and documentary methods, the author studied most 
of the literature related to both HMI history and its contemporary 
practice. In addition, substantial amount of literature about educational 
administration system, and a fair amount of literature about public 
education in England was reviewed. Apart from academic 
contributions, government publications, e.g., DES publications, various 
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committee reports, HMI publications and many inspection reports were 
paid special attention. With regard to the Chinese part, almost all the 
published materials were diagnosed. A large number of unpublished 
documents such as SEdC's regulations of inspection work, job 
descriptions of inspectors in several inspectorates, inspection reports, 
reviews of inspectorate's work, governmental circulars (SEdC's and 
some local government's), lists of evaluation criteria used by various 
levels of inspectorates, and inspector training programmes, are all 
collected and thoroughly reviewed. Therefore, historical and 
documentary methods, particularly the latter one, were extensively 
employed in this study. 
Considering the relatively less important position of observation 
method in the whole study, the author conducted seven observations. 
Two were observations on HMI full inspections which each lasted one 
week. One was an observation on Chinese aspect inspection which 
lasted two days. Others were observations on school visits carried out by 
Chinese inspectors, HM Inspectors and English LEA advisers. 
Special attention has been paid to interviews and questionnaires. 33 
interviews were conducted of which 10 were done in England and 23 
were in China. The interviewees included HMI (SCI, CI, SI, and HMI), 
school head teachers and LEA advisers. In China, interviews were 
carried out with inspectors at all levels, some administrators and school 
head teachers. 
Finally, as mentioned above, three questionnaires were sent out for 
three groups of people: inspectors, administrators and school heads (in 
China) to collect their evaluations of the work of the Chinese 
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inspectorate and their expectations. The response rates were 
satisfactory. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF HER MAJESTY'S 
INSPECTORATE OF SCHOOLS  
An inspection system is usually a product of the educational 
administration system within which it is embedded. The feasibility of 
using HMI as a model depends on the similarities and the differences 
between not only the two inspection systems, but also the two educational 
administration systems. In order to obtain a better understanding of the 
HMI system, this chapter is designed to trace briefly the process of the 
growth of HMI, to examine the changes in functions and methods 
which have taken place during its development, in particular, the 
factors that caused such changes. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate, a national body set up in 1839 to check 
the usage of central government grant, has gone through one hundred 
and fifty years' of vicissitudes. Although its tasks today are in some 
ways similar to those at its birth, there is a difference in priorities 
accorded to these tasks. The methods of working have also changed 
significantly. Both internal and external changes in the educational 
system such as philosophical changes, ideological evolution, 
educational administrative reallocation and the growing complexity of 
education, have had an enormous impact on the system of HMI. It has 
had to constantly redefine its functions and adjust its organisational 
structures. 
Because the Inspectorate has been developing alongside the 
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increasing state involvement in education, a brief account of the growth 
of the state school system (particularly the primary and secondary 
sectors) and the evolution of the educational administrative framework 
provides a background against which the development of HM 
Inspectorate can be better understood. 
3.1 A Brief Account of the English Primary and Secondary 
Education 
English primary and secondary education was not a continuous 
process in the past. Instead, they were separate systems and tended to 
cater for children of different social classes. Central government was 
not involved in financing education until 1833. Before that year, 
elementary education was dominated by industrial organisations and 
the Churches. The former ran schools for the purpose of giving children 
the basic knowledge and skill to cope with work and the latter were 
inspired by the belief that education was a plan for the "salvation of 
souls" (Morrish, 1970, p3). Secondary schools existed in the form of 
endowed or private grammar schools which, with some exceptions, only 
the children of wealthy families could afford to attend. Since the 1810s, 
central government became increasingly interested in educational 
affairs as a result of the acceleration of industrial development and the 
franchise reform. In 1833, Parliament gave a grant of £20,000 towards 
elementary school buildings. In 1839, the Committee of Privy Council for 
Education was set up to administer the increasing government grant. 
But till the 1870 Act, central government was content to offer grants to 
voluntary elementary schools instead of setting up schools owned by the 
state itself. In 1870, the Forster Act was passed in order to meet the 
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demand for popular elementary education. Though it failed to make 
elementary education either compulsory or free, it did make them 
possible by creating the School Boards at local level which set up 
elementary schools to fill in the gaps which the voluntary organisations 
could not cover. This was the beginning of a state system of schools. The 
secondary schools, pathways to higher education, were still open mainly 
to rich people. However, the agencies administering secondary 
education were many and sometimes they conflicted with each other. In 
addition, although the School Boards had no right to administer 
secondary education, they virtually did so as they created higher 
elementary schools or added higher classes to the normal elementary 
classes to accommodate pupils who wished to stay on after compulsory 
schooling. This led to a conflict for responsibility for secondary education 
between the School Board and other relevant agencies. Through a series 
of Acts at the turn of this century, the Board of Education at central level 
was empowered as a sole authority to supervise educational affairs 
nationally. Moreover, Local Education Authorities were created at the 
local level to be in charge of the primary as well as secondary schools in 
their areas. Therefore, the basic framework of partnership in 
educational administration was established at the beginning of this 
century. 
A considerable number of secondary schools were set up as a 
consequence of the 1902 Education Act. They followed the pattern of 
grammar schools which focused on classical subjects and allowed less 
room for science and modern technology. Meanwhile, most poor 
children were still excluded by entrance examination because there 
were not sufficient free places. They could only go to trade schools or 
technical schools to prepare for entering the labour market. Various 
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reports of different committees (Hadow Report, 1926; Spens Report,1938; 
and Norwood Report, 1943) strongly suggested that children should be 
transferred to the secondary schools which suited their abilities and 
interests. After 1944, grammar schools, technical schools and secondary 
modern schools were the three available types of secondary schools 
which the children went to based mainly on their 11+ examination 
results. The 1944 Butler Act terminated the separation of primary and 
secondary education by distinguishing three successive stages of 
education, namely, primary, secondary, and further. In addition, 
central government wielded greater responsibility and power to promote 
educational standards in the country. 
In the post-war years primary education has been in the position of 
"Cinderella" (Evans, 1985, p126). It did not change much structurally 
except for the fact that education has been receiving more attention than 
before. 
But secondary education underwent radical reforms. As the 1944 Act 
failed to eliminate the influence of social class on education, students of 
the three types of secondary schools were stamped with the brands of 
class. The 11+ examination became a competitive and bitter experience. 
In 1965, the Labour Party issued circular 10/65 and launched a radical 
movement for comprehensive schools which took all kinds of pupils in 
one school. Its aim was to break down the existing class distinctions and 
bring about "Secondary Education for All". Having experienced several 
political contentions, the comprehensive schools nowadays make up the 
majority of state schools while the number of grammar and modern 
schools has dropped dramatically. 
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Between the early 1970s and the late 1980s, the English education 
system suffered greatly from falling rolls and consequent outcomes. The 
reorganisation of schools and redeployment of teachers have brought 
about enormous pressure on central government, local education 
authorities, and teachers. Since the '70s, central government has been 
gaining greater power. The 1988 Education Reform Act introduced the 
national curriculum and financial delegation, bringing about some 
significant changes in the current English education. 
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HM Inspectorate, created in 1839, at about the same time as the first 
state educational authority -- the Committee of Privy Council for 
Education, has gone through all the changes mentioned above. It was 
those changes that produced today's HMI. 
There is a substantial amount of literature on the system of HMI 
ranging from historical review ( Lawton and Gordon, 1987; Rhodes, 
1981; Edmonds, 1962) to examination of the contemporary role of HMI 
(Browne, 1979; DES, 1979; Lawton, 1988). From role analysis (Lawton, 
1988; DES, 1983a) to descriptions of organisational structure and 
methods. (Pearce 1986; DES, 1970). Some of the literature makes a study 
of HMI against the overall context of educational system, some devotes 
itself entirely to describing or analysing the HMI system. 
All studies dealing specially with the history of HMI have divided the 
process of HMI's development into several periods. For instance, Rhodes 
distinguishes three periods: the 19th century, 1902 to 1944, and 1944 
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onwards; Lawton and Gordon mention five phases that HMI has gone 
through, but they still divide the history into two parts: the first 100 years 
of HMI and HMI since the Second World War; The Board of Education, 
when reviewing the growth of HMI up until 1922, analysed the role of 
HMI in three periods: 1839-1862, 1862-1902 and 1902 -1922. Most of the 
other literature in this area refers broadly to the evolution of HMI 
without dividing it into specific periods (Mann, 1979; Pearce, 1986). 
This study focuses on a review of the various functions performed by 
HMI and their priorities since its establishment. Therefore, the division 
of periods must depend on the changes of functions and changes of the 
central government's power and responsibilities. Keeping these criteria 
in mind, the past of HM Inspectorate can be broadly divided into the 
following five periods, namely: (1). the period of initiation (1839 - 1861); 
(2).the period of tension (1862-1902); (3). the period of shaping (1902-1944); 
(4).the period of frustration (1944-1968); and (5). the period of 
revitalisation (1969-1988). 
3.2.1 The Period of Initiation 1839-1861 
The acceleration of the industrial revolution and unprecedented 
population growth made it necessary for a younger generation to be both 
disciplined and literate. The voluntary organisations which 
monopolised educational service were no longer able to meet this 
requirement. With the purpose of assisting education, central 
government agreed, for the first time in the English history, to supply a 
sum of not exceeding £20,000 in aid of private subscriptions for the 
children of the poor classes in Great Britain. The force of the Church 
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was so strong and the ideology of non-intervention of government in 
education was so deeply rooted at that time that the grants provided in 
the first six years were used by the schools without being checked and 
justified. It was given through the Treasury on the recommendations of 
the then National Society and the British and Foreign School Society. But 
along with the annual increase in the grants, (from £20,00 in 1833 to 
£30,000 in 1839), central government felt it necessary to create an 
effective agency for grant administration in order to justify this 
expenditure. By an order of the Queen in Council, the Committee of the 
Privy Council for Education was set up in 1839 and at the end of that 
year, after bitter arguments, two inspectors were appointed to inspect 
grant-aided schools. 
The Privy Council used the inspectors as a means of checking and 
controlling the usage of grants because it believed that if the state spent 
money, it had the right to see that it was spent in a manner of which it 
approved. 
It was because of this that inspectors began to visit schools and 
observe their merits and demerits. Meanwhile, the Privy Council made 
other demands on the inspectors. They were asked to provide 
information on the state of education to the central authority in order to 
enable it to decide further grants offered and the level of intervention 
needed. In order to fulfil this function, inspectors contacted grant-aided 
schools and wrote reports on individual schools and on particular 
districts. In 1840 the instruction to inspectors divided the responsibilities 
of the inspectors into three parts: (1), enquiring into applications for 
grants; (2), inspecting schools aided by grants; (3), enquiring into the 
general conditions of elementary education in particular 
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schools.(Instruction to Inspectors of Schools, 1840). 
Although voluntary organisations had no alternative but to accept 
grants, they were very strongly against government intervention since 
they had monopolised education for so many years. Therefore, on one 
hand, they expected the inspectors not to interfere in their work (Lawton 
and Gordon, 1987, p9; Rhodes, 1981, p97), so they preferred inspectors to 
offer advice and suggestions which were not strictly enforceable but 
were free to be adopted. On the other hand, they had to treat inspectors 
seriously as the recommendations of the inspectors weighed quite 
heavily in deciding grant allocation. 
This conflict of ideology about whether the state should be involved in 
educational service and whether schools must be inspected did not put 
inspectors into a very difficult position. Because the influence and power 
of two parts was so imbalanced at that time, the central authority, which 
had neither great ambition nor actual strength of control, limited its 
action within the right derived from offering grant. The appointment of 
inspectors had to be approved by the Archbishops, "without their 
concurrence, we should recommend no person to your Majesty for such 
appointment" (Order in Council, 1840). One copy of the inspection report 
had to be sent to the Archbishop of the province. The inspectors 
organised their work on the basis of sectarian types of schools --- Church 
of England, Non-conformist and Roman Catholic. Inspectors were 
clergymen who were viewed not as expert professionals but as "gifted 
amateurs" (Lawton and Gordon, 1987, p102) who were well educated 
with good character and reputation, which partly explains the fact that 
their inspection reports were more concerned with social conditions 
than with the state of education of a school. All these features which 
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have now disappeared reflected the compromise of the central 
authorities. The most representative evidence was the Minutes of the 
Committee of Council on Education which asked the inspectors to bear 
in mind that inspection "is not intended as a means of exercising 
control, ---, It is not to be regarded as operating for the restraint of local 
effort but for their encouragement.----" (Instruction to Inspectors of 
Schools, 1840). Nevertheless, central government did hold the right to 
issue grant on the condition of inspection, which was a powerful 
influence on the schools. 
In 1846, as a result of the new teacher training apprenticeship 
system, the Committee of Council introduced a new task for inspectors 
--- to inspect the quality of teacher training. HMIs were expected to select 
suitable teachers to train apprentices, and every year they examined the 
pupil teachers in their subjects and observed them teaching a class. 
Based on their inspection reports and other criteria, grants would be 
paid to the apprentices and the instructing teachers. Here, the 
inspectors not only influenced the provision of grants to schools but also 
the grants to participants of the apprenticeship system. But this was 
only work expansion, the role remained the same. 
To conclude, 'the role of inspectors in the early days has to be viewed 
against the background of government intervention in education" 
(Rhodes, 1981, p97). Because the only means of state intervention was the 
provision of grants, the inspectors were concerned primarily with 
inspecting and checking the usage of public funds, and reporting to 
central government about the state of education in a particular school or 
area to enable it to justify this expenditure and to decide further grants. 
The "financial watchdog" and "ears and eyes of central authorities" 
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termed by contemporary scholars aptly describe the role they played. At 
the same time, when the inspectors went around schools, they acted as 
the liaison between the central authority and grant-aided schools. In 
addition, because the central authority was only in a position of offering 
assistance, the inspectors had no right to question or criticise the work 
of schools and teachers, but only to offer encouragement and advisory 
suggestions. 
The organisation of the inspectorate at that time was simple 
(non-hierarchical) and the channel of communication between the 
central authorities and schools was quite primitive. The inspectors 
worked mainly by visiting schools and writing reports. They dealt 
directly with individual schools and teachers, their scope was confined 
to elementary education since the Committee of Privy Council for 
Education was set up only for the purpose of assisting affairs in the 
elementary education sector. 
3.2.2 The Period of Tension 1862-1902 
The rapid growth of elementary education increased government 
expenditure from £30,000 in 1839 to £80,000 in 1861. Both the economic 
retrenchment following the Crimean War and the serious problems in 
grant-aided schools accelerated central government's determination to 
make education cheaper and more efficient. In 1862, the Revised Code 
was introduced based on the recommendations of the Newcastle 
Commission. It was stipulated in the Code that one third of the grant 
should be paid on the basis of pupil attendance and two-thirds on the 
performance of each pupil in the annual examination in three subjects-- 
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reading, writing, and arithmetic. "If it is not cheap, it shall be efficient, 
if it is not efficient, it shall be cheap" remarked Robert Lowe, the then 
head of the Department of Education. 
The Revised Code did contribute to a considerable increase in the 
school population and more frequent pupil attendance, and ensured a 
minimum level of attainment for all pupils. More significantly, it 
increased the power of central government as against the Church. 
However, scholars observed that by using economic laws and 
competition to operate education, the Revised Code narrowed 
curriculum and strangled school innovation. (Edmonds, 1962, p79; 
Lawson and Silver, 1973, p293). It also put great pressure on pupils and 
teachers. 
HM Inspectors played a key role in the implementation of the Revised 
Code. In the instructions to HMIs issued by the then Department of 
Education, inspectors were entrusted with the task of examining 
registers and conducting the annual examinations. There was no other 
period in which the functions of the inspectors were so precise and 
definite. "It became the instrument of central government control, and 
primary control over the way in which money was spent" . (Rhodes, 
1981, p113). Conducting examinations and reporting results to the 
central authorities as the basis of offering grants obviously became the 
primary function of HMI in that period. 
The consequence of HMI becoming the conductor of rigid 
examinations was that its role in that period was totally reversed. The 
inspectors had to devote most of their time on these tasks. Although the 
practice of normal open-minded inspection and reporting continued 
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(Browne, 1979, p37), it only constituted a small proportion of their work. 
Another more serious consequence was that, instead of being friends 
offering sympathetic advice and encouragement to teachers and 
managers about school building, teaching methods, learning conditions 
and so on, which they did before 1862, HM Inspectors became powerful 
persons who could determine the fate of schools and could make 
"children tremble at his name", (Edmonds, 1962, p114). Teachers 
distrusted and hated inspectors because their reports would determine 
their reputations and salaries. Managers also hated and feared 
inspectors because the grants were so important to the schools. 
Furthermore, teaching and learning in school narrowed down to the 3R 
subjects, other things like experiment with new methods, curriculum 
innovation and improvement of school facilities had to be neglected. 
The establishment of the School Board after the 1870 Act created a 
corps of local advisers whose role was oriented to advice and help. They 
showed their sympathy for teachers and their love for children. They 
had practical knowledge which could be shared with teachers and they 
were more flexible in their approaches. This intensified the teachers' 
dislike of HMI. The National Union of Teachers, in its memorandum 
submitted to the Bryce Committee in 1894, stated clearly that "Whilst the 
work of inspectors appointed by School Boards has been generally 
helpful to the teachers, the work of many of the inspectors appointed by 
the Education Department has, to a very serious extent, been harmful to 
the schools." (Bryce Report, 1895, Vol.5, p328). 
From 1870, the workload of the Inspectorate increased due to the 
development of elementary education. Inspectors were given the more 
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important task of inspecting schools and had to leave detailed 
examinations to their assistants. 
In the Code of 1882, the government realised that it was not wise to 
define education in terms of the 3Rs. School management, classroom 
discipline and quality of other subjects apart from the 3Rs were of equal 
importance. Merit Grants were introduced, and inspectors were given 
the task of examining the general work of schools to decide the merit 
grant a school could receive. 
In the period 1862-1902, the role of HM Inspectorate was distorted by 
the Revised Code. Compared with the functions it performed in the first 
period: checking usage of grants and offering advisory suggestions, 
HMI was now performing a more powerful controlling function: 
carrying out examinations and informing the central authorities to 
issue grants. It acted not only as the watchdog but also the instrument of 
the central authorities. This change of function was in line with the 
change of power of central government. Since its first involvement in 
1833, central government had been playing a more and more active role 
in educational service. Especially after the 1870 Act which ended the 
concord with the Churches, the central government's influence and 
strength was greatly increased. 
After 1870, the inspectorate was reorganised according to districts 
rather than types of church schools. Inspectors were responsible for 
both church and state schools within their districts which by law (1870 
Act) should "open at all time to the inspection of any of Her Majesty's 
Inspectors". In 1871, eight senior inspectors were appointed to take 
charge of divisions each consisting of 8-10 districts. The title finally 
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changed into Divisional Inspector in 1903. Meanwhile, the post of 
assistant inspectors was created to help with the conducting of 
examinations. In a word, the hierarchical structure of the organisation 
was forming, but the methods of work were still quite simple. 
3.2.3 The Period of Shaping 1902-1944 
In 1895, the system of "Payment by Results" finally disintegrated as a 
result of the rising influence of progressivism and the rapid increase in 
the school population which could not be matched by a corresponding 
increase in the number of inspectors. Inevitably the inspectorate had to 
modify and even to discard some previous functions. In addition, several 
great changes took place at the turn of the century. All these forced the 
inspectorate to think seriously of new roles in order to survive in a 
changing world. 
First of all, the abandoning of the Revised Code meant the 
elimination of the main duty of the inspectors --- examination of 
individual pupils. What remained was the visit which varied from 
district to district and which had no definite procedures and standard 
modes. The inspectors realised that effective inspection could be better 
attained by persuasion and influence rather than control and 
inquisition. Faced with the new circumstances, HM inspectors felt the 
need for new functions. 
Secondly, the Board of Education was set up after the 1899 Act by 
merging the Education, Science and Art Department and the Charity 
Commission. The new body was authorised as a single legitimate 
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government entity to run education -- not only elementary education but 
also all forms of education including, of course, secondary education. 
In addition, as a result of the 1902 Act, secondary education developed 
rapidly. Hence, the inspectorate faced the challenge of broadening its 
work sphere and finding different ways to inspect secondary schools. 
The third change was the realignment of the administrative system 
through which the Local Education Authorities replaced various local 
organisations and were given direct responsibility and great discretion 
to administer the education service. The power of the Board of Education 
was limited to coordinating and superintending the work of local 
governments, especially in fields other than elementary education. The 
creation of LEAs also indicated the birth of a powerful partner in the 
educational service. The administrative structure emerged at that time 
has been the basic framework till now. The existence of LEAs had an 
important effect on the work of the inspectorate. As a part of the Board of 
Education, HM Inspectorate was obliged to look for new ways to adapt to 
a changed administrative structure and the new distribution of 
responsibilities. In addition, the local inspectorates began to develop 
which became one of the causes of HMI's role changing in the late 
1960s. 
The last change was the pedagogic revolution. Since the 1870 Act, 
education began to be viewed as "a vital element in the development of 
social policy. Education was now of more importance than the army or 
navy because it affects the physical, intellectual and moral progress of 
the people". (Lawson and Silver, 1973, p323). Worldwide interest in 
children's development was reflected in the work of the pioneers of 
progressivism such as Froebel, Herbart, and Dewey. The new approach 
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which emphasised child-centred teaching and learning began to exert 
its influence on teachers and inspectors. The change of official attitude 
was shown in 1905 "Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers and 
Others Concerned in the Work of Public Elementary Schools" (three of 
the writers were inspectors). It argued that the acquisition of the 
knowledge should be in relation to the experience of the children. In 
1931, the Hadow Report stated clearly that "curriculum is ...to be 
thought of in terms of activity and experience, rather than knowledge to 
be acquired and facts to be stored". Influenced by the current of 
progressivism, some HMIs began to move towards the new ideas, 
though not all of them followed unanimously. 
In short, at the beginning of the century, significant changes both 
inside and outside the inspectorate led to HMI being faced with the 
urgent need to redefine its role and to modify correspondingly the 
methods of working. The outcome of its reform laid the foundations for 
the modern inspectorate. 
All the changes mentioned above resulted in important changes of 
direction. One was the shift from assessing pupil achievement to 
observing teaching and learning. The other was the shift of purpose of 
inspection from evaluating individual schools' work as a basis of 
offering grants to evaluating overall educational standards and 
ensuring value for money for the nation since the grant now was given 
to LEAs rather than individual schools. Another change of emphasis 
was that the duty of inspectors was no longer to test and assess teachers, 
in contrast, inspectors were expected to observe the methods pursued by 
the teacher, "any questioning that may be employed should be confined 
to the purpose of ascertaining how far these methods have been 
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successful" (Instruction to HMIs, 1898). 
Hence, the functions of the inspectors could be analysed as follows. 
Firstly, inherited from their predecessors, their primary duty still 
remained to see that public money was well spent, and that full value 
was obtained for it. Yet, the inspectorate was now more concerned with 
the overall quality of education rather than the limited academic 
achievement of pupils. Furthermore, as well as judging value for money 
for individual schools, the inspectorate tended to be more interested in 
efficiency on a national basis. 
Secondly, HM Inspectors were expected by central and local 
authorities to inform them of the state of education in the country or in 
particular LEAs. The speedy development of secondary education 
brought about substantial problems, such as the management of 
schools, the organisation of teaching and staffing, the provision of 
equipment and facilities and so on. There consequently was a need for 
the inspectors to go into schools, find out problems and inform central or 
local authorities in order to enable them to take actions. Since 
educational service was actually run by each LEA with the Board of 
Education in the position of coordination, central government also hoped 
to be informed not only of the state of education nationally but of the 
actual educational provision in each LEA. In this case, HMI was 
expected to be the liaison between the centre and the local authorities, 
which was a new role in the history of HMI. 
However, the Board of Education seemed to acknowledge that "there 
are, of course, definite positions on which the Board must be informed, 
but to deal with these is only a small part of the inspectors' duty." (Board 
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of Education, 1924, p20). Another notable aspect of their duties, as 
expected by central authorities and schools, was to suggest improvement 
and stimulate development by using their professional knowledge and 
experience and by making the school aware of good practice which had 
occurred in other educational establishment. (Board of Education, 1924, 
p19). The uncertainties surrounding the new pedagogic approach, 
innovation after the removal of the constraints imposed by "Payment by 
Results", and other difficulties derived from the rapid development of 
the education system, called for the inspectorate's advice and help. So 
that a large proportion of inspectors' work was devoted to visiting and 
inspecting schools on the basis of which they made reports and gave 
advice. 
Finally, there was a tendency to increase the administrative 
workload placed on inspectors especially on those who were directly 
dealing with LEAs as divisional and district inspectors. As the Board 
recognised, this administrative work was the outcome of the direct 
communication and correspondence between the LEAs and the 
inspectorate. 
Briefly, HM Inspectors performed many functions in this period. 
Firstly, they acted as a check on the public funds in order to ensure 
value for money on a national basis; secondly, they were the liaison 
between central authorities, local authorities and individual schools in 
terms of policy and practice; thirdly, they used their professional 
expertise to influence and encourage local innovation and practice. This 
was quite a change compared with the situation in 1839 -- the object, the 
purpose and the scope of their work were very different from those of 
before. Moreover, the priorities of the roles, as the Board of Education 
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Annual Report (1922-1923) implied, were also shifted towards the advice 
side. This might be due to the fact that the inspectors paid more 
attention to another component of their roles (i.e. advice) after the 
abandonment of the Revised Code and their corresponding control role. 
However, a more important cause, was the practical need to solve 
problems resulting from the rapid growth of education. One more 
reason could be that central government at that time had neither direct 
responsibility nor strong legal backing (compared with the Ministry of 
Education after 1944 Act) to regulate education, it only performed the 
function of coordination and encouragement. Limited by the activities of 
the Board, it was impossible for HMI to exercise control. Thus, in that 
period, information, advice, professional stimulation and 
encouragement, as well as spread of good practice became an 
indispensable agenda of the inspectorate. 
Relevant organisational adjustments had been made in order to 
adapt to the new tasks. First of all, the inspectorate was now divided into 
three branches corresponding to the three branches in the Board --
elementary, secondary, and technological. This meant that HMI's 
information and help could be classified and more direct according to 
different branches. In addition to this, through several modifications, 
England and Wales were divided into nine divisions each with a 
Divisional Inspector who acted as communicator in the two directions. 
On top of that, a Chief Inspector was appointed to oversee the whole 
inspectorate and to act as a senior professional adviser to the Board, as 
well as the organiser of his own division. Thus the information flow 
became more direct, accurate, quick and flexible. Another notable 
feature was that HM Inspectorate began to attach great importance to 
professional knowledge and teaching experience. The inspectorate 
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recruited more and more men and women who had some experience as 
teachers and also had a university degree. (Edmonds, 1962, p50), 
because the new circumstances required professional expertise, 
knowledge and experience to deal with curriculum, teaching methods 
and school management issues. Clergymen were no longer always the 
right men for this job. Finally, the invention of "full inspection" was 
regarded as something necessary in addition to the informal visit as it 
enabled inspectors to look into every aspect of school life. It was claimed 
to be an important basis on which the judgment of educational 
standards in the country could be made. The Board of Education made 
great efforts to ensure the three yearly visits to each school. This method 
was originally designed to inspect secondary schools when it became a 
new task of HMI, but it has spread to other sectors of education such as 
primary and further education. 
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3.2.4 The Period of Frustration 1944-1968 
During the Second World War, the 1944 Education Act was passed 
and it framed the post war English education system until 1988. 
Post-war education enjoyed a high priority and favour in the society at 
large, and every aspect of education was developed. Firstly, education 
was no longer a matter of philanthropy, it was regarded not only as a 
public welfare service, but also as a means of social control. "The belief 
that education is a prerequisite of politico-economic security is 
widespread and apolitical" (Midwinter, 1980, p33). In addition, having 
suffered from the wars, the whole nation was eager to invest resources 
to its children in order to build an advanced country to achieve collective 
survival. Apart from the function of social solidarity, education was also 
believed since the 1960s, to be a human capital investment which could 
gain return in faster economic development. The urgent need of 
manpower for advanced science and technology after the Second World 
War called for the rapid expansion of education. All this meant that 
post-war education enjoyed a high priority politically and publicly. 
The statutory base for the work of HM Inspectorate was section 77 of 
the 1944 Education Act which stipulated that it was the duty of the 
Secretary of State to cause inspection to be made of every educational 
establishment at appropriate intervals. In practice, its role became one 
of adviser. This phenomenon can be tentatively explained by three 
important factors: coalition among educational partners; higher 
professional status of teachers and the continuance of progressivism. 
Firstly, one distinctive feature after the 1944 Act was the formation of a 
political and administrative coalition among central government, local 
governments and teaching body. The social and economic problems left 
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over by two destructive wars created unity in the efforts of every partner 
in the educational network. Although the then Ministry of Education 
assumed the potential control power by the law, it did not use its power 
in the form of control. As Evans argues, "generally speaking, the 
Ministry of Education ...treat the LEAs and the teachers as real 
partners... and even took considerable notice of them". (Evans, 1985, 
p206-207). Education in England was a national system, locally 
administered. In a climate of cooperation and consultation among 
partners, HMI was naturally expected by central government, the 
teaching body, and LEAs to emphasise an advisory and intermediate 
role rather than the role of control. This also resulted in some overlap 
with the work of LEA advisers and partly accounted for the 1968 Select 
Committee Inquiry which questioned the very existence of HMI. 
Secondly, after one hundred years' development of teacher education, 
teachers were no longer the daughters of working class people as was 
the first generation. They had a degree and had received special 
pedagogic training. So that the status of teachers was increasingly high 
and became even higher because of the post-war teacher shortage. In 
the context of a national drive for better education, teaching became an 
attractive vocation and consequently the teachers' union occupied a very 
important position in the partnership network, a much more influential 
role than today. Under these circumstances, teachers' professional 
autonomy was much emphasised. Curriculum, teaching methods, and 
the internal organisation of schools were left to the discretion of school 
teachers. Since teachers were not subject to any dictatorial oversight of 
their work, HMIs could only influence teachers by disseminating good 
practice and assisting teaching innovation. The third factor explaining 
why HMI took this advisory role was the continuance of progressivism. 
Effective inspection was supposed to be democratic and humane, so the 
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positive way to achieve this goal was through persuasion and 
consultation rather than sanction and control. 
To summarise, because of the fact that the government's power was 
confined by its role in the partnership, central government did not 
interfere much in matters such as curriculum and school organisation. 
HMI had little to question but spent much of its time on full inspections 
as a means of helping and advising individual schools, and also as a 
means of gathering information in order to keep Ministers well 
informed. Edmonds concludes the role of HMI like this: "yet it is the 
advisory side of inspectors' work which today is most evident"(Edmonds, 
1962, p185). 
In the post-war period and up to the 1950s, HM Inspectorate was 
engaged in clearing up all the arrears of inspection that had piled up 
due to the wars. It wanted to keep the inspection at fixed intervals, 
which resulted in it being accused of perfunctory visits and decline in 
the quality of inspections. Along with the rapid demographic growth 
and the consequent rise of the school population, the fixed inspection 
intervals could no longer be maintained. 
In the '60s, HM Inspectorate was engaged in the comprehensive 
school movement. It was "involved in scrutinising schemes for 
comprehensive education submitted by LEAs and advising Ministers on 
the soundness or otherwise of the plans." (Lawton and Gordon, 1987, 
p6). Because the real operation of comprehensive education was left to 
the individual LEAs, central government was not very active in 
controlling detailed development. The information gathered by HMI and 
the opinions proposed by it were not fully made of use. 
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Apart from full inspections and routine visits on the basis of which 
HMIs could suggest improvement and recommend sound practice, HM 
Inspectors developed other forms of advice based on their unique 
professional expertise and collected first hand evidence. Various 
influential publications were published to be freely adopted as teachers' 
references. Moreover, HMI-run in-service teacher training courses 
were further expanded in order to help teachers from all over England 
and Wales to keep abreast of educational development. 
The emphasis of HMI's work in that period was advice through 
inspections, visits, publications, and INSET courses. But the problem 
was that local education authorities had gradually developed their own 
advisory services. Ever since the School Boards were created in the 19th 
century, local government had been developing their own forces of 
inspection and advice because the local politicians and administrators 
also needed to be informed of the state of education in their areas and 
needed help on decision-making. In addition, because the LEAs had 
direct responsibility for education in their areas, whilst the curriculum 
and school management were at the discretion of individual schools, 
local inspectors were concerned more with the advice and assistance to 
schools. Men and women called advisers or inspectors acted as 
consultants and advisers to work alongside the schools and teachers 
within their areas. Compared with HM Inspectors, they went to the 
same school more frequently (for example, once every term by LEA 
adviser compared to once every eight years by HMI). In addition, LEAs' 
supervision was more detailed and direct. In this respect, HMI was less 
competent to bring practical benefits to schools although its advice had 
the advantage of including good practice outside a particular LEA. In 
addition to this weakness, the stress of HMI's advisory role resulted in 
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certain functional overlap with LEA advisory services which led to the 
appeal for abolishing HMI or changing its title in the late '60s. In 1961, 
for example the NUT Conference called for a "Ministry of Education 
Advisory Service of Schools" to replace HMI. (Lawton and Gordon, 1987, 
p105). The 1968 Select Committee also received similar suggestions. 
(Select Committee Report, 1968, pxi). 
Meanwhile, HM Inspectorate, as a professional adviser to Minister 
and later the Secretary of State, was supposed to keep him well informed 
and give judgments on any educational matters. In reality, however, 
central government at that time relied very much on the initiatives of 
local authorities and teaching body, it did not spend much effort in policy 
making which would have needed the help of HMI. When the Select 
Committee was appointed in 1968 to examine the activities of the DES 
including HMI, some HMIs complained to the Committee that their 
opinions were not fully used by the DES. Furthermore, at that time the 
status of the Senior Chief Inspector was under the Deputy Secretary in 
the DES, so that the organisational arrangement hindered HMI from 
playing its role fully. In the investigation of the Select Committee, the 
former SCI said to the members of the Committee, "I think he (SCI) 
should at least have an equal entree and be able to speak at first-hand 
level". (Report of Select Committee, 1968, p47). 
The Report of the Select Committee admitted that inspection itself 
was no longer regarded as the main function of HM Inspectorate. It also 
noted that the growth and progress of local advisers would probably 
affect the establishment and function of HM Inspectorate, i.e., the 
probable heavy duplication of functions performed by two inspection 
forces (Report of Select Committee, 1968, x-xi). 
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This examination of the HMI work and the recommendations of the 
Select Committee made HMI realise the urgent need for role changing, 
that is, to leave the detailed advisory role to local advisers who could do 
better than HMI, and to "establish a role which was national and 
professional, and which did not duplicate the work of LEA advisory 
service. " (Lawton and Gordon, 1987, p108). 
As early as the early '60s, HMI had already begun to seek new roles 
to adapt to the new circumstances. When the inspectors became involved 
in the work of the School Council, they found that the School Council 
was enthusiastic about curriculum development rather than 
curriculum planning. Consequently, HMI began developing its interest 
in national planning in terms of core curriculum In addition, it started 
to try out the survey method as an alternative to full inspection which 
became increasingly difficult to keep at desirable intervals. For example, 
for the 1967 Plowden Report, the whole body of HMI responsible for the 
inspection of primary schools took part and inspected 2,000 primary 
schools as samples of the whole population. Although HMI was later 
criticised for the methods of sampling and evaluation criteria, it had 
made the first step towards a new and exciting stage of its development. 
The report of the Select Committee helped HM Inspectorate and the 
latter was further determined to direct its development towards a 
national and professional role. 
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3.2.5 The Period of Revitalisation 19694988 
As analysed above, in the post-war period, particularly in the 1950s 
and the 1960s, because of the functional overlap between HMI and local 
advisory services and also because of the inactivity of central 
government in policy making, the influence of HM Inspectorate was 
quite weak. But since 1970s, there had been an increasing politicisation 
of education leading to the break down of partnership between central 
government, local government, and teaching body. The Department of 
Education and Science became more and more active in making 
nationwide policy especially in matters of curriculum and financing of 
education whilst the power of local education authorities was 
continuously on the decrease. Meanwhile, teachers' professional 
freedom had been under attack and the debate about accountability 
resulted in the decline in teachers' power and the increase of parents' 
influence. Three factors contributed to such changes in education: faced 
with a severe oil crisis and economic slump in the '70s, both youth 
unemployment and social order became very serious problems that 
frustrated the public and politicians. People found that education failed 
to produce the manpower needed by industry and could not solve social 
problems either. Thus the belief in education gradually changed into the 
doubt about the usefulness and the efficiency of the existing educational 
practice, such as curriculum, teaching methods, and school 
management, which, at that time, were still mainly in the hands of the 
teaching body and local government. As a result of this doubt of the 
social function of the educational system, the ideological base of English 
education was also under attack. Progressivism was accused of 
bringing down educational standards. In addition, some research 
results showed that traditional teaching methods were more effective 
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(Sockett, 1980, p7; Richmond, 1978, p61). The inquiry into William 
Tyndale School further intensified the conflict between progressive and 
traditional camps (Sockett, 1980, p7; Richmond, 1978, p61; Evans, 1985, 
p161). In 1976, the Prime Minister's famous Ruskin speech indicated the 
change of official attitude towards progressivism and indeed the then 
educational practice. Moreover, caused by the public suspicion and the 
political dissatisfaction with education, educationists were required to 
account for their professional autonomy. Gradually, local authorities 
and the teaching body were being deprived of much of the freedom which 
they had acquired for some 30 years. In addition to this, the decline of 
the school population and consequent redundant teaching staff made the 
situation even more complicated. Teaching was no longer an attractive 
occupation and the position of teachers in the partnership became weak. 
Hence, the role of HM Inspectorate since the '70s should be analysed 
in the context of an increasing zeal of the DES in policy-making and also 
the politicisation of education on the one hand, and the decreasing 
profile of education in the public mind and also the diminishing power 
of the teaching body and LEAs on the other. On the whole, HMI moved 
its way in the direction of performing a national and professional 
function. 
It was quite clear that the more active the authority was, the more 
information it needed in order to make proper decisions. Added to this 
was the fact that the politicians and administrators in the DES were not 
expert at educational affairs. Therefore, professional advice became 
essential for sound policy-making. As stated by ex-SCI Sheila Browne, 
"the Secretary of State... and senior members of the Department of 
Education and Science expect to have their attention drawn promptly to 
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matters of concern and new trends identified by HMI. In addition, they 
...expect quick and reliable answers from HMI to their own questions 
arising from day-to-day work." (Browne, 1979, p37-38). 
The functions performed by HM Inspectorate can be uncovered 
through a series of DES publications over the years. In 1970, "HMI: 
Today and Tomorrow" was issued by the DES in which the function of 
HMI was vaguely described as "ultimately answerable to the Secretary 
of State for Education and Science... help to accumulate and to sift the 
evidence and so to provide those who need it with the foundation on 
which to make reasonable decisions."(DES, 1970, p1-4). By 1978, the 
major functions of HMI seemed to have clarified. The 1978 DES 
Management Review claimed that the prime role of the inspectorate was 
to "assess standards and trends throughout the system and, on that 
basis, to report to the Permanent Secretary and to the Secretary of State 
and to advise on the state of the system nationally." (DES, 1979, p23). And 
then, in 1982, the Rayner Report described the primary function of HMI 
which had been mentioned in the DES Review as "the first and 
overriding duty" (DES, 1982, p8). "The Work of Inspectorate in England 
and Wales: A Policy Statement" which shortly followed the Rayner's 
scrutiny of the inspectorate was the document which more clearly 
defined the role of HMI, "firstly, assesses standards and trends and 
advises the Secretary of State on the performance of the system 
nationally; secondly, identifies and makes known more widely good 
practice and promising developments and draws attention to weakness 
requiring attention; thirdly, provides advice and assistance to those with 
responsibility for or in the institutions in the system through its 
day-to-day contacts, its contributions and training and its publications." 
(DES, 1983a, p2). 
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The event which revitalised HM Inspectorate, according to Lawton 
and Gordon, was the DES' replacement of the Department Planning 
Organisation for the Planning Branch in 1970 (Lawton and Gordon: 
1987, p26). An important part of that system was the Policy Steering 
Group which was concerned with guiding the planning of educational 
policy. The Senior Chief Inspector became a member of this key 
committee. (Lawton and Gordon, 1987, p75). At lower levels of this 
system there were Policy Groups and sub-groups concerned with 
various educational sectors which also contained relevant Chief 
Inspectors and Staff Inspectors. That is to say, at every level of the 
planning system, relevant inspectors were involved. Further, the 
position of the SCI not only became equal to the Under Secretary, but 
could also have direct access to the Secretary of State. Thus the 
organisational restructuring of the DES facilitated HMI in exerting its 
influence. At regular meetings of the planning groups, the inspectors 
could promptly draw attention towards the concerns or issues identified 
by HMI's field work. They could also provide factual information based 
on their first hand evidence. More important, the inspectors could 
influence the process of decision-making and put forward professional 
suggestions and judgments which could affect the outcome of national 
policy. From the standpoint of the inspectors, especially the senior 
members of the inspectorate, joining in the policy groups would help 
them to be aware of the context in which the inspectorate worked and 
they could direct its activities correctly. 
To perform the function of providing information on the state of 
education meant that the information given to the DES must be prompt 
and reliable. In order to meet this challenge, HMI adopted the survey as 
its important tool of collecting evidence. Knowing that nowadays it was 
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unwise to dream of keeping fixed inspection interval because of the 
imbalance between the number of schools and the number of inspectors, 
the inspectorate largely cut down the number of full inspections. At the 
same time, it made great efforts to improve the quality of sampling in 
surveys to ensure the representativity of these samples. Apart from 
careful subjective judgments, quantitative approaches and statistical 
tests were increasingly employed. In 1978 and 1979, national survey 
reports by HMI published, "Primary Education in England" and 
"Aspects of Secondary Education in England" were regarded as 
successes and they exerted a great influence on the work of 
educationists as well as administrators. Besides the large scale national 
surveys which could last several years, survey methods were also used 
for collecting data about one particular division, sector, or aspect of 
educational system. Its flexibility and concentration could very well 
meet the requirement of new situation provided survey itself was of high 
quality. 
Full inspections, on the other hand, were not done away with. They 
were still conducted every year. Apart from being used for assisting 
individual schools, as in the '60s, it served two further important 
purposes. Firstly, it was one of the means by which HMI could keep 
track of the overall state of education in the country, based on which it 
could provide a general context for policy makers. Secondly, it was 
treated as preparation for survey. From the routine full inspections, 
HMI identified the possible trends and issues which were vital for the 
development of education, thus, it conducted surveys according to 
necessity and available conditions. While concentrating on playing the 
role of "watchdog" and "professional adviser", HMI still performed 
some functions of advice. Different from before, its advisory work was 
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not solely reflected in the detailed inspections or assistance to individual 
schools, it played its role nationally. For example, a large number of 
publications were published every year, especially in the period of 
developing national curriculum. In addition, publishing all the 
inspection reports since January 1983 was another form of 
disseminating good practice. INSET courses still continued although 
the amount had been reduced. 
Apart from the influence on the policy-making process, HMI took a 
very important part in curriculum planning. Lawton and Gordon 
comment that " some kind of national guidelines are desirable, but they 
should be produced by professional educationists rather than by 
politicians or civil servants. "(Lawton and Gordon, 1987, p152). As early 
as in the '60s, HMI identified the trend of national curriculum planning 
and began to put some effort into curriculum theories and research. 
Based on its researches and first-hand evidence, HMI expressed its 
professional opinions about curriculum in its frequent publications. "A 
View of the Curriculum" in 1980, "Curriculum 11-16" in 1983, "Better 
Schools" and "Curriculum 5-16" in 1985, and "Curriculum Matters, an 
HMI Series" since 1986, had effectively influenced the work of local 
authorities and school teachers. Some of them even became a basis for 
important educational planning in the LEAs. HMI's contributions to 
curriculum planning also constrained, to some extent, the interference 
of politicians and civil servants who were keen on, but not good at 
educational matters. Things like curriculum-led staffing and areas of 
experience which were strongly advocated by HMI are now shown in the 
DES national curriculum documents as a result of HMI's strong 
influence. Along with the continuance of implementation of national 
curriculum, the professional role played by HMI in this respect should 
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become more and more important. 
In short, along with the shift of power among educational partners 
and the increasing activity of central authorities in controlling 
educational matters since the late '60s, the work of HMI had been more 
and more utilised as an indispensable basis of DES' work. HMI left the 
advisory role it played in the '50s and the '60s to the local adviser so that 
the functions of two systems became complementary rather than 
duplicating each other. Some HMIs admitted openly that they were 
advisers of the Secretary of State and they had no official obligation to 
teachers. That was to say, the role of HMI was the "ears and eyes" and 
"the professional adviser" of central government more than the adviser 
of individual schools and teachers. In order to play the role well, it 
adjusted its methods of working and shifted its work focus. It had been 
performing a leading role in the area of curriculum. Its advisory role 
was more reflected in national publications and INSET courses than in 
detailed assistance to individual schools. 
3.3 Conclusion 
Looking back on the history of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of schools, 
one learns that it had been fluctuating between the role of control and 
the role of advice. Indeed, among functions it performed in every period, 
there were always some functions which were more inclined to control 
while others inclined to advice. But the priority among these functions 
kept changing almost in all five periods, so were the corresponding 
working methods. 
67 
Chapter3: A Brief History of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Schools 
The functions in one particular period were largely determined by 
the spheres of jurisdiction of central government at that time, as well as 
the degree of power over those spheres. To take the example of the grant 
in the first period, (which was not much at the beginning), the 
inspectors could only work with the right derived from issuing the 
grants -- check the usage, and generally inspect those grant-aided 
schools. In the second period, similarly, the inspectors still worked 
alongside the grant line, as the then central government had not 
extended its sphere of jurisdiction. However, the grant rose and 
gradually made up a substantial part of the total funds. Hence the 
degree of power of central government in this grant aspect increased. 
HMI was then used as central government's instrument to test pupils' 
achievement in order to decide the grant allocation. But even so, the 
inspectorate still did not have power to interfere directly in other matters 
like curriculum, at least in theory, though the practical impact of the 
"Payment by Results" on curriculum was very strong because of the 
importance of the grant. 
Although what the inspectorate can do is constrained by the power of 
central government, it does not necessarily mean that if the government 
has the power, it must be the inspectorate that uses it. Central 
government could use other bodies or create new bodies to enforce its 
policies though enforcement was seldom used in reality due to the 
partnership in educational service. Most of the time, HMI acts as a 
watchdog of educational standards instead of an enforcement agency to 
enforce DES policy. 
Secondly, reviewing the growth of HMI, one can easily see that what 
the HMI's functions were in one particular period was largely 
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determined by the expectations of central government. As one part of the 
central education authority, HMI had the duty to help discharge 
educational responsibilities. When the DES started accelerating its pace 
of national policy making in the '70s, for example, HMI was very much 
expected to closely monitor the overall state of education nationwide, and 
to send prompt and reliable information to enable the policy making. 
The DES also expected HMI which was composed of highly experienced 
professionals to advise on policy making so that its national policies 
could effectively guide the educational development. 
Finally, though the soundness and the rationality of the 
organisational structure and the working methods could, sometimes to 
a substantial degree, affect the effectiveness of the function fulfilment, it 
is usually the function that determines the method. So the structure and 
the working methods should be constantly adjusted in line with the 
function changes. This was the case in the HMI experience. Looking at 
the original simple structure of the inspectorate, one can imagine its 
relatively simple tasks and limited power. Compared with the first 
period, the structure in the last period was much more complicated. 
During the first two decades of its establishment, the structure of HMI 
was non-hierachical, working methods were simple -- visits to schools 
divided by religions. In the last period, however, the whole inspectorate 
was composed of several ranks of status from Senior Chief Inspector to 
ordinary HMI. In order to collect information promptly and nationally, 
seven divisions were set up across the England and Wales. Working 
methods became multiple: full inspection, short inspection, survey and 
informal visit. 
To conclude, ever since its establishment, HMI has been adjusting its 
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personnel, working methods, organisational structure and its 
relationships with other educational interest groups in order to better 
perform the functions which themselves are determined by the needs 
risen from the practice. HMI's rapid growth itself proved the great 
success of this system and in a way justifies the decision to use it as a 
model for comparison. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FUNCTIONS OF  
HM INSPECTORATE 
The previous chapter analysed the various functions performed by 
HM Inspectorate and the corresponding organisational structures as 
well as working methods in five different phases of its development. 
This, especially the post-1944 discussion, provides some background 
information which helps the understanding of the current HMI system. 
The 1988 Education Reform Act, regarded as the most significant 
educational legislation since the 1944 Act, dramatically altered two of 
the most important aspects of educational system: curriculum and 
finance. For the first time in the English education history since 1862, a 
nationally unified curriculum sets up the guidelines for teaching and 
for pupils' achievements. Yet for the first time since 1944, the schools 
have gained much higher degree of autonomy in school budgeting but 
lost certain freedom in deciding professional matters. Also, the LEAs 
have lost some of their entitlement of managing finance. 
These major changes taking place in the educational system are 
bound to have an effect on the functions of HMI, as it did in the past. 
This time, however, the functions of HMI have not changed very much 
so far. In addition, because the Act has only recently started being 
implemented, the changes in the HMI system have not been stabilised. 
In view of these two factors, focusing the examination on the HMI 
system closely prior to 1988 would be more productive and more 
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beneficial to the Chinese inspectorate. Nevertheless, much of HMI's 
practice, especially its functions described in past tense is still true 
today, though there is a difference in what the inspectors are specifically 
doing. At the end of the chapter, a certain length of discussion will be 
devoted to the tentative prediction of the possible changes that might 
occur to HM Inspectorate as a result of the 1988 Education Reform Act. 
4.1 The Function of HMI (Prior to 1988) 
The 1944 Education Act continued the statutory base for the work of 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate by providing that "It shall be the duty of the 
Minister to cause inspection to be made of every educational 
establishment at such intervals as appear to him to be appropriate, and 
to cause a special inspection of any such establishment to be made 
whenever he considers such an inspection is desirable ..." (Subsection 2 
of Section 77 of the 1944 Education Act). However, except for 
emphasising the right to enter the premises and to carry out inspections 
on behalf of the Minister, the Act and other proceeding legislation did 
not define the specific role or function of the inspectorate. And indeed, it 
is difficult to specify functions simply because they cannot be fixed. The 
entire history of HMI clearly proved this assumption. This part is 
intended to examine the functions of HMI and its distinctive features 
around 1988. In addition, it is planned to consider the organisational 
structure and methods through which the roles and functions are 
fulfilled. It must be remembered that much of the HMI practice around 
1988 still continue to exist at present. 
The central inspectorate's ultimate aim is to assist central 
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government to discharge its responsibilities laid down by law. To achieve 
this end, there are several roles that an inspectorate can play. But the 
roles and functions are determined by "the constitutional and 
administrative settings in which this body is embedded" (Neave, 1987, 
p3). These roles and functions, in turn, determine the organisation and 
methods by which the roles can be fulfilled. Needless to say, the role of 
the English central inspectorate should also be analysed from this 
standpoint. 
4.1.1 The Role of HMI in the English Education System and its Main 
Features (Prior to 1988) 
The decentralisation in the English educational administration 
system, which will be discussed in more detail later, took the form of 
devolution, i.e., the authority to make some decisions about educational 
service was transferred to sub-national level. In addition, this transfer 
was ensured by legislation rather than by administrative regulation. 
(Conyers, 1983, p101). However, the English devolution was not at the 
same degree as that in federal systems. The English LEAs and schools 
did not assume most of the responsibilities for administering 
educational service, rather, they had to work within the broad 
framework set by legislation and sometimes by DES regulations. But 
they had much more power than those LEAs in a deconcentrated 
system, which had only the authority to make decisions about the 
implementation of central instructions rather than the independence to 
make their own policies. (ibid). 
Generally speaking, between 1944 and 1988, the Department of 
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Education and Science (Ministry of Education) exercised its control over 
national education in the following three ways: Financial, building 
programme and teacher supply. It was not so interested in what was 
going on inside the school, i.e., what was being taught and how, because 
it felt it was the freedom of professional teachers throughout the history 
of English education. Not until the late 1960s and 1970s, when Britain 
was faced with economic recession and public demands for 
accountability of professionals did the DES gradually develop its interest 
in curriculum matters and educational standards. Even so, it still did 
not have much real power to regulate what to teach until the 
introduction of the national curriculum in 1988. 
In a situation like this where the central government's concern was 
mainly in allocating resources and training teaching staff (apart from 
formulating some national policies), and much of the actual power of 
administering the service was in the hands of LEAs and schools, central 
government had to have some agency to monitor the educational quality 
so that the Secretary of State could fulfil the requirement of the 
Education Act to maintain education standards and to secure the best 
possible return from the resources. In the author's view, it was this part 
that HMI played. In other words, HMI essentially played a monitoring 
role to safeguard national educational quality. It was because of this 
character that all HM Inspectors were recruited from successful 
teachers or other experienced professionals, because their professional 
expertise was crucial for ensuring the success of monitoring. 
In short, it was the dilemma between the responsibility of the 
Secretary of State and his limited power that gave HMI this position 
(before 1988). It also encouraged HMI to concentrate on everything 
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related to educational quality, mainly, curriculum and pupil learning, 
but also school resources and school management in order to 
accomplish its obligation. 
Another feature of HM Inspectorate related to the limited power of 
the DES was that up until 1988, it was still concerned with effectiveness 
of the system rather than conformity with some predetermined criteria 
since the DES had no right to enforce implementation. Therefore, HMI 
did not have nationwide fixed specific requirements against which it 
could check. HMIs judged the effectiveness of educational provision very 
much based on their rich professional knowledge and their experience 
throughout the country. HMIs exerted their influence on schools by 
persuasion rather than by enforcement. This feature was also partly due 
to the fact that effectiveness and quality of education were not clear-cut 
matters which could be easily judged and unanimously agreed upon. 
Apart from the function of monitoring and reporting on the 
educational standards across the country, which was largely 
determined by the DES' dilemma between fulfilling the resposibility of 
maintaining standards and the lack of controlling in professional 
matters, HMI also played a role of professional adviser, which was the 
result of another dilemma: the DES' duty of maintaining educational 
standards and the incompetence of politicians and civil servants in 
professional matters. 
Roughly speaking, the public administration organisations in 
England were composed of three types of people: politicians, 
administrators (in the case of central government, they were called civil 
servants), and professionals. Undoubtedly, the opinions and advice of 
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the professionals were essential for politicians to make sound policies 
and for civil servants to implement policies properly and effectively. In 
the case of the DES, as mentioned above, in the past, it did not involve 
itself much in professional matters and other activities administered by 
LEAs, but along with the gradual change of power balance among 
central government, LEAs and teaching professionals, and the DES' 
accelerated pace of centralisation and "marketisation", the importance 
of sound national policies was self-evident. So that the voice of HMI also 
became increasingly important, especially in those policies associated 
with professional matters such as the national curriculum. However, 
on the other hand, the possibility that the HMI's advice would be less 
important did exist. Because of the "marketisation" tendency, the 
opinions of the parents and "consumers" sometimes became more 
powerful than those of the professionals. Moreover, the politicians would 
sometimes pay little attention to HMI's opinions when making policies 
for special political reasons. But on the whole, HMI played a very 
important role in advising politicians on the formulation of national 
policies based on the evidence they gathered in the field and on the 
professional expertise they possessed. In addition, this role is likely to 
increase its weight as central government becomes more and more 
active in professional matters. 
In addition to the two main roles mentioned above, the author 
suggests that communication among various bodies should be 
recognised as another significant role played by HMI. 
First, HMI greatly facilitated the communication between central 
educational government and local education authorities and their 
schools. As the DES had no regional bases in England, HMI's divisional 
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offices had more meaning than just being an extension of the 
inspectorate. In a way, it was more like a liaison between centre and 
periphery. HMI divisions could promptly inform and feedback to its 
headquarters in London, through their various internal communication 
methods, on the situation in schools and teachers' comments on 
national policies, or some serious issues. The headquarters in turn 
informed the DES if necessary. Similarly, the DES could possibly 
influence the local authorities and schools through HMIs' daily contact 
with them and its authoritative advice. This form of function was not as 
obvious, or as clearly specified as the function of reporting and advising, 
rather, it was dissolved in HMIs' day-to-day work. 
Second, this role of liaison also enabled HM Inspectorate to promote 
understanding and keeping up-to-date among LEAs. Because the rather 
decentralised system encouraged close articulation between education 
and local conditions, thus resulted in variations in educational 
development in the country, it was essential for individual LEAs to be 
kept informed about the practice in other LEAs and to keep up with 
national development. Besides the various approaches of 
communication between DES and LEAs, the visits and inspections 
carried out by HMIs were certainly a valuable way of disseminating 
good practice and increasing understanding among LEAs. 
This role of liaison was further reflected in HMI's close operation 
with various professional organisations, such as the then School 
Council, and various examination boards. Being inspectors, HMIs were 
working in the field and had the most up-to-date information about the 
educational standards in the country. Their valuable contributions to 
these professional organisations were very helpful to their work. 
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In 1988, after nearly one hundred and fifty years of changes, HMI 
was now performing the following functions: 
a. Assessing standards and trends and advising the Secretary of 
State on the performance of the system nationally; 
b. Identifying and making known more widely good practice, 
promoting development, and pointing out weaknesses requiring 
attention; 
c. providing advice and assistance to those with responsibilities for or 
in the institutions in the system through its day-to-day contacts, its 
contribution to training and its publications. (DES, 1983a, p2). 
4.1.1.1 HMI and Central Government 
Central government was the major determinant of the functions of 
HM Inspectorate. The DES, more specifically, the Secretary of State and 
his ministers, expected HMI to carry out two tasks. One was of 
information provision on the factual state of education including the 
information on general situation, or on one particular aspect of the 
educational provision in a particular area. The other expectation was 
the professional anticipation of a proposed policy, i.e., what did HMIs 
think, on the basis of present situation, would happen if this policy was 
implemented? The former task, which asked for HMI's judgment of 
factual educational performance, served three purposes. The first was to 
provide general briefing of a local situation in order to help the Secretary 
of State to deal with local authorities. For example, if the Secretary of 
State needed to make a decision about whether to approve a plan of an 
LEA to close a school, he would probably ask the inspectors' advice. The 
second was to offer evidence to enable Ministers to answer the questions 
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about education in Parliament or on other occasions. Finally, it gave 
feedback to the Secretary of State of the effect of his policy on educational 
system in order to enable him to adjust the policies or take further 
actions. The other task, which was the HMI's professional anticipation 
of a proposed policy was needed whenever a policy was to be made. The 
setting up of the Policy Steering Group and various sub-groups in 1970 
opened up one more channel for HM Inspectors to exert stronger 
influence on the DES officials by participating in the meetings and 
expressing professional views. A detailed description has been given in 
the last chapter, more will be discussed in section 4.1.2.3 in this 
chapter. 
The factual knowledge and anticipatory judgment were obviously 
derived from the same source --- first hand knowledge on the basis of 
close observation of educational institutions. According to the figures in 
the Rayner Report, in 1980, HMI visited 9,052 institutions which covered 
30% of all schools. The number of published reports in 1980 increased by 
34% compared with that of 1975. (DES, 1982, p12). Again, the more recent 
data available is from the Senior Chief Inspector's annual report. It 
claimed that in 1989, 13% of maintained primary schools, 47% of 
maintained secondary schools, 17% of independent schools and 100% 
further and higher education institutions were visited by HMI, and the 
number of inspections carried out was 268. (DES, 1990, Annex). In 1988, 
55 days out of 80 each term were devoted to "issue-led inspections" in a 
centrally determined programme in order to keep track of the general 
state of education as well as to respond to policy priorities set down by the 
Secretary of State (interview findings). Compared with the proportion in 
1986, the percentage of centrally determined inspections had increased 
nearly 9% (60% was given to policy and routine inspections in 1986 and 
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68.7% in 1988; interview findings). Although the difference might not be 
significant by statistical standards, it did suggest that more time and 
more effort had been put in the activities of monitoring schools and 
collecting more information in order to respond to the Ministers more 
accurately, more promptly. This was the result of the DES' increasing 
interest in the formulation of national policy. 
4.1.1.2 HMI and Local Education Authorities 
HMI, a national entity accountable to the Queen in Council, was 
certainly not under the leadership of LEAs. In addition, the main 
mission of HMI was to assess educational quality by means of inspecting 
individual schools. Although in recent years HMI had conducted 
several inspections of LEAs, it was still not HMI's overwhelming task. 
In general, the relationship between HMI and LEAs was neither 
employee and employer, and to most LEAs, nor the inspector and the 
inspected. 
There was no statutory base for relationships between HMI and 
LEAs. But in fact, HMI, especially its regional divisions had a fair 
amount of contacts and exchanges with LEAs. Firstly, HMI acted as the 
liaison between LEAs and central government. In the further and 
higher education sector, it was even the representative of the DES who 
had to approve FE courses. Because the DES had no regional base, HMI 
was willing to offer advice to schools and LEAs on the DES' policies 
though it was not obliged to enforce the policy implementation. In 
addition, it served as a communication channel through which the DES 
could get to know more local information and grass roots opinions. 
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Secondly, HMI could not complete its mission of maintaining and 
improving educational standards without contacting the LEAs which 
were responsible for running schools and colleges. Each LEA was 
allocated one HMI for schools and one HMI for further education. The 
task of exchanging information with the LEA Chief Education Officer 
and sometimes local advisers was very much carried out by these two 
people known as "District Inspector". They informed the LEA promptly 
of the findings of HMI's visits and inspections. Furthermore, they 
advised LEAs in the light of the local context and the national 
background. However, as there was no standard or clear administrative 
relationship, this form of assistance and advice depended largely on the 
attitude of the Chief Education Officer of each LEA. The degree of such 
exchange varied from one LEA to the other. 
Besides this, HMI helped politicians and administrators in LEAs by 
publishing various pamphlets which described educational work in the 
country, expressed HMI's professional views on educational issues. 
With the help of these publications, local politicians and administrators 
would be able to evaluate the educational quality within their areas and 
improve their work in the light of the national background. 
4.1.1.3 HMI and the Teaching Body 
It was clear that the evaluation of educational provision could by no 
means avoid evaluating teachers' performance including the selection 
of curriculum, syllabus, and teaching methods. However, as HMI was 
not responsible for teachers' employment, the aim of the observation and 
evaluation of teachers' work made by HMI was generally not directed to 
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the appraisal of individual teachers, though in some cases HMIs would 
be called uopn by the LEAs to assess probationers. Rather, teaching was 
evaluated in the light of the pupils' learning and viewed as one part of 
the overall school work. During inspection or visit, HMIs talked to 
teachers concerned, gave comments or suggestions if necessary (and 
about school management to the head teacher). If there was a serious 
problem worth noting, HMI would tell the head of department or 
headteacher but never mention the name in the formal inspection 
report. 
With the ratio of 1000 teachers per HMI, it was self-evident that 
teachers, especially ordinary teachers had few chances to meet HMIs, 
however, those who met them appreciated their suggestions and 
regarded HMIs as "very very bright and sharp" (Rogers, 1983, p9). 
The indirect contact with the teaching body was through the variety 
of HMI's publications. Helping teachers in the same way as they helped 
LEAs, the publications were seen as one form of national advisory role 
played by HMI. 
Apart from these, as the Secretary of State had the duty to supply and 
to train teachers, HMI was entrusted with the task of running in-service 
training on a national basis in order to keep teachers well informed 
about educational developments as well as to help teachers improve 
their work. 
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4.1.2 Organisational Structure of Her Majesty's Inspectorate, 
Communication Within HMI and With the DES 
4.1.2.1 The Organisational Structure of HMI 
It was essential for an organisation to possess a sound structure in 
order to effectively discharge its functions. Therefore, the organisational 
structure of HMI had to meet the requirement of overall monitoring as 
well as speedy communication. 
It was inevitable that HMI set up the bulk of its members in seven 
divisions which covered the whole of England and Wales. Among 485 
members of the whole inspectorate, one tenth stayed in the DES which 
was a centre of communication. Others worked in regional bases and 
each division contained roughly 60 inspectors. 
Broadly, the organisational structure of HMI in 1988 can be shown in 
the following diagram. 
83 
7 Divisional lnspts 
HMI 
1 Senior Chief Inspt 
7 Chief Inspectors 
DES 
60 Staff Inspectors 
Divisions 
Chapter 4: The Functions of HM Inspectorate 
Diagram 4.1: The Organisational Structure of HMI 
At the top of the inspectorate was the senior Chief Inspector who was 
regarded as the senior professional adviser to the Secretary of State. 
He(she) held the direct access to him/her which facilitated the 
information flow and promoted professional influence. He(she) also 
oversaw the overall operation of the whole inspectoraste. Below him 
(her) there were 7 Chief Inspectors whose responsibilities were 
delegated by SCI to cover different aspects of work such as primary 
education, secondary education, curriculum, teacher training and so 
on. This group, constituted by these 8 senior people was HMI's central 
decision-making body which decided the priorities of HMI's work as 
well as a main professional advisory body to the Secretary of State. 
Under them, 60 Staff Inspectorg who performed the key role not only in 
digesting the decisions of the top management group and making 
detailed plans but also in processing and summarising the information 
from divisions. Some of them worked in the London headquarters while 
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others were in the field. But no matter where the bases were, Staff 
Inspectors were coordinators in the inspectorate. At the same salary 
level, there were 7 divisional Inspectors whose main duty was to oversee 
and co-ordinate all HMIs' activities within their divisions. In the 
position of linking central home and regional bases, the DIs also gave 
additional tasks to ordinary HMIs according to local needs. Finally, the 
DIs were expected to undertake training of probationer HMIs in their 
divisions. 
Ordinary HMIs were the people who actually went to schools and 
colleges and collected first-hand evidence. Their work was mainly 
determined by central programme and divisional plans. All HMIs in 
divisions (except DIs and SIs) were divided into school inspectors and FE 
inspectors. In addition to this, every HMI was allocated a certain 
number of schools and colleges of which he(she) was the general 
inspector who was expected to look after the overall work of these 
institutions. Meanwhile, he (she) was also a specialist inspector to look 
after a broader range of schools and colleges in a particular subject or 
phase. Information gathered by them served all purposes. This 
information might be used as first-hand evidence for reporting 
educational quality, or as basis of HMI's publications, or as grounds for 
answering parliamentary questions. Finally, two HMIs were allocated 
to each LEA as district inspectors to act as a liaison between HMI and 
the local education authorities. This relationship helped the LEAs to get 
to know factual state of education within their boundaries, and obtain 
helpful suggestions for improvement from experienced professionals. 
This structure had three key parts: policy-making, planning and 
implementation which constituted a circle: policy-making  	
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planning 	  implementation. The three tasks were respectively 
carried out by three ranks of people: chief inspectors (including SCI), 
staff inspectors and ordinary HMIs. The SCI and CIs set the priorities of 
HMI's work based on the issues identified by HMIs as well as the policy 
priorities of the DES. Staff Inspectors were the people who turned the 
general decisions (made by SCI and CIs) into detailed and operational 
activities so that HMIs in the field could have clear directions for their 
work. In the other direction of communication, Staff Inspectors acted as 
a checkpoint to ensure that the tasks of HMIs were completed as well as 
possible before they reached CIs. Sometimes Staff Inspectors collected 
"raw" material from the field and processed it into the form required by 
CIs. Each CI had a team of several staff inspectors, so that at 
policy-making and planning levels, work was divided according to the 
aspects of responsibility. 
At the implementation level, however, HMIs in the field were not 
divided into seven teams corresponding to seven Chief Inspectors. 
Instead, each HMI worked according to the centrally planned 
programme and carried out all the tasks coming from the higher level. 
This was the second feature of the English style. Nationally determined 
activities and divisional activities, plus HMIs' individual activities (for 
instance, to attend conferences), composed a programme with which 
HMIs carried out their work. This way of organising manpower avoided 
splitting the work of HMIs, instead, it made full use of the manpower in 
divisions. Each HMI was both general and specialist inspector. They 
could collect both general and specific information when visiting and 
inspecting schools and colleges. This feature allowed the inspectorate to 
collect more information in the same amount of time and with the same 
amount of manpower. 
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The third feature of HM Inspectorate before 1988, which might be 
similar to that of other countries, was the regional distribution of its 
members. The advantage of this structure was quite obvious. It ensured 
the close monitoring of local situations and prompt action if necessary. 
The advanced computer system installed in the mid '80s helped to solve 
the problem of slow information flow as a result of dispersal of 
manpower. 
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4.1.2.2 Communication Within the Inspectorate 
It was of vital importance for the inspectorate to gather reliable 
information promptly and effectively for the reason that information was 
the evidence of reporting the performance of educational system as well 
as the basis for making judgment. 
The inspection programme was the fundamental tool of organising 
the work of HMI. It was regarded as "a mechanism for defining 
priorities and reserving time" (DES, 1982, p15). In 1988, of 80 working 
days each term, 55 days were programmed issue-led inspections 
including full inspections, short inspections, school visits and so on 
(interview findings). The Senior Chief Inspector and Chief Inspectors 
considered the national policies made by the Secretary of State as well as 
the issues identified by HMIs and then tried to decide the work priorities 
for the next period. About 25 days were left to HMIs individual priorities, 
e.g., attend a professional body meeting. The evidence gathered through 
all kinds of activities would be recorded and stored in computers. When 
inspectors, especially staff inspectors and chief inspectors needed 
information, they only needed to look through the computers and 
relevant information would be easily obtained, though more usually, 
they were still used to getting paper-written material. 
Apart from using the programme as an instrument of 
communication, HMI had an extensive network of subject and phase 
committees. Phase committees including primary, secondary and 
further education committees existed at both national and divisional 
level. At the national level, there were more than 30 subject teams each 
chaired by a relevant staff inspector. Both phase and subject specialist 
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inspectors formed different working groups to exchange information 
and pool experience. In addition, this structure was also a means of 
identifying trends and discussing priorities. More important, it was an 
essential tool to sustain this dispersed service. 
Besides the projected programme and committee network, the 
inspectorate employed other administrative instruments such as 
memorandum (e.g., memorandum to Inspectors, Working 
Instructions). Also, informal contact like having dinner together, or 
telephone conversations should not go unheeded as a mechanism of 
communication. 
The causes for adopting these communication mechanisms, formal 
or informal, were derived from the motivation of achieving prompt 
information flow and updating professional knowledge and experience. 
The centrally planned programme was a fundamental instrument to 
ensure the information required by the centre was promptly collected. 
The committee network was the valuable means by which up-to-date 
information and experience could be exchanged and refreshed. After 
all, these mechanisms served the need for playing the role of monitoring 
and advising. 
4.1.2.3 Communication With the DES 
HMI had the statutory duty of carrying out inspections for the 
Secretary of State. In fact, it also had the obligation to report to the 
Secretary of State and to advise on the state of education in the country. 
In practice, this obligation also applied to other senior officials at DES. 
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Civil servants other than HMIs had no right to instruct HMI to do 
something. In effect, HMIs, especially senior inspectors and civil 
servants worked quite closely on a day-to-day basis. Apart from the 
policy steering group and sub-groups, there was no fixed formal 
mechanism for communication between HMI and the rest of the DES, 
according to the author's interview results. Rather, the communication 
was largely through minutes, attending meetings and discussions. So 
that the frequency and the amount of communication varied depending 
on the degree of importance and urgency of the event. When the national 
curriculum was under deliberation, for example, much effort, 
particularly the subject specialists' was put in by HMI and several 
inspectors spent several hours a day with Ministers and civil servants. 
Furthermore, participation in the multi-level policy making groups 
(which has been discussed in the last chapter) enabled HMI to exert 
professional influence on national policies. On the whole, the 
communication between HMI and the rest of the DES was not through a 
fixed formal mechanism, their cooperation depended on individual 
cases. 
4.1.3 The Forms of Inspection 
The first two inspectors of HMI started their work by visiting schools. 
Over one hundred and fifty years, the ways of inspecting schools and 
collecting information have been unremittingly explored and 
experimented. Up until 1988, in order to collect different types of 
information, HMI had adjusted its forms of inspection in various ways, 
i.e., full inspection, short inspection, survey, school visit, and LEA 
inspection. 
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Full Inspection: according to the explanation of the former SCI, was 
"full only in the sense that the school is considered as a whole and a 
broadly based team of inspectors together sample all that is there to be 
seen at the same time" (Browne, 1979, p37). Compared with other 
methods of inspection, full inspection had the characteristics of a longer 
period of time, more inspectors and more aspects to be looked at. Schools 
to be inspected were chosen randomly by computers or occasionally on 
the recommendations of relevant inspectors. The number of inspectors 
and duration of inspections varied in accordance with the size of the 
school, the phase in which the school was, and the cause of the 
inspection. But on average, inspecting a secondary school took one week 
with a panel of 18 HMIs, and a primary school 3-4 days with 4-5 
inspectors. Usually one month notice would be given to the headteacher 
and preliminary preparations such as filling in standard inspection 
forms and submitting school documents would be required. During the 
inspection, almost every aspect of school work was examined as 
thoroughly as possible. On the Thursday afternoon and Friday the 
results would be reported to the headteacher, a general view of the whole 
team would be formed after HMI's Thursday evening meeting. Six 
months later, the inspection report would be available to the public. This 
method of inspection was designed to keep monitoring the schools as the 
basis of accumulating evidence and offering professional advice. In 
addition, it was the source from which the issues stemmed. It also 
aimed at providing the school with an overall evaluation from a 
professional perspective. Although the pressure that the school faced 
was considerable, most schools found inspection invaluable, as was 
claimed by the headteachers who were interviewed. HM Inspectors, as 
the people outside the school and with wide national experience, 
examined the work from a fresh perspective and with certain degree of 
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objectivity. On the whole, as one inspector described it, full inspection 
was an "uncomfortable but helpful experience" to the schools. 
Naturally, this full inspection team was purely composed of HM 
Inspectors whose specialities were supposed to match most aspects of 
the school work. One notable feature, however, was that all inspectors 
were from different divisions, brought together by the central 
headquarters. Some of them did not know each other before the 
inspection. Having admitted the possible high expenses arising from 
travel and accommodation, one has to admit that this way of organising 
inspection enabled the inspectors to broaden their scope and get to know 
more practice in areas other than their own divisions. In addition, by 
bringing HMIs from different bases together, the objectivity of the 
evaluation could be better ensured. 
Due to the increasing need for gathering prompt and multi-fold 
information, the full inspection could no longer meet the needs because 
of the long duration, high cost and vast manpower it required. As a 
result, Short Inspection (only in secondary schools) was invented. It was 
an economical and speedy way of gathering information. Only 3 or 4 
inspectors went to the school and spent three or four days there. The 
evaluation was not as complex as the full inspection, but the quality of 
writing, reading, oral, numeracy and so on would still be judged. 
Standard forms then were filled in by HMIs at the end of the inspection. 
Apparently, these forms served the same purpose as full inspection 
reports with the advantage of being standardised and could be used for 
quantitative analysis. 
Another relatively new and efficient tool of gathering information 
92 
Chapter 4: The Functions of HM Inspectorate 
was Survey. Once the theme of a survey was chosen, the relevant 
evidence would be collected during school visits and inspections, and 
then be input into computers by HM Inspectors. Based on this vast 
amount of information, HMI would be able to report the educational 
standards of particular aspects. The scale of the survey ranged from 
reading ability at a certain age in a certain area to the overall national 
quality evaluation which took several years to complete. 
One more tool of gathering information was the traditional School 
Visit. Each HMI was a general inspector as well as a specialist 
inspector. More than 50 schools or colleges were assigned to him(her) as 
the scope of general contact. Wider range of schools and colleges were 
allocated to him(her) where the specialist knowledge would apply. When 
the inspector found something worth considering but beyond his ability, 
he could call for the help of relevant inspectors. So in theory, every 
school had a general HMI to look after the overall work as well as a 
number of subject inspectors to focus on particular subjects. But in fact, 
the ratio of teacher to HMI was large, and nowadays HMIs are largely 
centrally programmed, the time to visit school as a general inspector 
was more limited. In short, this method had its uses, but it was no 
longer a sole or prominent method for information collection. 
The final form of inspection was Inspection of LEA The overall 
picture of the national educational standards could be drawn based on 
all the inspections of individual schools. But what could not be seen 
directly, was the educational standards in one particular local education 
authority because the number of samples was too small to generalise 
anything. In order to reflect the level of educational provision in LEAs 
since they were the bodies responsible for maintaining schools, and also 
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in order to assist the Secretary of State to get to know the situation in one 
particular LEA, HM Inspectorate adopted the method of inspection of 
LEAs. 
During the inspection, a considerable number of schools were 
examined, so that the quality of those major services provided by LEAs 
could be generally revealed, though the internal organisation of the LEA 
itself was not subject to inspection. In this kind of inspection, those 
aspects which belonged to the LEAs' responsibilities such as capitation, 
provision of equipment and textbooks, building and teacher qualification 
and performance, were intensively examined in particular. 
Briefly, the inspection of LEAs was created to cater for the needs of 
drawing a regional picture of educational quality, perhaps as a result of 
the emphasis on LEAs' accountability. However, this type of inspection 
was done by inspecting school samples, rather than by examining the 
organisation of LEA itself. 
In short, HMI employed quite a number of forms of inspection. 
Though the importance attached to them and the frequency employed 
varied from time to time, they served different purposes. A combination 
of them provided a very good system by which the functions were 
satisfactorily fulfilled. 
4.2 HMI and the Local Advisory Services 
The local education authorities advisory services, composed of corps 
of "inspectors" or "advisers", form part of the mechanism of quality 
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control in education in England. Like HMI, they have a long history 
which started from the end of last century. However, till now, and 
probably in the future too, the LEA advisory services do not represent a 
single service organised nationally. Rather, they operate as separate 
individual local services relating to the needs of individual LEAs. 
Therefore, variations in terms of number, quality, specialist coverage, 
functions, and influence of these advisory services are enormous, which 
manifests the feature of a decentralised system. If HMI works to assist 
the Secretary of State in the discharge of his responsibilities, the work of 
the local advisers, or inspectors, assists LEAs in the performance of 
their functions. However, while admitting some common elements in 
the roles of these two organisations, one has to reckon that they are two 
separate but complementary systems. 
Leaving aside the history and the future of the LEA advisory services, 
this discussion concentrates on the function of the LEA advisory services 
and the relationship with HMI prior to 1988, to be in line with the HMI 
practice at that time. 
In 1984, the then Secretary of State drafted a statement concerning 
the role of the LEA advisory services. According to this draft, the LEA 
advisory services carried out the following inter-related functions (DES, 
1984). 
First, they provided the LEAs with assessments, based on detailed 
knowledge and first hand observation, of the quality of education 
provided by its institutions and by their teachers. Bearing the similar 
task of monitoring and assessing the state of education, the LEA 
advisory services did it locally. In addition, they did not regard the 
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formal and in depth inspection, or called full inspection in the case of 
HMI, as the most effective way of evaluating the quality of educational 
provision. (DES, 1984, p4). Rather, the advisers preferred to adopt 
informal visits over time and other supportive means to achieve the goal 
of collecting information. Another difference in the way of carrying out 
the same function between LEA advisers and HM Inspectors was that 
the advisers were expected to be familiar with their institutions to such a 
degree that each institution was known well by at least one adviser. They 
should have up-to-date knowledge of its curriculum and organisations, 
even the quality of the individual teachers. This, was certainly an 
unachievable goal for HMIs. 
Second, they worked in support of schools and other educational 
establishments. In performing this function, the advisers acted as 
agents for change. They either initiated the innovation and implemented 
it in cooperation with the schools, or encouraged schools' move and 
provided support and advice on improvement. The aspect they were 
concerned with included almost every aspect of educational provision, in 
particular, curriculum. They might work alongside school teachers for 
a period of time, they might bring together relevant schools and colleges 
and support their cooperation and joint innovation, or sometimes they 
might even help the schools to obtain extra resources to facilitate their 
good practice. This, again, seemed to be a difficult task for HMI. 
Because HMI was heavily loaded with the task of inspection. Plus the 
factor of large HMI to school ratio, it was virtually impossible to work 
very closely with each school over a period of time. Thus, apart from the 
suggestions that HMI could offer on the spot of visits and inspections, 
other advice and support could only be given through indirect means 
such as nationwide accessible publications and INSET courses. 
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Third, the advisory services supported teacher development and 
advised on teachers management. Apart from inducting and assessing 
probationers and new school heads, the advisers spent considerable 
amount of time involved in teacher and headship appointments. By 
organising in-service training, the advisory services kept teachers 
up-to-date and helped teachers' career development. All these tasks 
could be attributed to the simple reason: it was the LEAs not the DES 
that employed and deployed teachers. In order to maintain educational 
standards, the quality of teaching staff was undoubtedly vital. Therefore, 
promoting the professional standards of these teachers became one of 
the most important concerns of the LEAs. HMI did not have such duty 
as assessing individual teachers' performance. To HMI, inspecting 
teaching quality was inspecting one of the elements that affect pupil 
learning, so its assessment of teaching in schools had nothing to do 
with the promotion or demotion of the teachers. Though case like that 
did happen as a result of the HMI inspection, it was the LEAs' decision, 
not HMI's. 
Finally, the function of the LEA advisory services was reflected in its 
work on local and national initiatives. Locally, these initiatives might 
arise from the decisions of elected members, or from LEAs' policies. 
Nationally, they might arise from new national legislation, or from the 
responses which the LEA made to national policies. Usually under these 
circumstances, advisers were likely to be involved not only in helping 
LEAs' policy formulation, but also the subsequent detailed work needed 
to secure policy implementation. In this respect, HMI worked 
differently. What was similar to the local advisory service, was the duty 
to keep monitoring the state of education undergoing changes resulted 
from the initiatives, and to advise politicians on policy making. But what 
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was dissimilar to the local advisers was that HMI was an independent 
body responsible for safeguarding educational standards. It was not 
obliged to enforce the implementation of DES policies. Instead, it had the 
duty to observe the implications of these policies on the quality of 
education. Although in reality, HMIs were seen to advise schools on 
implementing national policies, it should be seen as part of its advisory 
functions to schools rather than a gesture of enforcing policy. 
The description of the functions of LEA advisory services leads to the 
following observations: 
Organisationally speaking, those two systems were totally separate. 
Both systems existed to assist their respective authorities in discharge of 
their responsibilities. As the relationship between central government 
and the LEAs was not the superior and the subordinate, HMI and the 
LEA advisory services did not have hierarchical relationship. Rather, 
the relationship was regarded by the Rayner Report as "partnership" 
(DES, 1982, p35). 
The only organisational connection was the link between the HMI 
District Inspector and the LEA CEO and advisers. But this link was not 
a statutory requirement, thus the actual degree of contact largely 
depended on the attitude of two sides, particularly, the CEO and 
advisers. Another regular way of exchanging information and ideas 
was through the National Association of Inspectors and Advisers. 
Except for these two forms of communication, there was no other official 
channels available. Nevertheless, there were some forms of joint 
working on occasional basis. For example, helping assess probationers, 
assisting with each others' programme of in-service training and 
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cooperative work on curriculum development. 
In terms of functions performed by two bodies, they were, to a 
substantial degree, different and complementary despite the existence of 
common interests. The first and obvious difference was the geographical 
scope. HMI worked across the country and had the duty of monitoring 
and assessing educational standards on a national basis, while the local 
advisory services, though bearing the same responsibitities, worked 
within their LEA limits. Secondly, the function of HMI was more 
inclined to information gathering whilst the local advisory services laid 
their emphasis on supporting and advising on school work. Thirdly, the 
local advisers had some power to facilitate the desirable improvement of 
schools, for instance, they can influence the allocation of resources for 
curriculum development. They also played an important role in 
advising on teachers' appointment and promotion. HMIs had none of 
these executive powers. They had only the right to offer advice and their 
advice was purely advisory. Fourthly, as a result of the big difference in 
HMI school ratio and adviser school ratio, local advisers visited a same 
school more frequently than HMIs. Similarly, they worked along with 
the schools over a period of time. So they were able to observe the whole 
process of development. By contrast, when HMIs walked into the school, 
what they saw was just a picture of educational performance at that 
particular moment. The sum of these snapshots formed a national 
picture of the state of education. Finally, while the local advisers were 
employees of the LEAs, HMIs were appointed by the Queen in Council 
instead of the DES. Thus the advisers were obliged to implement LEAs' 
policies whilst HMIs were free of this duty. In addition, this 
independence enables HMIs to speak out their views much more openly 
than their local counterparts. 
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To sum up, the separation of the two monitoring systems were 
largely due to the division of responsibilities between central and local 
government. They performed different but complementary functions in 
response to the needs of their respective authorities. Though in fact 
there were some cases of joint work, there was still much room for 
further cooperation and strengthened relationship. 
4.3 The Effect of the 1988 ERA on HMI's Future Work 
The 1976 the Ruskin Speech launched an intensive debate on 
educational standards and on accountability. One of the outcomes of this 
debate was the emergence of the Education Reform Act in 1988 bringing 
in five important changes: the introduction of national curriculum, the 
arrangement for more open enrolment, the delegation of financial 
control to school level, the establishment of grant-maintained schools 
and the creation of city technology colleges. For ordinary schools and 
colleges, the first three innovations had, and still have, enormous 
impact on their work, as the Act altered two main aspects of educational 
service: professional matters and management matters. The 
consequence of the ERA, from the perspective of the power balance 
among three partners, was that the power of central government and 
schools increased whilst that of the LEAs decreased. But the 
professional autonomy of the teachers at the same time was reduced. In 
addition, the fourth partner represented by school governors and 
parents emerged though its influence was not as strong as the three 
better established partners. To the DES, one of its most significant 
achievements was its entering the "domain" of professionals -- the 
curriculum and school organisation. Now, it was not any longer 
100 
Chapter 4: The Functions of HM Inspectorate 
excluded from the professional matters. Instead, it became one of its 
partners. 
To HMI, almost all changes brought about by the ERA have certain 
effects on its work. Because the Act is being implemented at the 
moment, many things are not stable. Consequently, HMI's work is 
changing constantly in response to practical needs. At this stage, one 
can only try to speculate on the possible changes in its work. 
Firstly, two new types of institutions are emerging --
Grant-Maintained Schools and City Technology Colleges. According to 
the functions of HM Inspectorate, it has the duty to monitor the 
educational standards in England and Wales, certainly including these 
two types of schools. Thus, visiting and inspecting these new schools 
will be taken into account when making central programme, and 
certain number of HMIs may be allocated to be specialists of this kind. It 
can be argued that these schools might be paid more attention in the 
first few years as firstly, these are the new schools with uncertainty and 
difficulties lying ahead. Secondly, the grant-maintained schools are 
favoured by the DES, HMI might have to keep a close eye on them and 
feedback promptly to the DES unless there are another special bodies set 
up for this task. 
Secondly, the role of monitoring might need to be vigorously 
strengthened. As it is the first time in the English education history that 
there has been a comprehensive and unified curriculum, the reactions 
and situations in different schools must be very different, so will the 
actual process of implementation. In addition, both open enrolment 
policy and financial delegation are having an enormous impact on the 
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management of schools, on teaching in schools, and eventually on the 
learning of pupils. From the DES' standpoint, this is the time that 
information about the state of education is most needed in order to take 
prompt and appropriate action and offer guidance. From HMI's 
standpoint, though it is mainly concerned with educational quality in 
schools, open enrolment and financial delegation have a strong 
influence on the pupil learning. So that HMIs must closely monitor the 
effects of this legislation and DES' policies on pupils' learning, in other 
words, they indirectly judge the soundness of government's policies by 
judging the effects they have on educational standards. 
Thirdly, another function which might be strengthened by HMI is 
the function of acting as professional adviser to the Secretary of State. 
Along with the deeper involvement of central government in 
professional matters, particularly in the implementation of national 
curriculum, the DES will have to listen to the opinions of HMI in order 
to make sound policies. Although other bodies like the School 
Examinations and Assessment Council and the National Curriculum 
Council have been set up especially to advise the Secretary of State on 
assessment and to keep the curriculum under review, the voice of HMI 
as a body of most experienced professionals will still have an important 
position. On the other hand, however, the possibility that HMI's views 
will be neglected also exists. As analysed earlier, the influence of the 
fourth partner in the educational system -- parents and consumers, is 
growing, and the government's policies created and encouraged this 
development. If the political reason plays a major role in deciding 
policies, or the position of the fourth partner rises too high, national 
policies might be made by amateur politicians and those "consumers" of 
the educational service without taking into account the opinions of 
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professionals. 
As to HMIs in the field, an urgent task might be to offer more 
assistance to schools and colleges on the implementation of national 
legislation, in particular, of the national curriculum. It can be 
imagined that facing great uncertainty, how badly the schools need help 
from experts about teaching and assessment. Being extremely 
experienced professionals and the supporters of the national 
curriculum, HMIs are the ideal people to do this job. It seems that it 
could be their overwhelming task for the next few years. In fact, all the 
HMIs are so engrossed in helping the implementation of ERA, they are 
now unable to allocate sufficient time and manpower to continue the 
inspections of LEAs. 
Fourthly, retaining the state of independence is becoming 
increasingly difficult for HMI. In a way, the independence of HMI is a 
means of protecting educational standard from being influenced by 
politics. Nowadays, education is attracting more and more attention, 
from the public, from the professionals, and from the politicians, 
because it is a major social service and a big spender of public funds. 
Thus, the publicisation and politicisation of education, in the author's 
view, is unavoidable. As an independent body, HMI must try very hard 
not to be involved in politics in order to retain its unique independence. 
The announcement by the Secretary of State that he was conducting "a 
thorough internal review of the structure and role of Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate" (Hansard, 4/3/1991) occurred too late for consideration in 
this thesis, however, it confirms the above analyse. 
Finally, whether or not HMI will be expected to enforce the 
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implementation of new educational legislation, was once a most 
controversial topic. Usually, once central government set up regulatory 
legislation with specific requirements, there will be some body to take 
the duty of enforcing implementation. Now that the DES has got a fairly 
specific national curriculum, the approach to get it implemented could 
be enforceable. i.e., the means like administrative punishment, or more 
likely, financial control, or even legal sanction as a last resort could be 
employed. When the national curriculum was just introduced, there 
was suspicion that HMI might be given this mission, because though 
the two recently established Councils had a score of field officers, they 
were too few to perform the function of enforcing implementation. On 
the other hand, HMI usually did not perform the function of enforcing 
the implementation of DES' policies, and it was strongly emphasising its 
status of independence and trying hard to retain its role only as a 
monitor and adviser, added to this was the fact that HMIs were 
appointed by the Queen in Council, not by the DES. Furthermore, the 
national curriculum was nor yet very specific and detailed, so there 
were reasons that HMI would not play this role. In February 1990, the 
Secretary of State clearly stated that the local advisers (or inspectors), 
not HMIs, who should be responsible for implementing the national 
curriculum. (Education, 1990, p236). Therefore, the doubt about whether 
HMI would enforce the legislation was removed. However, along with 
the more and more curriculum regulations coming out, whether the 
DES can still succeed in ensuring implementation without its own 
enforcement body, will remain to be seen. In other words, the fate of 
HMI in the future still hangs in the balance. 
After revealing the functions of HMI and its organisational 
structures and working methods, we turn the focus to the Chinese 
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inspectorate and examine similar issues in the Chinese context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE, 
INSPECTORATE IN THE EDUCATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM  
As argued earlier, an inspection system is a product of the 
educational administration system in which it is embedded. 
Accordingly, the examination of the system of inspection in China 
should be carried out within a broader scope which embraces the 
educational administration surroundings. 
Therefore, this chapter is designed to analyse briefly the system of 
educational administration in China, in particular, the organisations 
responsible for administering education at different levels, their 
respective duties and their relationships. More importantly, it 
examines the position of the Chinese inspectorate against the 
background of the administrative system both in terms of the 
organisational-structural relationship and in terms of functional 
relationships. 
5.1 General Background: Educational Administration System • 
5.1.1 The Composition of the Central Government 
As in most countries in the world, the responsibility for providing an 
educational service belongs to the state. It is stipulated in the Chinese 
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constitution that "the state is responsible for developing socialist 
education; raising scientific and cultural standards of all the people in 
the country. The state runs all kinds of educational institutions, 
universalises compulsory education, promotes secondary education, 
vocational education, and higher education, and develops preschool 
education." (the Constitution of P.R.C., Article 19, 1982). In fact, the 
state takes nearly all the responsibilities, private schools are extremely 
rare. 
Though bearing a similar obligation to provide educational service, 
the way of discharging this duty (i.e. educational administration) in 
China is different from that in most other countries, due to its unique 
conditions of politics, economy and history. In addition to this, the 
administration system has been experiencing tremendous changes 
since the announcement of the "Decision on Educational Reform" by the 
Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in 1985. In chapter 
one, the present educational reform was briefly discussed. It resulted 
primarily from the call to supply more educated and skilled labour to 
enhance economic development. The basic aims of this educational 
reform were to encourage the gearing of education to local economic 
needs and to raise the general standards of education, in particular, of 
the nine year basic education. The consequences were the delegation of 
some power from the top downwards as well as the closer link between 
education and economy in local areas. As a result, there is a 
considerable diversity of organisational structures and functions of 
educational administrative authorities in the country. In this thesis, 
only those most common patterns are to be selected and discussed. 
Generally speaking, there are two basic features worth noticing 
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when talking about China. First, China has been a centralised country 
since it was unified in 221 B.C. Therefore, the basic philosophy of public 
administration has always been centralisation and bureaucracy though 
the degree varies from time to time. In addition, China is a large 
country with several tiers of division of regions, every aspect of public 
administration itself is a hierarchy, which constitutes part of a greater 
hierarchical and bureaucratic network in the country as a whole. 
Second, the monopolistic political party the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) plays a dominant role in controlling the direction of national 
development and in formulating ideological and strategic guidelines for 
educational development. 
Theoretically, the highest organ of state power is the National 
Feople's Congress 
 (NPC) whose members represent regions all over the 
country. Supervised by the NPC, the State Council  occupies the position 
of the supreme governmental and administrative body in the country. 
Under its direct supervision, various Ministries, Commissions, and 
Offices carry out different aspects of public administration, one of which 
is the State Education Commission. Then comes the judicial organ: the 
Supreme People's Court. On the political side, it is the CCP Central 
Committee that makes final political decisions for the nation (note: not 
only for the Party). Theoretically speaking, these bodies are parallel. But 
because of the overlapping membership and interlocking directorates, 
and also because of the extremely powerful position of the CCP, these 
bodies have virtually identical attitude toward almost everything, i.e., 
those policies approved or initiated by the CCP will always be approved 
by the NPC, and then get implemented through the State Council. More 
often, it is the CCP Central Committee and the State Council that jointly 
issue regulations and documents as political and administrative 
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directives, without going through the NCP. Moreover, it is also worth 
noticing that not only central government, but also every local 
government is constituted by these four components (legislative, 
administrative, judicial and political). Each component in the local 
government receives leadership from its corresponding higher level 
authority. 
An illustration of the relationship among these four bodies is shown 
in Diagram 5 1 
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5.1.2 The Central Educational Government --- The State Education 
Commission (SEdC) 
In China, fundamental educational policies are jointly formulated by 
the CCP Central Committee and the State Council. More important 
legislation must be approved by the National People's Congress. In 
reality, the main approach by which the government exercises its 
control is administrative rather than legislative. Since the foundation of 
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the P.R.C. in 1949, only two pieces of educational legislation have been 
adopted at the NPC level, (one was the Degree System in the 1950s, and 
the other was the Law of Compulsory Education in 1986). So in reality, 
most educational activities are done by administrative means. The State, 
Education Commission, is the body primarily responsible for 
administering all the educational services in the country. It is directly 
led by the State Council, and is equivalent to a Ministry. (see 
Diagram5.1). 
Generally speaking, the main duties of the SEdC are to formulate 
general educational policies, regulations, instructions and circulars 
(and rarely but increasingly to draft the legislation to be adopted by the 
NPC) in accordance with the fundamental guidelines set by the Party; to 
undertake overall planning for educational development in the country; 
to supervise and guide the nationwide education reform; to strengthen 
the inspection force; and to coordinate the efforts of other ministerial 
authorities concerned. 
Apart from formulating national educational policies, drawing 
developmental plans and deciding implementation priority, scale, speed 
and procedure, the SEdC is also responsible for: 
(1). general administration of basic education, (primary and 
secondary education), vocational education, teacher education, special 
education, minority education and non-formal education, setting up 
some general policies and principles; 
(2). directly running some 40 universities, drawing up enrolment 
plans and graduate assignment plans, etc. Generally supervising other 
higher education institutions run by provincial level governments (but 
not specialised HE institutions which run by other Ministries, e.g., 
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Medicine and Pharmacy universities are run by the Ministry of Public 
Health); 
(3), overall planning for developing teaching force, and generally 
supervising teacher education in provinces; 
(4). supervising the compilation of textbooks, the setting of 
curriculum, and syllabus which is organised by the People's Education 
Press; 
(5). monitoring but not controlling educational funding for 
non-directly-run universities, i.e., institutions other than those 40 
directly run universities; 
(6). inspecting and supervising lower level governments and 
education authorities to help implement national policies and laws; 
(7). international exchange and overseas studies; 
(8). administering professional bodies such as the Central Research 
Institute for Educational Science, and publishing journals and various 
educational media. 
Perhaps quite different from what some people would imagine, the 
functions of the SEdC currently do not include direct running of any 
primary or secondary schools. The general responsibilities for providing 
educational services, especially primary and secondary education, 
including enrolment, developing plans, teacher recruitment, training 
and so on, all belong to various levels of local governments and 
education authorities. Educational funding is also one major item of 
local government expenditure, which is allocated out of the block grant 
from central government and local taxation. In other words, on the 
whole, the SEdC does not exercise direct financial control over 
educational provisions in localities, though special support grants 
would be given to pilot trials or to those schemes favoured by the SEdC. 
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However, the SEdC does retain the power to initiate national polices 
which local education authorities must carry out. The implementation 
is ensured by inspections carried out internally through educational 
administrative hierarchy. If the matter is more significant, then 
policies will be issued by the State Council on behalf of the SEdC, which 
confers greater importance on the policies. If the issue is even more 
important, then the circular will be issued jointly by the CCP Central 
Committee and the State Council, in which case the decisions must be 
implemented not only by relevant education authorities but also by 
relevant levels of local government as well as the political Party 
Committees placed in these governments and education authorities. (see 
the illustration of relationship in Diagram 5.3 and relevant discussion 
on page 114-115). In addition, the nationally unified curricula, textbooks 
and syllabus greatly reduce the freedom of professional teachers in 
deciding what and how to teach. The existence of Teaching Research 
Office network (which will be discussed later) throughout the country 
helps to ensure the proper implementation of the national curricula. In 
other words, the professionals at grass roots level only have the freedom 
to add materials and references which conform to the unified curricula, 
but have no right to change them. Today several changes have taken 
place in the curricula, notably, more choice of textbooks, more freedom 
in compiling supplementary material in the light of the local conditions, 
and more encouragement to experiment with new and heuristic 
teaching methods. But still, professional autonomy is relatively limited. 
By and large, the control over basic education in China is actually 
shared by two major bodies -- central and different levels of local 
education authorities. Schools and professional teachers have little say. 
Local education authorities (provincial, prefectural, county and 
township education authorities) have great influence in deciding basic 
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education in their areas; the SEdC exercises its power by formulating 
enforceable national policies and unified curricula. 
There is a Party Committee in the SEdC whose mission is to ensure 
the correct political direction of every important decision of the SEdC, 
and to administer its Party members. Apart from that, the SEdC can be 
divided into two parts-- functional departments and professional units 
to complete a line and staff system. According to its publication in April 
1989, the SEdC has 23 functional departments responsible for different 
aspects of educational service (Chinese Education Post, 25/3/1989). The 
Inspection Department is one of these with a staff of 6 at that time. 
Detailed discussion of the Chinese inspectorate will be carried out later. 
The main professional institutions and enterprises under the SEdC 
are: the Central Institute for Educational Science, and the People's 
Education Press, (the body responsible for organising textbook compiling 
and curriculum planning). The units are entrusted with the tasks of 
educational research, dissemination of research results, supply of 
educational technology and equipment, training of educational 
administrators and so on. 
A detailed organisational structure of the State Education 
Commission is shown in Diagram 5.2. 
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Diagram 5.2 The Structure of the State Education Commission 
5.1.3 Four Tiers of Local Education Authorities --- Provincial, 
Prefectural, County and Township 
Similar to the situation in many countries, educational 
administration in China is structured in accordance with the nation's 
division of administrative regions. In addition, at every level, all 
governmental organisations correspond to those at their next senior 
level. Apart from the Party Committee, (corresponding to the CCP), the 
Region's People's Congress (corresponding to the NPC) is the most 
powerful body within the district. Its executive organ --- the Region's 
People's Government (corresponding to the State Council and is usually 
called government) carries out public administration. The educational 
authority (corresponding to the SEdC) is one of the governmental 
departments. Due to the vast scale of the country, and probably also due 
to the long tradition of centralisation, the network of local education 
authorities in China is much more complicated than that in many 
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countries. The bureaucracy is composed of four tiers: provincial, 
prefectural, county and township education authorities, each bearing 
different responsibilities for educational provision to different degrees. 
Each education authority works under the direction of both its 
corresponding local government and the educational authority at its 
next senior level. The dual leadership system is supposed to ensure that 
both the central and local interests are properly reflected in the 
educational service in the locality. However, there have been several 
swings on which direction should be stressed in these four decades. 
When centralisation was stressed, the "branch dictates" (Hawkins, 
1983, p60) style was favoured which advocated top-down leadership along 
the educational line. When a decentralisation policy was pursued, the 
"area dictates" (ibid) style was welcomed which encouraged the 
education authorities to listen more to their local governments. This 
time, with the progress of recent education reform, "area dictates" is 
once again prompted in order to bring closer articulation between the 
educational service and local economic conditions. 
The bureaucratic relationships between the central and local 
education authorities (four tiers), as well as between the Regional 
People's Government and education authorities are illustrated in 
Diagram 5.3. 
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Diagram 5.3 Dual Leaders of the Education Authorities 
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5.1.3.1 The Provincial Education Department 
The Provincial Education Department is sometimes referred to as the 
intermediate body in the whole administration system because it is the 
communication channel between the central planning agency and lower 
level executive agencies. Before the education reform, the power of 
administering education used to be shared by several authorities in the 
provincial government like the Provincial Education Department for 
Schools, Adult Education Department, and Higher Education 
Department. Because of the difficulty in coordinating these agencies, 
(and more difficulties when things like finance and staffing must be 
dealt with, which required other departments' involvement), many 
provinces began to set up a comprehensive authority called the 
Provincial Education Department to administer all the educational 
services within the province. In answer to the Party's call "education 
must serve socialist construction and socialist construction must rely on 
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education", those recently established Departments appoint 
representatives from other governmental authorities (e.g.,the Finance 
Department, the Provincial Planning Commission) and large 
enterprises as part time staff to work together in order to bring mutual 
benefits. 
The functions that the Provincial Education Department carries out 
are more arduous than before, since it is no longer just the "channel". It 
has to make great efforts in drawing the blueprint for educational 
development in its region. At present, a considerable amount of effort 
and manpower is devoted to planning for compulsory education because 
most of the provinces are expected to make nine year education 
universal by 1995. 
The work of the Provincial Education Department can be roughly 
classified into the following categories: 
(1). to implement the general policies of the State Education 
Commission, to formulate additional regulations, concrete measures 
and to ensure proper implementation by strengthening inspection force; 
(2). to formulate overall development plans in its own province taking 
into account the available conditions and manpower needs; 
(3). to administer the province-run schools and universities 
including capital construction plan, enrolment plans etc; 
(4). to be responsible for basic education and other aspects of 
educational service, cooperating with other bodies if necessary; 
(5). to make plans for in-service teacher training and in-service 
administrator training; 
(6), to be involved in compiling supplementary teaching materials 
suitable for local use; 
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(7). to inspect the educational work of lower levels of government and 
their education authorities. 
Corresponding to the SEdC, the organisational layout of the 
Provincial Education Department is divided into functioning branches 
and professional units. However, it has fewer branches than the SEdC. 
Presumably this is because the province has fewer responsibilities. 
5.1.3.2 The Prefectural Education Bureau 
The administrative body below the provincial level is either the 
Prefecture or the Prefecture-Rank Municipality. The only difference 
between the prefecture and the prefecture-rank municipality is that, the 
former, as an agency of the provincial government, is commissioned to 
carry out certain tasks, whilst the latter is a relatively independent 
government which is free to make many decisions within its own 
region. Therefore, comparatively speaking, prefectural commission 
authorities have fewer bureaucratic organs than the prefecture-rank 
municipalities and less power and less independence. The recent 
tendency is for municipalities to take over responsibilities from 
prefectural commission offices to look after those counties and small 
cities which used to belong to the prefectures. It is probably because with 
the delegation of power, provinces prefer to shift some responsibilities to 
those bodies which can make their own decisions. 
On the whole, the responsibilities of the education authorities in 
prefecturs and in prefecture-rank municipalities are similar, as far as 
the basic education sector is concerned. They are obliged to: 
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(1). carry out the policies and directives from the state and the 
province, and make additional policies in the light of local situation if 
necessary; 
(2). draw up plans for the development of education in the areas, 
coordinate and balance the educational developments in its subordinate 
counties and small cities; 
(3). administer directly-run key schools; 
(4). organise in-service training for teachers and administrators, 
administer training colleges; 
(5). ensure that national curricula are properly implemented at 
county and small city level with the help of the Teaching Research 
Offices; 
(6). organise inspection of county and small city education authorities 
as well as of the schools run by prefecture itself; 
(7). in many places, to manage adult education and vocational 
education in conjunction with other governmental bodies. 
It should be noted that responsibilities for formal higher education, 
particularly full time HE institutions only belong to central and 
provincial levels. Education authorities lower than provincial level do 
not administer tertiary institutions. Their attention is focused on basic 
education, vocational education, and adult education. 
Again, the number of branches in the Prefectural Education Bureau 
is fewer than that at provincial level. But the education authorities in 
prefecture-rank municipalities have more branches than those in 
prefectures because the former take more independent responsibilities 
than the latter. 
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5.1.3.3 The County Education Bureau 
Being at the executive level in the whole educational administration 
system, the work of the County Education Bureau (and small city 
education bureau) has crucial importance. It is the county level 
education authorities that are undergoing the most severe 
transformation. The shift of responsibility for administering most 
primary and junior secondary schools to Township Education Offices 
has created an unprecedented relationship between these two levels of 
bureaucracies. 
In the past, the County Education Bureau was almost at the lowest 
level of educational administration although the township level did 
cooperate in operating primary schools. Most powers like finance, 
personnel management (including staff transfer, promotion, and school 
headship appointments), and professional guidance on syllabus, 
timetabling, and INSET were more or less in the hands of the county 
authorities. Therefore, as the township government did not have much 
educational duty, it had no separate educational agency. Usually one 
cultural-educational assistant was sufficient to cope with the daily 
business. With the deepening of the reform and further delegation of 
power aimed at bringing closer link between education and local 
conditions, junior secondary and primary schools nowadays have been 
transferred into the township's jurisdiction. However, one of the 
unsolved problems is that, until now, although the township authorities 
are required to contribute financially to the education provision, they 
actually do not have much say in matters other than money. 
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The main tasks of the County Education Bureau are to: 
(1).implement the policy and plans from its government and from 
senior level education authorities, and make supplements if desirable; 
(2). draw up development plans for universal education, and make 
great efforts to ensure implementation; 
(3). strengthen the work of the Teaching Research Office and its 
pedagogical guidance, organise in-service teacher training, organise 
various "experience exchanging" meetings to disseminate good 
practice; 
(4). administer adult education, farmer education with the help of 
other authorities; 
(5). run senior secondary schools and keypoint primary schools, 
teacher training colleges and vocational schools; 
(6). prepare the annual budget, and allocate funds to schools; 
(7). be responsible for appointing school heads, teacher transfer 
across the township, and other personnel affairs; 
(8). begin to set up an inspectorate to strengthen inspection force. 
Another important feature that needs to be noted is the role of the 
Teaching Research Office (TRO) at the county level as the county is 
actually the lowest executive level for ensuring proper implementation 
of the national curricula. Teaching Research Offices are usually located 
in Teacher Centres or sometimes Teacher Training Colleges. Members 
of the office are not administrators, instead, they are selected from 
experienced teachers though the possibility of selecting by political 
credentials cannot be ruled out. Usually the TRO is divided into several 
parts in accordance with subjects taught such as moral education, 
Chinese language, mathematics, science, English etc. Members of the 
office have the duty, in cooperation with Teacher Training Colleges, to 
121 
Chapter 5: The Position of the Chinese Inspectorate in Educational Administration 
carry out educational research on pedagogical theory, textbook content 
and methods of instruction, and to disseminate these results. In 
addition, they are required to visit schools as frequently as they can and 
to try their best to know schools well. Moreover, one further function is to 
organise in-service teacher training to help prepare the teaching 
programmes. 
5.1.3.4 The Township Education Office 
As explained earlier, the state used to employ "branch dictates" 
policy to administer educational service; local government, especially 
township government (the lowest tier of public administration) had little 
influence on educational planning and management. So the township 
government did not need a separate agency for educational service. 
Today, the new system of "local responsibility and decentralised 
administration" has been put into practice. Township government has 
to (either willingly or reluctantly) accept the financial responsibility for 
basic education, that is, primary sector and junior-secondary sector. 
The responsibilities of the Township Education Office (in some places 
only one or two persons) include: (1). admitting sufficient pupil 
according to the target set by the County Education Bureau. Having 
accomplished that, the township office then have the right to make their 
own plans; (2), levying an "extra education tax" on farms and 
township-run enterprises based on their sales, and using this money to 
improve school buildings, school resources and teachers' living 
conditions. Three years have passed since the tax levy was carried out. 
This method has not proved to be very successful on the whole, because 
of insufficient cooperation between the education office and the taxation 
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office, also because of the reluctance of farmers to pay. In addition, it 
seems that 95% of the township governments only have the duty to 
contribute money to educational service, they have little right to 
involvement in matters other than money. Many farmers think that it is 
because higher level governments want to "get rid of the financial 
burden", and to "increase the load on farmers". Therefore, after a period 
of feverish activities, problems have emerged: the imbalance between 
duty and power, the unsettled distribution of power between the county 
and the township, and the lack of professional competence of township 
officials. In short, many scholars believe that the township is the 
weakest link in the whole administration system. As one researcher 
claimed, "We should not overestimate the result of administration of 
education by township" (Tao, 1989, p41). 
As a result, at the moment, the major administrative and 
professional responsibilities are still in the hands of County Education 
Authorities, though the Township Education Offices have gained some 
power in funding matters. It is likely that more power will be delegated 
to township level along with the development of reform and 
decentralisation, but what power should be delegated, and how, 
moreover, how the township educational administration should be 
strengthened so that it is capable of taking not only financial duty but 
also other responsibilities, still remains to be seen. 
5.1.3.5 Summary 
Reviewing the education administration system in China, one can 
see that, in the first place, it is a network of centralised hierarchies 
123 
Chapter 5: The Position of the Chinese Inspectorate in Educational Administration 
composed of central and four-tiers of local government. However, it is 
not a network as rigid as many might imagine. Because of the large 
scale of the country and the consequent diversities of local 
circumstances, it is impractical and unwise to set up very detailed 
national policies and to make every local government conform to the 
rules. Hence, the responsibilities for some aspects of educational 
administration are delegated to provincial and various local education 
authorities instead of being retained in the SEdC. Nevertheless, it is still 
a centralised system on the whole. Three points justify the above 
conclusions. First, the decision of decentralising educational 
administration was issued jointly by the CCP Central Committee and 
the State Council as an administrative circular. No matter how 
powerful the circular is, it is still an administrative circular, not a piece 
of legislation. In other words, these delegated powers can be withdrawn 
as easily by a joint announcement. So this decentralisation is in the form 
of delegation, by no means devolution whereby the power and 
independence of local education authorities are ensured by legislation. 
Even if it is ensured by legislation, (such as the Law of Compulsory 
Education in which the responsibility for implementing compulsory 
education has been assigned to the local governments), it is still probable 
that administrative directives can alter legislative requirements, 
because of the overlapping membership of administrative and legislative 
bodies. Second, most of the policies and decisions are initiated by central 
government, leaving local education authorities to follow and 
implement. In fact, a considerable amount of the so-called "local 
autonomy" is actually the autonomy of deciding the ways of 
implementing the policies, rather than the autonomy of initiating some 
policies of their own. Whatever the education authorities do, they will 
have to be accountable to higher level authorities and ultimately be 
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accountable to central government. This is not a devolved system or a 
partnership system in which the central government and local 
government stand at an equal position and both are accountable to the 
same body. Third, there is little consultation and negotiation going on 
between the higher and lower level education authorities when decisions 
are being made. It is always those of higher rank who issue 
announcements and tell the junior ones what to implement. However, 
having said that, one should really point out that since the Education 
Reform was launched in 1985, more and more powers and 
responsibilities have been delegated and local initiatives have been 
encouraged, and it is likely that this trend will continue along with the 
proceeding of the reform. 
The second feature of the administration system in China, which is 
not difficult to understand, is that the lower down the administrative 
hierarchy, the less well differentiated and less sophisticated the 
organisation and responsibility -- a typical feature of a centralised 
system. For example, there are 23 functional branches in the SEdC, but 
only about 6 in the County Education Bureau, not to mention the 
township level which usually does not have separate education offices. 
Presumably it is because the higher the level, the more responsibilities it 
must bear since the system is centralised. The SEdC used to make quite 
concrete plans and the provinces made detailed plans and then "at the 
subprovincial level, relevant portions of the plans are received, adapted 
and implemented. " (Hawkins, 1983, p26). Along with changes in the 
distribution of power, and the consequent change of functions of 
education authorities, it is likely that some branches would be merged 
whilst some others would be split, and education authorities at lower 
levels would expand their organisations. 
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Finally, one can probably feel, from the discussion of the recent 
changes in educational administration, that the delegation of power 
may well result in difficulty for the higher level authorities in keeping 
their junior education authorities under reasonable control, as the 
Chinese have not yet got used to such a degree of decentralisation. In 
addition, how the power should be distributed so as to benefit educational 
development is still in a trial stage. Facing the fluctuating and 
uncertain changes in the reform of educational administration, how is 
the newly restored inspectorate going to gain its foothold? What is its 
present position in the whole educational administration system? 
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5.2 The Position of the Inspectorate in the Educational 
Administration System 
Theoretically speaking, the chain of educational administration (and 
indeed, any form of administration) is composed of three basic parts: 
policy making, implementation, and evaluation. Absence of any of these 
three components will brake the chain, thus affecting the smooth 
operation of the system. Clearly, given the already existing policy 
making group (heads of education authorities and Party Committees) 
and the implementation groups (various administrative branches 
within the education authorities), the inspectorate takes the role of 
evaluation. 
5.2.1 Brief History of Inspection in China Prior to 1986. 
In China, the activity of educational inspection in a broad sense, has 
been a practice for more than 2000 years of the existence of an education 
system. But the system of inspection was not instituted until 1906, 
during the Qing dynasty. 12 "supervision offices" were appointed to be 
responsible for visiting local authorities and schools in the country and 
for reporting to the central government on the state of education. Each 
province also had several people who acted as inspectors. Since then, the 
practice of inspection has developed quickly. (Mao, 1988, p1-4; Zhang, 
1987, p175; Bai,1987,p7). For example, in 1913, during the period of the 
Sun Yat-Sen government, not only was a separate department created 
within the then Ministry of Education, but also a series of statutory 
regulations of inspections was issued. In the 1930s, when the 
Kuomintang government was trying to make basic education universal, 
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a complete system of inspection from central Ministry to county bureau 
was set up. Very concrete decrees had been put into practice with 
emphasis on the inspection of local government about policy 
implementation and on quality of school education. On one hand, one 
can say that the development of educational inspection during that four 
decades (1906-1949) had not been constant due to the frequent and radical 
political changes, (Qing dynasty-- Sun Yat-Sen government --
Kuomintang government -- Communist revolution). On the other hand, 
the system did become more and more complete. What is more, one 
feature which ran though the evolution was that emphasis was always 
on inspection to ensure policy implementation. 
In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party took over state power 
from the Kuomintang government, every aspect of the social system 
underwent a revolutionary transformation including the educational 
inspection system. An inspection department was set up within the then 
Ministry of Education immediately after the foundation of new China. 
In addition, it would be fair to say that, in the '50s, especially in the early 
'50s, educational inspection was highly valued by many education 
authorities and professionals. Apart from a central inspectorate, many 
provinces and counties also had their own corps of inspectors. Others 
appointed some administrators as part-time inspectors to carry out 
inspection tasks. The main tasks, according to Jing's 1988 research, 
were to: 
(1), find out the proceedings of schools and lower level authorities 
implementing government policies; 
(2), collect comments and requests from teachers and parents; 
(3), get to know the situation of pupils' study and life; 
(4), assess the performance of cadres and teachers; 
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(5), sum up and disseminate advanced experience, and so on (Jing, 
1988, p12). 
In 1955, the then Ministry of Education specially issued a circular to 
require local education authorities to strengthen their inspection work. 
It instructed that inspectors should have a clear goal and a 
well-conceived plan, and should cooperate well with the inspected local 
government. It seems from recent research findings and the 
recollections of some administrators that, though ensuring policy 
implementation was given top priority, advising on school teaching and 
disseminating good practice were also emphasised by the state and 
manifested in practice at that time. (Nanjing Education Bureau, 1988, 
p1-2, Jing, 1988, p30, Sheng, 1988, p32). The inspection team in Gansu 
province was even described as a body mainly advising on professional 
matters such as teaching and textbooks, and carrying out little 
inspection. (Sheng, 1988, p32). 
However, in the late 1950s, the endless political movements have 
resulted in frequent changes in the functions and organisational 
structures of educational authorities. In accordance with the left-wing 
principle, "Party decides everything", educational decisions were made 
solely by members of Party Committee without much consultation with 
professionals, or even with administrators. Under that circumstance, 
the inspectorate was subject to a very difficult position. As the current 
chief of the central inspectorate said when he was giving a lecture, " it 
(the then inspectorate) could not inspect the Party Committee and 
criticise it, otherwise it would be charged with being against the Party 
leadership. It was also felt to be meaningless to inspect school heads or 
professional administrators in the education authorities who had no 
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claim on educational administration' (Zhen, 1989). Apart from political 
reasons, the lack of sufficient communication and effective cooperation 
between the inspectorate and other administrative branches (e.g., 
primary education branch) also accounted for the later abolition of the 
inspectorate. There was no clear division of responsibilities between 
these two parts, sometimes the inspectorate interfered in the work of 
other branches by giving instructions to schools without discussing 
them with those branches in advance. Similarly, the inspectors 
sometimes were not able to advise schools promptly because they were 
not informed about the arrangements of other branches. All these 
shortcomings, together with the increasing left-wing political current 
which stressed unified Party dictationship, brought about the abolition of 
inspection system in 1958. In the period of the Cultural Revolution, even 
the Ministry of Education was abolished, not to mention the 
inspectorate. The left-wing Party controlled everything, political needs 
became the sole aim of education. 
In short, although the inspectorate was set up in the '50s and 
operated normally for the first 6-7 years, its functions and organisations 
were soon twisted by several political movements, until its abolition. In 
addition, the inspectorate lacked sufficient communication with the rest 
of the education authority, and also lacked sound criteria for evaluating 
educational standards. (Jing, 1988, p5; Nanjing Education Bureau, 1988, 
p2; Bai, 1987, p8). 
After the Cultural Revolution, as restoration started, so did the 
educational system. As early as in 1977, Deng Xiaoping instructed the 
then Ministry of Education to "find some people, at least 20, who are in 
their 40s to visit schools every day, to sit in classes and find out the state 
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of policy implementation, then to come back and report. Only in this way 
can the problems be reflected and solved quickly." In 1981, the then 
Ministry of Education called for the restoration of inspectorial activity at 
every level of educational authority. In response to the call, some 
authorities even established inspection teams whose task was more 
inclined to advise schools and lower level education authorities and 
provide feedback to the employing authorities. For example, the 
inspection branch in Nanjing Education Bureau recalled that its task 
was to "feedback, guide and advice" (Nanjing Education Bureau, 
1988,p4). In 1983, a document named "Suggestions on Setting Up 
Inspection System in the Basic Education Sector" was published by the 
State Education Commission. Subsequently, several places, e.g. Ninbo 
and Tongxian, were selected as subjects of pilot experiments. In 1986, 
the ex-Party Leader Mr. Zhao Ziyang said clearly in his report that "we 
must strengthen the administration of education. We must gradually 
establish a systematic system of evaluation and inspection." (Report on 
the Fourth Plenary of the Sixth National People's Congress, 1986). 
In 1986, the State Council issued the document "Some Observations of 
Realising Compulsory Education "on behalf of the SEdC. In this 
document, the education inspection system was clearly mentioned and 
required to be restored to be "responsible for inspection and guidance on 
implementing compulsory education in its area, and to cooperate with 
local governments to solve various problems which have emerged.•' 
(East China Normal University, 1987, p361). Finally, at the end of 1986, 
after several years' preparation and trial, the Department of Inspection 
was created within the State Education Commission. Six people were 
allocated to that department. At the beginning of the next year, a 
guiding circular -- "Summary of Conference on Educational Inspection" 
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was published. It still serves as a guiding document today though it 
seems to be a bit out-dated. By the end of 1988, 24 out of 31 provinces, and 
138 out of 334 prefectures had set up such organisations. By 1990, all 
provinces had done so. Meanwhile, those inspectorates already existing 
had been strengthened. For example, the number of central inspectors 
has increased from originally six to more than a dozen. More and more 
county rank inspectorates are being set up. 
The reasons for the return of the inspectorate have been discussed in 
Chapter One. Briefly, it is the natural consequence of a decentralised 
administration brought about by the Decision of Education Reform in 
1985; it is an essential organisational measure to ensure the 
achievement of compulsory education; it is a means of making 
educational management more scientific and effective. 
5.2.2 The Nature of the Newly Restored Inspectorate 
As early as in 1983, the then Ministry of Education drafted some 
guidelines for the inspection work which already existed in some 
education authorities. Some of the clauses are obviously inapplicable to 
the current development. Regardless of those out-dated clauses, the 
fundamental spirit is still valid. The more recent 1987 SEdC document 
"Summary of the Conference on Educational Inspection" reconfirmed 
the most important feature of the Chinese inspectorate -- the 
administrative nature of the inspectorate. (SEdC, 1987a, pl). Educational 
inspection was defined as "local governments and their educational 
authorities at all levels authorising their inspectorates and inspectors to 
inspect, examine, guide, and advise the educational work of lower level 
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local governments, educational authorities and schools". (ibid). 
The nature of the inspectorate is administrative -- it is a functioning 
administrative organisation. This statement indicates three points: 
first, the authority of the inspectors and the legitimacy of their carrying 
out inspections are basically, if not entirely, based on their 
administrative status and according power. Second, the inspectors have 
the executive administrative power to enforce, if necessary, the 
implementation of legislation and certain national policies. It 
determines that the inspectorate is neither a research nor a consultant 
body which only perform advisory functios. On the contrary, it has 
certain powers to stop immediately those activities which violate the 
national educational principles and legislation. It has the right to 
recommend education authorities to reward those who perform well. 
Third, since the inspectorate does not directly participate in 
decision-making and actual implementation, its administrative power 
(especially the power to give instructions and directives) is less than that 
of other administrative branches in education authorities. i.e., 
comparatively speaking, it has a more advisory and guidance role. 
It is not surprising that the Chinese inspectorate is an 
administrative body within educational authorities (or directly under the 
supervision of local government in some cases. i.e., enjoying equal 
administrative rank as the education authority) when one considers the 
reasons for which the inspectorate was set up. Bearing the prime duty of 
seeing the national legislation and policies are complied with, especially 
in the period when resistance exists, the administrative power would be 
vital for the completion of inspectors' missions. If they had only the right 
to offer advice which could be turned down by the inspected education 
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authorities or schools, their task certainly could not be fulfilled. It is, 
then, also not surprising that the authority of the inspectorate is built 
upon its administrative power and the inspector's position. In many 
places, the head of the education authority also concurrently holds the 
post of chief of the inspection branch. 
5.2.3 The Organisational Structure of the Chinese Inspectorate 
5.2.3.1 The Leadership Issues 
The Chinese inspectorate is structured in accordance with the 
administration system. It is composed of four tiers: central, provincial, 
prefectural and county inspectorate. (Townships do not have a separate 
inspectorate). There are 31 provinces in the country, 11 prefectures in 
one province, and 8.6 counties in one prefecture on average (SEdC, 1986, 
p2). The average number of inspectorate personnel is 13 (national level), 
8-10 (provincial inspectorate), 6-8 (prefectural inspectorate), and 5-6 
(county inspectorate). The intention of the central inspectorate is to 
complete the establishment of inspectorates at provincial and 
prefectural level first, then turn the focus downwards to county level. 
Every local inspectorate has two supervisors. For most inspectorates, 
one is their education authorities, the other is the inspectorate at their 
next senior level. For a few inspectorates in the country, one of the 
leaders is their local governments instead of their education authorities. 
In his dissertation, Xia claims that, leaving aside the inspectorate at 
higher level, there are two ways of putting the inspectorate in 
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educational administration system. One is to let it work under the 
leadership of its education authority and be accountable to it. The other 
is to let it become a functioning body directly under the leadership of its 
corresponding government. That is to say, under the former, it belongs 
to education authorities while under the latter, it directly belongs to the 
government and stands at the same administrative rank as its 
education authority. In reality, both cases exist though the number of 
latter cases appears much smaller. 
The relationship among inspectorate, education authority, and local 
government, inspectorate at higher level is shown in Diagram5.4. 
Diagram 5.4: The Organisational Position of Inspectorate in the 
Administration System 
Case I 
Inspectorate Under Educ. Authority 
Inspectorate 
In cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou,Wuxi, Nangjing and Dalian, the 
inspectorates are accountable to their employing education authorities. 
But in cities like Beijing and Shengyang, and a number of counties in 
some provinces, the inspectorates are directly supervised by the local 
governments in their areas. The co-existence of these two relationships 
135 
Chapter 5: The Position of the Chinese Inspectorate in Educational Administration 
has to do with the administrative base of the inspectorates. As 
mentioned in the last section, in China, the authority and the legitimacy 
to inspect are almost totally based on the administrative position of the 
inspectors. If the inspectorate is attached to its education authority 
instead of the local government, it will find itself one rank lower than 
the inspected government when it inspects the government (not the 
education authority) at its next lower level. (see Diagram 5 3). According 
to the regulations of the Chinese public administration, a department of 
a government administratively has the same rank as its next lower level 
government. For example, the provincial education authority is at the 
same rank as prefectural government, meanwhile, the provincial 
inspectorate, as one branch, is one rank lower than its employing 
provincial education authority, therefore, the provincial inspectorate is 
one rank lower than prefectural government administratively. 
Therefore, when the provincial inspectorate has to inspect the prefecture 
government on compulsory education matters, for instance, it will 
certainly feel odd to inspect its administrative superior. Sometimes 
when the inspectors carry out such tasks, they are not given due 
treatment by the inspected government. In an extreme case, the 
chairman of the government sent his personal culture-education 
secretary to receive the inspectorate. In view of this embarrassing 
situation, many inspectors appeal strongly that they must directly 
belong to their government instead of education authorities in order to 
raise their administrative status. 
However, what administrative rank the inspectorate can have is not 
up to the inspectorates themselves to decide. It entirely depends on 
various levels of local government which approve the establishment of 
inspectorate. On the whole, a majority of inspectorates is still working 
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under education authorities, just as other administrative branches in 
the education authorities. But there are a small number of inspectorates 
backed by their local governments which enjoy higher administrative 
status, which might well become a model for future development of 
some inspectorates. 
5.2.3.2 Internal Division of the Inspectorate 
As to the division of personnel within the inspectorate itself, there are 
several criteria, according to the author's research findings. They are: 
phase, district, and current task, though chance of using the last one is 
quite rare. Although inspectorates are usually small with 8-10 
personnel on average, many of them still divide themselves by phase, 
i.e., a group of inspectors look after the primary sector and others 
secondary, in order to reach closer cooperation with the primary 
education branch and the secondary education branch in the education 
authority. However, there are many inspectorates which do not have 
internal division at all. A prefectural inspector told the author that they 
had only two inspectors, so "what is the point of dividing between two of 
us'?" 
Another feature of the Chinese inspectorate is that it appoints both 
full-time and part-time inspectors. The combination of insufficient 
number of inspectors and vast amount of inspection work account for 
this feature. According to the regulations of the Chinese public 
administration, the Staffing Department of each government 
determines the number of staff that each bureau can appoint. (e.g., 
Education Bureau, and Public Health Bureau). Hence the number of 
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inspectors that the education authority can have must be approved by 
that Department. Unfortunately, the number of inspectors authorised is 
much smaller than actually needed, because of the current movement to 
reduce the number of government staff. The solution adopted by the 
education authorities, therefore, is to reduce the number of staff in other 
administrative branches in order to subsidise the inspection branch. 
Meanwhile, they appoint some part-time inspectors to cushion the 
shortage of inspectors. From the interviews with inspectors from several 
prefectures and counties, the author got to know that part-time 
inspectors exist in almost every inspectorate. The ratio of PT to FT 
inspectors vary from 1:2 to nearly 1:1. In some city districts PT 
inspectors are more numerous than FT inspectors. Most PT inspectors 
are chosen from retired administrators and school heads who have quite 
rich experience in educational administration and school management 
as well as in teaching. 
However, although the central inspectorate has repeatedly stressed 
that the majority of inspectors must be in mid career, in some places, 
even full time inspectors are those nearly retired educationists in their 
60s whose efficiency is likely to be impaired by their health. One 
consideration might be that although they are old, they are experienced 
so that the advantage of being influential is very helpful. In some other 
cases, however, the inspectorate becomes a "charitable place" full of 
those who have not reached retirement age but are incapable of hard 
work because of health problems. On the whole, in a considerable 
number of education authorities, the importance of having an 
inspectorate has not yet been understood by many people. In turn, things 
get worse when the inspectorate cannot justify its existence by showing 
its importance. 
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5.2.3.3 Relationship Among Inspectorates at Different Levels 
As a typical feature of a centralised system, higher level authorities 
in a hierarchy are bound to have influence on the lower authorities. In 
the 1987 "Summary of Conference on Educational Inspection", It was 
stated that every local inspectorate must accept the leadership of both its 
local government and the inspectorate at its next higher level. It was 
also pointed out clearly that the supervision of the latter only took the 
form of professional guidance. To put it in another way, the higher level 
inspectorates are not responsible for managerial matters of their next 
junior inspectorates, such as appointing staff, deciding funding (it is the 
job of the local government). However, they have certain responsibilities 
for supervising matters concerning with inspection work proper of the 
lower level inspectorates. For example, to influence their inspection 
programmes, and to coordinate the work of their junior inspectorates. 
In reality, however, this relationship is very vague and weak due 
largely to the incompleted construction of the system itself. Every 
inspectorate is fully devoted to setting up its own business. So far, little 
effort has been made by higher level inspectorates to coordinate or to 
supervise their subordinate inspectorates. Thus it is fair to say that the 
relationship among inspectorates at different levels has not yet been well 
established. Several inspectorates the author visited were doing work by 
themselves without any guidance from their superiors, simply because 
senior inspectorates had not yet been set up, or were just set up a short 
time before. 
On the whole, the current transactions between two levels of 
inspectorates are limited to the exchange of annual plans and work 
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reviews, to submission or transmission of the inspection reports carried 
out by each inspectorate. 
The plans of higher level inspectorate do not have much influence on 
the plans of its junior inspectorates. All inspectorates are working 
under the leadership of their education authorities or directly under 
corresponding local governments. When the author asked the inspectors 
in the questionnaire: "When your inspectorate is making inspection 
plans, which side's requests are considered most important?, the 
employing education authority, higher level inspectorate, or schools?" 
The answer was: 17 out of 61 respondents claimed that the proposal of 
the higher inspectorate was considered to take first place, 33 claimed 
that the requests of the employing education authorities and local 
governments held most weight, and last, 11 of them said that the 
schools' expectations had major influence. This clearly shows that the 
main determinant of the inspectorate's work is its employing 
educational authority's wishes, not its higher inspectorate's. (N.B. the 
details of the field work design are to be given at the beginning of 
Chapter Six and in the appendices). 
Nevertheless, there is always some influence on the lower 
inspectorates asserted by the higher ones, especially when the latter 
decides to carry out an inspection in the lower inspectorate's area, 
which means that the lower level inspectorate will have to plan its work 
alongside the intention of its senior inspectorate to cooperate in the 
inspection. Usually, the lower level inspectorate is made responsible for 
coordinating all the necessary preparations including pre-reviews, both 
at governmental level and at school level, or even mock inspections. 
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For example, in 1989 and in early 1990, in response to the State 
Council's concern about the state of education, the central inspectorate 
initiated a nationwide "aspect inspection" (i.e. only inspecting some 
aspects of the performance of schools, education authorities and local 
government). Given very short notice, every provincial inspectorate, 
(and subsequently every prefectural and county inspectorate) had to give 
up completely their original plans and devote all their manpower to 
preparing for the national inspection. 
Apart from that, however, the higher level inspectorates do not have 
much influence on their subordinates, partly, as argued before, due to 
the incomplete system itself, and partly due to the present emphasis on 
local government's leadership rather than the top-down approach 
within the educational hierarchy. 
In short, the Chinese inspectorate consists of four tiers, one 
national, three local, in accordance with the educational administration 
system. Apart from receiving leadership from the inspectorate at next 
higher level, the inspectorates are at the same time either working 
under their education authorities, or directly under their local people's 
governments. In addition, the influence of local authorities seems 
stronger than that of the superior inspectorate, because of the "area 
dictates" principle. The inspectorates at different levels have not yet 
established stable and systematic relationships as many of them have 
not yet completed their own organisations. 
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5.3 Summary 
The educational inspection system does not exist in a vacuum. 
Instead, it is very closely related to, and largely determined by its 
surrounding educational administration system. This axiomatic 
assumption justifies the description of the current educational 
administration system in China as a background for an examination of 
the inspection system. 
The birth of the new inspection system in China, has very much to do 
with administrative decentralisation and, more directly, with the Law of 
the Nine Year Compulsory Education. Given the problems in reality and 
the urgency in realising universal education, the administrative power 
is very important for the inspectors. Plus the already existence of the 
professional body --- Teaching Research Office (TRO), the nature of the 
inspectorate naturally becomes adminstrative. 
The work of the TRO, which will be discussed later, only involves 
curriculum matters, teaching and learning, and in-service training of 
teachers. However, this does not mean that the inspectorate can exclude 
itself from issues such as curriculum, teaching methods, and 
teaching-learning. Firstly, as a body for monitoring the state of 
education and evaluating educational standards, the inspectorates, 
especially those at lower levels and conducting school inspections, can 
by no means avoid being concerned with curriculum matters as this is 
one of the most important aspects of school work. In addition, members 
of the Teaching Research Office do not inspect teaching as regularly as 
inspectors visit schools. When they inspect, they seldom inspect pupils' 
learning as a whole (they usually inspect on a subject by subject basis). 
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Thirdly, the TRO members are not entitled to examine other parts of 
school performance other than in professional matters. Therefore, the 
inspectorate will still have much connection with the Teaching 
Research Office and will still have a very important role to play in 
judging overall teaching-learning quality in one school or one area, 
particularly in linking educational quality with educational provision 
and administration. The question is: to what extent, should the 
inspectorate be involved in professional matters and how? 
Apart from arguing for the professional element in the nature of the 
inspectorate, as a supplementary to the administrative one, the author 
would also like to argue for another important role of the inspectorate, 
apart from the present role as a supervisor of policy implementation. At 
present, the main task of the inspectorate is to help implement the new 
legislation. To do this, specific national regulations and legislation need 
to be enforced and implemented. Hence the administrative authority 
enables inspectors to carry our their duties. The co-existence of two 
leaders (education authority or directly local government) and the 
stronger and stronger call for the promotion of the inspector's 
administrative rank clearly shows the importance of administrative 
authority in enforcing policy implementation. 
Having emphasised the importance of administrative power, 
particularly in the next few years, one needs to look at the advisory role 
that inspectors ought to play, and are likely to play more in the long run. 
With the further decentralisation, local government will have more 
freedom in managing education, which the central government cannot 
enforce. For example, today, planning for compulsory education is 
almost totally within the discretion of the provincial government. The 
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central inspectorate can only comment on and give advice to the plan, 
but can hardly force the plan to be altered in the way preferred by the 
centre. Therefore, the inspectorate's advisory function should also be 
paid sufficient attention. Anything concerned with the advisory role 
should be well considered, for example, inspectors' qualifications and 
experience in teaching and administration, the method of performing 
advisory functions and so on. 
To summarise, it is the centralised system of the Chinese 
educational administration, the long history of bureaucracy, and the 
current urgency in implementing recent legislation that make the 
Chinese inspectorate very much a component of administration. This is 
manifested in the fact that the inspectors have power to enforce some 
national legislation and regulations. Nevertheless, many aspects of 
administration nowadays have been delegated to local authorities, thus, 
the inspectors do have some aspects that they cannot enforce, but may 
advise. Finally, the work of the nationwide Teaching Research Office 
makes it necessary for the inspectorate to be concerned with professional 
matters in a different but cooperative way. 
Even so, what are the functions of the contemporary Chinese 
inspectorate? To what extent, does it fulfil its duties? These are the 
questions that the field research was aimed at. The findings are to be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE CHINESE INSPECTORATE --, 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND ISSUES  
As with any new system in the early stages, the Chinese inspectorate 
is desperately trying its best to grow up. Sufficient personnel must be 
selected, training must be given in one form or another, organisations 
must be set up, working regulations must be laid down, different ways of 
working must be tried out, and criteria for evaluating educational 
standards must be drawn up and put into practice. All this work is 
essential for the effective running of an organisation. But because of the 
different conditions in different areas, there is a great diversity in the 
work of the inspectorates across the country. In addition to that, as the 
actual organisation of the inspectorate only started a few years ago, plus 
the fact that it is a very new system in which very few people have 
experience, there is not much literature available to study, or even to 
describe the present development. Most of the literature found consists 
only of the reasons for setting up an inspection system. 
In view of the shortage of, as well as the importance of the 
information, the author conducted some field work in 1989 in an attempt 
to reveal the key issues and problems in the present inspection system so 
that relevant comparisons can be made with HM Inspectorate and 
recommendations can be proposed. A detailed summary of the field 
work, which included observations, interviews, and questionnaires, can 
be found in the appendix. The general picture is as follows: 
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Table 6.1 General Summary of the Field Work in China 
Methods Number 
1.0bservation 2 ( 1 	 inspection + 1 	 routine visit ) 
2.Interview 23 (12 inspectors+ 4 administrators+ 
7 schoolheads ) 
3.Questionnaire 205 ( 76 insp + 52 admins + 77 heads) 
The field work was composed of three parts: 
(1). Observation: 1 aspect inspection of a secondary school in 
Shanghai, and 1 routine visit to a primary school in Shanghai (Aspect 
Inspection: An inspection which examines only particular aspect(s) of 
educational standards in schools or educational provisions of education 
authorities); 
(2). Interviews: 23 people from 6 provinces (20% of the provinces in 
the country) ; 
(3). Questionnaires: 3 sets of questionnaires were designed for 3 
groups of people: inspectors, administrators, and primary and 
secondary school head teachers. Each group contained 110 samples 
selected from 10 provinces in the country. The numbers of respondents 
are as follows: 
inspectors: 	 76 	 response rate= 76/110=69% 
administrators: 52 
	 response rate= 52/110=47% 
school heads: 	 77 	 response rate= 77/110=70% 
Apart from the 76 inspector respondents, there were another 10 
inspectors who sent letters to explain their difficulty in filling in the 
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questionnaires. They complained that although they had received 
inspection training, they still remained in their old occupations because 
the inspectorates in their areas had not been set up. The administrator 
respondents and school head respondents faced a similar situation. 
Because of the nonexistence of inspectorates in their areas, some of 
them were unable to complete the first part of the questionnaire, which 
was the evaluation of inspectorate's work. Instead, they could only 
manage the second part, which was the expectations of the roles of the 
inspectorate. 
A breakdown of the respondents by their levels and positions is 
shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2a Breakdown of Inspectors (N=76) 
level 
7 provincial prefectural county 
did not 
indicate 
% 6.6 47.4 36.8 9.2 
Table 62b Breakdown of Administrators by Level and Position (N=52) 
evei 
% 
pro- 
yin- 
cial 
pre- 
fec- 
tural 
coun-did 
ty 
not 
indi- 
cate 
P9si.  
ion  % 
LEA 
head 
branch 
head 
stsff did not 
indi-
cate 
% 5.8 26.9 30.8 36.5 % 7.7 23.1 32.7 36.5 
Table 6.2c Breakdown of School Heads (N= 77) 
type primary 
school head 
secondary 
school head 
did not 
indicate 
% 29.9 33.8 36.4 
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In addition, the field work unfortunately coincided with the 
happening of the "Tiananmen Square Event", which enormously 
affected the research plan. Inter-province interviews became extremely 
difficult as the railway system was almost at a standstill, and the 
number of observations had to be cut as there were no buses running 
around the city. Once the author had to walk for four hours in order to be 
on time for the observation. In short, though the results on the whole are 
not as bad as had been feared, they could have been better if the event 
had not occurred. 
6.1 Some Facts About the Chinese Inspectors 
It goes without saying that the quality of the inspectors themselves is 
of prime influence on the successful accomplishment of their missions. 
In view of the functions that they performed (which will be discussed in 
the next section), the inspectors were selected either from 
administrators or from school heads. In the former case, the education 
authorities transferred administrators from primary education and 
secondary education branches to the inspection branch. In the latter 
case, inspectors were chosen from experienced school heads. Having 
checked the background and performance of the candidates, the Party 
Committees of the education authorities (or local governments if the 
inspectorate was directly supervised by the local government) decided 
the appointments. 
The survey conducted in June 1989 revealed some facts about the 
inspectors themselves. 
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Table 6.3a: Age Distribution of the Inspectors (N=72) 
1503 <30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >60 
No. of 
people 
0 4 23 40 5 
cY0 0 5.6 31.9 55.6 6.9 
Table 6.3b: Academic Qualifications of the Inspectors (N=73) 
Degree 
post 
graduate 
graduate college 
secondary 
school 
 
primary 
school 
 
No. of 
people 
0 33 18 21 1 
0/0 0 45.2 24.7 28.8 1.4 
Table 6.3c Positions Before Joining the Inspectorate (N=72) 
position schoolhead 
school 
teacher 
retired 
head 
retired 
administr, 
adminis-
trator others 
No. of 
people 27 5 0 3 33 
4 
0/0 37.5 6.9 0 4.2 45.8 5.6 
Table 6.3d: Years of Teaching Experience (N=71) 
No. of 
years 0 1 - 5 6-10 11-15 >15 
No. of 
people 2 
7 4 5 53 
% 2.8 9.9 5.6 7.0 74.6 
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Table 6.3e: Years of Administrative Experience (NY7) 
No. of 
years 0 1 - 5 6 -1 0 1 1 - 1 5 >15 
No. of 
people 6 
1 3 1 4 7 2 7 
% 9.0 19.4 20.9 10.4 40.3 
This background information confirms that the administrators and 
school heads are the two main sources of the inspectors. In addition, 
these two sources are almost on a half-half basis (school side 
37.5%+6.9% versus administrative side 45.8% + 4.2%) (see Table 6.3c). 
This way of selecting inspectors is reasonable when one considers the 
fact that the inspectorate inspects both schools and lower level education 
authorities, in which case both the teaching experience and school 
management skills, and the experience of working in educational 
authorities are essential. The figures also show us clearly that the 
inspectors have very rich experience in both teaching and 
administration. The majority of the surveyed inspectors claimed that 
they had worked for at least 15 years as teachers, and half of them had 
another 15 years as administrators. In other words, half of the inspector 
respondents had been working in educational field for more than 30 
years, which was consistent with the finding that more than half of the 
inspectors (55.6%) were aged between 50 and 60 years old. No wonder the 
average age of the inspectors was 51. (refer to Table 6.3a). As to the 
educational background of the inspectors, although there were nearly 
30% who only had high school qualifications, or even lower, the 
inspectors on the whole could be regarded as relatively highly-qualified, 
as there are not many educationists who have university qualifications 
in China. Appointments of inspectors were required by the central 
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inspectorate to be strict and the inspectorate "would rather go without 
anyone than have something shoddy" (Zhen, 1989, lecture). 
In short, the quality of the inspectors is reasonably high, as far as 
qualifications and experiences are concerned. The problem of over-age 
(approximately 30% of the inspectors were over 55 years old) might 
become an obstacle to the effectiveness and efficiency of the inspection 
work, which demands good health and vigour. In addition, the good 
quality of teaching and administrative experience does not guarantee a 
good quality of inspection as most of the inspectors had little knowledge 
of the inspection job (no one had been an inspector before!). Therefore, 
in-service training of the inspectors and learning from foreign 
inspection systems became two of the central tasks of the Chinese 
inspectorates at all levels. 
62 The Functions of the Chinese Inspectorate 
The stated functions of the inspectorate is a good indication of what 
the inspectorate is doing. It is determined by the role that an 
inspectorate plays, and it in turn determines the methods of performing 
these functions. To the author, examining the functions of the 
inspectorate lays the foundation for a further examination of its 
relationships with different bodies. (e.g., inspectorate with education 
authority; inspectorate with the TRO, inspectorate with school), as well 
as for the scrutiny of the methods of working. 
Though the SEdC had not issued a formal statement about the 
functions of the inspectorate across the country after several years' 
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practice, it did, however, make some provisional suggestions in the 
"Summary of the Conference on Educational Inspection" in 1987, which 
still acts as an official guiding document today. After examining the 
1987 document, and the job descriptions of several provincial, 
prefectural and county inspectorates (Shanghai, Ninbo, Nanjin, Wuxi, 
Nanshi, Guangzhou inspectorates), the author felt that the following 
descriptions reflected the major functions of the inspectorate: 
(1). to supervise and examine lower level governments and their 
education authorities, kindergartens, primary and secondary sectors of 
formal education (including primary schools, secondary schools, 
vocational schools, and secondary teacher-training schools) about the 
implementation of national legislation and important policies; 
(2). to evaluate the efficiency of educational provision in regions 
(could be at any level) by inspecting the work of local governments and 
education authorities, and to assess the overall educational performance 
in schools; 
(3). to guide and advise on the work of lower level education 
authorities and schools; 
(4). to feedback the requests of educationists, to look into issues in 
reality and make suggestions to its employing education authority or 
higher level authorities; 
(5). to inspect and advise on the work of lower level inspectorates. 
These were, however, the functions that the official documents 
claimed to be. Did the reality match the theory? The concerns of the 
inspectors in reality could be revealed by asking inspectors how much 
time they spent on each of several tasks. 76 inspectors were requested to 
tick an appropriate answer on a 5-point scale: spend no time (1 point), 
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spend a little time (2 points), spend some time (3 points), spend quite a lot 
of time (4 points) and spend much time (5 points). The average score of 
each task was then calculated by using Equation (6.1). The results which 
are presented in Diagram 6.1 show that what the inspectors were doing 
accorded with what the SEdC document had proposed. 
 
1, s* ns  
S = 1,2,3,4,5 	 (6.1) 
= 	 1, 
 ns 
Where 
g is the mean score of the task, 
which is shown in Diagram 6.1 
S 	 is the corresponding point for each individual answer, 
ns is the number of answers having the point of S 
Diagram6.1 The MAjor Work of the Inspectorate 
T1 T2 T3 T4 15 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 112 113 
SPend 
much time 
SPend 
quite a lot 
sPend 
some the 
sPend 
little time 
sPend 
no time 
task 1: evaluating the overall work of schools and lower level education 
authorities; 
task 2: evaluation of teaching-learning and management in schools; 
task 3: administrative and clerical work. 
task 4: discussion with inspector colleagues; 
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task 5: time spent on the way to the inspected (visited) institutions; 
task 6: taking part in various external meetings held by the education 
authority; 
task 7: attending meetings of the employing education authority; 
task 8: attending meetings of higher level inspectorate; 
task 9: helping solve teaching-learning problem in schools; 
task10: helping solve resource problems in schools and in lower level 
education authorities; 
task 11: school staff appointment and promotion; 
task 12: consulting teachers' individual problems; 
task 13: organising INSET; 
From the chart, one can see that the time spent on each task was not 
at all even. Most of the time was devoted to the evaluation of educational 
administration in lower level education authorities and of management 
and teaching-learning in schools. The less important position of those 
tasks such as organising INSET and helping solve teaching-learning 
problems confirmed that the Chinese inspectors were more concerned 
with inspecting and evaluating the overall state of education, in 
particular, the administrative performance of both education authorities 
and schools. From that chart, one can also observe that the amount of 
time sitting in office (including discussions, writing reports and 
administrative work) was quite considerable. On the whole, the 
functions of the inspectorate in practice matched the official claims, 
particularly the first and second function. However, it seemed from the 
chart that the functions of the inspectorate were dominated by the 
evaluation of the educational provision of education authorities and the 
performance of schools. Other formal functions such as advising on the 
work of lower level education authorities and schools, feeding back the 
requests of educationists, and looking into problems in reality could not 
be reflected clearly. Therefore, there was a need for further exploration 
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of the functions, and the degree to which they were fulfilled. The 
discussions below are arranged to cover both the relationship between 
the inspectorate and its employing education authority, and the 
relationship between the inspectorate and the inspection objects: lower 
level education authorities and schools. 
The first section (6.3.1: Administrators' Evaluations) examines the 
contributions of the inspectorate to its education authority and the ways 
of cooperation between them. The second section (6.3.2. School Heads' 
Evaluations) looks into the functions of the inspectorate with regard to 
schools and lower level education authorities. Therefore, the overall 
functions of the inspectorate should be understood on the basis of the 
discussions in both two sections. 
6.3 The Work of the Inspectorate 
6.3.1 Administrators' Evaluations 
6.3.1.1 The Functions of the Inspectorate with Regard to Its Employing 
Education Authority 
Undoubtedly, the principal purpose of an inspectorate is to help its 
authority discharge its educational responsibilities. Therefore, the 
functions of the inspectorate with regards to its education authority can 
be analysed by examining its position in the education authority 
management procedure: decision-making, implementation, and 
evaluation. (see Diagram 6.2 below). Usually, the decision-making body 
is composed of chiefs of the education authority, Party Committee heads, 
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and various branch heads. Then come the individual branches that are 
responsible for planning and implementing relevant decisions. Finally, 
the task of the inspectorate is to monitor and feedback the state of 
implementation and evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation as 
well as the soundness of decisions. In view of the close relationship 
between the inspectorate and administrative branches in the education 
authority, the author asked the administrators to give comments on the 
work of the inspectorate. Similar questions were also put to the 
inspectors. 
Diagram 6.2 Three Components of Administration 
soundness 
Given 8 choices of possible functions, (which also could be interpreted 
as inspectors' contributions to their education authorities), the 
administrators were requested to choose three and put them in order of 
the degree of contribution (i.e. the biggest contribution (3 points), the 
second biggest contribution (2 points) and the third biggest contribution 
(1 point) ) to answer the question "What, do you think, are the three 
main contributions of the inspectorate to your authority?". The mean 
score of every function was calculated using equation (6.2). All the 
results are shown in Table 6.4. 
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S' ns  
  
S = 1,2,3 	 (6.2) S = 	 ns 
Where 
w is the mean score of the task, 
which is shown in Diagram 6.4, 6.5 
S is the corresponding points for each individual answers, 
n s is the number of answers having the point of S 
1 57 
administrators' view  
Scale 	 Point 
Functions 
provincial 
adminis- 
trators 
prefectural 
adminis- 
trators 
county 
adminis- 
trators 
score place 
1.to provide info. on the 
state of educin schools 
administration 	 In 	 LEAs 
2.667 2.000 1.917 2.048 1st 
to advise on policy 
making of own LEAs 1.000 1.333 0.917 1.048 2nd 
to supervise policy 
3. Implementation on 
behalf of LEAs 
0.667 0.833 1.000 0.905 3rd 
to collect comments 
4. from schools and lower 
level LEAs 
1.333 0.667 0.417 0.620 4th 
to evaluate policy of 
5. own LEAs 0.333 0.000 0.667 0.429 
5th 
6.to run errands for LEAs 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.1 90 6 t h 
to !lase between own 7 1EAs and schools (lower 
level 	 LEAs) 
 
0.000 0.000 0.167 0.095 7th 
8.to trouble - shoot 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.048 8th 
Inspector's view 
score place 
2.246 1st 
1.615 2nd 
0.886 4th 
1.169 3rd 
0.062 7th 
0.062 7th 
0.092 6th 
0.123 5th 
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To analyse the whole table above, one can see that the function of 
providing information on the state of education in schools and on the 
administration in lower level education authorities occupied the 
dominant position. Two other functions: to advise on policy-making and 
to supervise policy implementation carried similar but less weight. The 
rest of the functions were relatively insignificant. The cases of acting as 
trouble-shooters or errand running for the authorities were seldom 
found in the answers of the administrators, which meant that the 
inspectors were really getting on with their own business, not others. It 
was also interesting to note that although the function of "advising on 
policy-making" was the second biggest help to the authorities, the 
function of "evaluating the soundness of the authorities' policy", which 
is supposed to be a critical part of advice on policy making, was only 
regarded by administrators as the fifth contribution. Furthermore, the 
function of "liaison between the employing education authority and 
schools (lower level education authorities)" was also not viewed as a 
main function and received an extremely low score. 
The scores of each function were categorised according to the 
administrators' level (provincial, prefectural and county) to see whether 
the functions performed were related to the level of the inspectorate. As 
shown in Table 6.4, the provincial administrators offered higher scores 
to the inspectorate's function of providing information than did the 
county administrators, which indicated that the provincial inspectori 
did more on this function. In another case, more county administrators 
thought that the function of supervising policy implementation on behalf 
of the education authorities was a big help than did the provincial and 
prefectural administrators. In other words, the county level inspectors, 
being at the lowest level and in the forefront of the inspectorate network, 
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carried out much work on supervising the implementation of national 
and regional policies and decisions. However, despite the variations of 
score, the statistical analysis showed that the score of each function was 
not significantly related to the types of respondents. Therefore the 
inspectorates at all levels performed similar functions. 
The same question appeared in the questionnaire for the inspectors 
in order to find out the degree of similarities between the evaluations of 
the administrators and those of the inspectors themselves. The 
inspectors' answers showed a similar distribution. See Table 6.5: The 
Functions of the Inspectorate to Its Employing Education Authority--
Views of the Inspectors (presented at the same page with Table 6.4). 
Diagram 6.3: Comparison Between the Views of the Inspectors and 
Those of the Administrators 
biggest 4 
help 
function 
0 Administrators 
	
E3 Inspectors 
A list of the functions can be found in Table 6.4. 
Comparing these two sets of distributions, one can learn that, on the 
whole, both sides shared similar views about the functions of the 
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inspectorate. Almost every function was unanimously classified into the 
same scale by both sides, except for function No.4. But one phenomenon 
worth noticing is the very low scores of functions like: evaluating 
authorities' policy, and liaising between the employing education 
authority and schools (and lower level education authorities). This 
indicates that while concentrating on evaluating the standards of lower 
level institutions, inspectors seldom evaluated the soundness of their 
own authorities' policies. Meanwhile, while concentrating on ensuring 
conformity to national principles, statutory requirements and 
authorities' decisions, inspectors usually saw themselves as the 
representatives of the authorities instead of the liaison between their 
education authorities and those being administrated. So it is fair to say 
that the assistance to authorities' administration, from the perspective 
that Diagram6.2 shows, was primarily realised by monitoring, 
providing information on, and evaluating the state of education (the 
result of the implementation of policies) in the field, and rarely by 
reviewing and evaluating the soundness of the policy itself, which ought 
to be an important form of assistance to decision-making. The 
administrators' and inspectors' version of the functions of the 
inspectorate, shown in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, is consistent with the 
findings in Diagram6.1 in which the inspectors claimed that they spent 
more than 'quite a lot of time' evaluating the overall work of schools and 
lower level education authorities. This, to a certain extent, verifies the 
truthfulness of their claims. 
One might also be surprised by the low score of the "role of liaison". 
Under the circumstances of radical reform and the constant changing 
of the distribution of power between the different levels of education 
authorities, as well as between education authorities and schools, new 
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experience and new problems were bound to emerge. Therefore, the task 
of the inspectors was not only to collect information in the field to report 
to their authorities, but also to convey their authorities' messages to the 
lower level establishments in order to keep them well informed, as well 
as to disseminate good practice to assist their innovations. In comparing 
function 1 and function 7, one can conclude that in the two way 
communication, informing the employing education authorities was 
given a much higher priority than informing the schools and lower level 
education authorities. 
These survey results were supported by the interview findings. Apart 
from devoting their efforts to the evaluation of educational as well as 
administrative standards, most of the inspectors limited their work to 
informing the education authorities about the state of education in the 
area, but they less often considered the possible professional advice and 
judgments they could offer to influence the policy-making. In a visit to a 
model inspectorate, the author found that among 82 articles they had 
written in four years, 27 were inspection reports and survey reports, 22 
were reports of the general state of education, 8 were self-reviews of the 
inspectorate's work and suggestions to the authority, 25 were inspection 
plans and speech drafts for inspectors as well as for authority heads. 
Therefore, one can see that the majority of the material was on 
information presentation, and there were only 5%-10% of it specially 
intended for putting forward advice. The situation in other inspectorates 
varied. By examining the work reviews of several inspectorates, the 
author found that some inspectorates (e.g. Ninbo, JiangYin, Shanghai 
inspectorates) were more concerned with inspection and collecting 
information, but ignored the function of providing professional advice to 
a quite considerable degree, whilst some other inspectorates (e.g. Wuxi 
162 
Chapter 6: The Present Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
inspectorate) were quite aware of the latter task, at least in their review 
reports. 
Why was the score for the function of offering professional advice 
(1.048) far behind the score for the function of providing information on 
the state of education(2.048) (refer to Table 6.4)? Why was the function of 
offering professional advice to educational administration (including 
policy making and implementation process in education authorities) 
considered less important by some inspectorates? The following might be 
the reasons: Firstly, many inspectorates were recently set up, their 
priority was to complete their organisation as soon as possible and 
meanwhile to try their best to start some inspection work. Therefore, for 
them, the function of offering professional advice did not become an 
important agenda. Secondly, some education authorities had not yet got 
used to the existence of the inspectorate. They regarded the inspectorate 
as a source of information rather than a source of advice, so there was 
actually little demand for such assistance. If the education authority 
retained its old working style, (i.e., the administrative branches were 
still doing both implementation and evaluation), and the new 
inspectorate was just a result of going through the motions, then the 
need for advice from the inspectorate was even less. Thirdly, the 
overwhelming task of implementing the nine-year compulsory 
education and evaluating educational standards made the inspectors 
pay practically most of their attention to the schools and lower level 
education authorities. Thus the employing education authority side was 
less considered. Fourthly, it might be that the inspectors themselves did 
not realise the importance of this function to educational development in 
the long run, so it was less well performed. 
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In short, there were many possible reasons to which this problem 
could be attributed. Practical conditions, education authorities, 
inspectors themselves, or the combination of them could all be causes, 
depending on individual cases. Admittedly, there were some 
inspectorates which performed this function well, like the Wuxi 
Inspectorate mentioned above, because both the education authorities 
and the inspectorate attached much importance to it. 
In brief, according to the similar opinions of both administrators and 
inspectors, the roles of the inspectorate with regard to the employing 
education authorities were primarily that of information collector, 
secondly, adviser of policy-making, and thirdly, supervisor of policy 
implementation on behalf of the employing education authorities. The 
function of acting as liaison between education authorities and those 
administered institutions (lower level education authorities and schools) 
was viewed as a lower priority, the evaluation of authorities' policy was 
seldom carried out by the inspectors. 
6.3.1.2 The Cooperation Mechanism Between the Inspectorate and Its 
Employing Education Authority 
The quality of cooperation between the inspectorate and its employing 
authority is mainly manifested in the ways by which they collaborate 
with each other, the frequency of their contact, the extent of involvement 
by both sides, and the administrative positions of those involved. 
The freauencv of contact, There were considerable variations in the 
frequency of contact between both sides, due to the different regulations 
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in different authorities, and also due to the imperfection of the 
inspectorate itself. 
Table 6.6 The Frequency of Contact Between Inspectors and Their 
Education Authorities (N=20) 
frequency 
positio daily 
weekly/ 
fortnightly 
monthly/ 
termly 
not 
fixed 
staff 1 4 3 2 
branch 	 he 0 2 3 3 
authority he 0 1 1 0 
The findings show wide variations in frequency of contact. Some 
administrators met inspectors on a daily basis while others met termly 
(there are two terms per academic year in China). A few of them did not 
have fixed meeting frequency. 
Whom they contact. Again, the inspectors whom the administrators 
met varied from place to place. Some mostly met the head of the 
inspectorate, some met the inspectors concerned instead of meeting the 
head. For example, administrators in the primary education branch 
often discussed matters with the primary school inspectors. Some 
administrators claimed that they mainly communicated with the 
relevant inspectors, and invited their heads if necessary, while others 
told the reverse story. The general picture is illustrated in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7. The Level of the Inspectors in Contact with Administrators 
(N=20) 
object 
positio 
only or 
mainly 
inspt. 	 head 
only o rmainly 
inspectors 
concerned 
always 
all 
staff 3 6 1 
branch head 6 2 0 
authority he 1 0 1 
It seems from this distribution that the heads of the administrative 
branches usually met the heads of the inspectorate and that ordinary 
branch staff were more likely to meet ordinary inspectors. But the 
results do indicate a variety of practice in different inspectorates. 
It must be remembered that not all branches in the education 
authorities had the same frequency and extent of communication with 
the inspectorate. In the inspectors' opinion, those having most contact 
were: the basic education branches (including the primary education 
and secondary education branches); the finance branch (because most 
inspectorates did not have sufficient financial support from the 
authorities), and the personnel branch ( one reason was to strive for 
more inspector quotas, the second reason was to recommend the 
promotion or demotion of school heads or staff in lower level 
authorities). Some inspectors mentioned the Teaching Research Office  
because they needed its help in full inspections and large scale aspect 
inspections. 
It was quite understandable for the inspectorate to have more 
frequent contact with the primary and secondary education branches 
than with other branches (e.g., the teacher training branch) because of 
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the urgent task of implementing the law of compulsory education and 
the overwhelming evaluation work on educational standards in schools 
and in lower level education authorities. 
It was also natural for a newly emerged inspectorate to have more 
contact with such branches as Finance and Personnel to resolve 
organisational and managerial matters. However, it was disappointing 
to know that the inspectorate did not have much cooperation with the 
Teaching Research Office except on the occasions of full inspections and 
large scale aspect inspections. Because of their administrative nature, 
the inspectors were already more inclined to the managerial side of 
school performance. If they had not had a close relationship with the 
TROs which were mainly concerned with professional matters in 
schools, how could the inspectors have monitored the overall state of 
education and present an all-round picture to the education authorities 
to enable decision-making? In view of the importance of this issue, more 
detailed examination of the relationship between the two bodies is 
carried out later in this chapter. 
How They Contact, An important aspect of the quality of cooperation 
is the ways in which it was conducted. Again, the administrators and 
inspectors reached identical conclusions. Both groups claimed that they 
met each other because of taking part in the same inspections. The 
second most usual way was on a general staff meeting of the education 
authority. Next came a meeting specially held by the inspectorate or by 
the other branches concerned in which both sides invited each other to 
take part. But memoranda and circulars were seldom used by either 
side. 
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Having obtained information on the frequency, extent, and form of 
communication, one can argue that both sides formally communicated 
with each other at certain intervals, and the occasions of the meetings 
were joint inspections or the authority's general meetings which in the 
Chinese context, are often what is referred to as "political mobilisation", 
or are sometimes work reviews. There was, however, little 
communication about serious business between the inspectorate and 
relevant branches in the education authority. For example, when a 
primary education branch was making its plans for the next term, it 
was unlikely for this branch to seek advice from the inspectorate. When 
administrators were asked "Do you ask for the help of the inspectorate?", 
40% answered seldom or never, 32% answered sometimes, and only 27% 
answered often. As to communication with authority heads, it was done 
through two channels. One was to invite the heads to attend the 
inspectorate's meetings, the other was through the authority's board 
meetings. which were attended by authority heads and all branch 
heads, including the head of the inspectorate. In some places, the 
authority head concurrently held the post of inspectorate chief so that 
communication could be quicker and more direct. 
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6.3.1.3 The Influence of the Inspectorate on the Work of the Education 
Authorities 
It goes without saying that one of the crucial criteria by which to 
judge the work of the inspectorate is its influence on the work of the 
education authorities, both on decision-making and on implementation 
process. In order to find out the weight of the inspectorate, 
administrators were asked to answer the question: "Does the 
inspectorate have influence on your authority's or your branch's 
decision-making?" The inspectors were also requested to evaluate their 
influence. The results of the statistical analysis (x2 test) showed that the 
views of the administrators differed from those of the inspectors. 
Table 6.8: The Inspectors' and Administrators' Views About the 
Influence of the Inspectorate on the Work of the Education 
Authorities (Ni=62,Na=22, N=84) i=inspector 
a= aelminiqtrator 
degree 
same 
no 
influence 
a 	 little 
influence 
some 
influence 
quite 
strong 
strong 
influence nr 
inspector 2' 
'3.2% 
4 
/6.5°A 
4 5/ 
/72.6%  
1 1y 
A7.7% 
,O, 
0% 6 2 
3 6 y 11 2 y 0 
adminis 7 	./ 13.6% //7.3% /50.0% A .1 c'/0 0% 2 2 
ric 5 10 56 13 0 N = 84 
x2 .10.9, df=4, when P=0.05, x2 is significant. 
The x2 score shows that the evaluation of the inspectorate's influence 
was significantly related to the type of respondent. In other words, 
inspectors and administrators did not share the same view on the 
influence of the inspectorate despite the similar conclusions they 
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reached in the previous questions. This time, it was the inspectors who 
estimated a higher influence than their administrator colleagues. 
Diagram6.4. The Degree of Influence Estimated by the Inspectors and by 
the Administrators 
administrator 	 inspector 
I 	 I 	 I 	 • 	 I 	 I 
no 	 little 	 some 	 quite strong 	 strong 
influence 
	
influence 
	
influence 
	 influence 
	
influence 
It was surprising but also interesting to learn that the influence 
estimated by the inspectors was higher than the one estimated by the 
administrators, as modesty is a very important virtue in the Chinese 
culture. One possible cause might have something to do with the 
administrator samples. Among 10 people who thought that the 
influence of the inspectorate was none or little, 4 were ordinary staff of 
the branches. As there was not as much cooperation and 
communication at ordinary staff level as at the branch heads level, these 
respondents may have underestimated the influence of the inspectorate. 
But more probably, it was because the inspectors thought that they had a 
considerable contribution to the education authority while the 
administrators expected them to do more. As the expectations of the 
administrators showed, (see Table 6.17 and section 6.4), the function of 
providing professional advice was not performed very well by the 
inspectors, thus the influence on the education authority was not strong. 
Why did the inspectorate not have much influence on the whole 
authority as well as other administrative branches? The answers 
discovered in the interviews can probably explain this phenomenon. 
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Firstly, it was largely related to the current "junior" position of the 
inspectorate in the authority. In most of the authorities, the 
inspectorates were only recently set up and the shortage of personnel 
was very serious indeed in many inspectorates, including those 
recognised as good ones. In some extreme cases, only two part-time 
retired school heads were available to inspect 8 counties, not to mention 
the schools. In circumstances like these, the first priority of the 
inspectorate was to struggle for a larger quota of inspectors, and more 
funds to support the inspectorial activities, and at the same time to try to 
do some inspection and evaluation work. Compared with those well 
established administrative branches, the inspectorate was really in a 
"junior" position. Many functions could not be carried out. Naturally the 
influence on the education authority could not be significant at this 
stage. 
Secondly, even in those education authorities where the inspectorates 
were relatively well established, many authority and branch heads still 
had not yet realised the functions of feedback and advice, besides the 
function of inspection which the inspectorate had. In an interview, a 
branch chief told the author about his view of the inspectorate "It is just 
a branch, like us, they do their work, and we do ours. So it is difficult to 
comment on their work". So although they met each other when they 
inspected schools together, or at a general meeting of the authority, or 
even at the authority's board meeting, they usually did not exchange 
information deliberately. Perhaps the inspectorate provided some sort of 
information by circulating inspection reports which the administrators 
read, but they did not yet regard the inspectorate as a source of advice. 
Having been accustomed to the old ways of administration, they thought 
of the inspectorate as another ordinary branch which carried out 
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inspection work, and nothing more. Therefore, when 22 administrators 
were asked "Does the inspectorate have an effect on your authority's or 
branch's decision making?", 40% answered "a little" or "none", 50% 
answered "some", only 9.1% answered "quite strong". 
The third possible reason was the lack of proper purposive 
communication between the inspectorate and the rest of the authority. 
Sometimes, both sides were unaware of what the other was doing. In 
some authorities, the head of the inspectorate was the only person who 
was in regular contact with the authority, by attending the authority's 
board meeting once a month. Other inspectors did not have a full part to 
play in offering advice. In some other authorities, the inspectorate was 
considered so insignificant that some big decisions were made by the 
authority heads and heads of large branches like the basic education 
branch and finance branch without much consultation with the 
inspectorate. Even in those better inspectorates, communication with 
the rest of the authority was still not a network in which both the 
inspectorate and the rest of the authority kept each other well informed, 
nor a network in which all inspectors had a full part to play in 
contributing professional advice. 
The final factor which accounted for why the inspectorate did not 
have much influence on the decision-making of the education authority 
was associated with the understanding of the inspectors themselves. 
Some inspectors paid much more attention to their functions in relation 
to the schools and junior education authorities than to their own 
authorities (the functions in relation to schools and lower level 
education authorities are discussed in section 6.3.2). In other words, 
they regarded their work mainly as evaluators of the standards in 
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schools and gave scores to each school they inspected. Some of the 
inspectors interviewed by the author talked on and on about the recent 
inspections they had conducted, but seldom mentioned (even when 
requested by the author) how they interpreted these inspection results in 
terms of the general state of education in the area, how they identified 
issues from all the information they collected through inspections and 
visits, and further, how they offered effective suggestions towards the 
authority's policy based on these processed inspection results. 
6.3.1.4 The Inspectorate and the Teaching Research Office 
In China, the curriculum is unified nationally, though the recent 
reforms have brought about some freedom in selecting suitable 
curricula and textbooks among several choices. The Teaching, Research 
Offices, a nationwide network of professional groups, corresponding to 
each level of local education authorities, is the agency responsible for 
ensuring conformity to the national curricula. Unlike the inspectorate, 
the TRO is professional in nature, though both it and the inspectorate 
are working in the same education authority. From the education 
authority's point of view, as introduced in the last chapter, every 
education authority is virtually divided into two parts: administrative 
branches and professional units. Usually the professional units are 
hierarchically under the education authority but do not work in the 
same building. They prefer to place their offices inside Teacher Centres, 
or Institutes of Education in order to be closer to the professional 
community. 
Every TRO is divided into several sub-groups in accordance with 
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specialised subjects, even at the primary school level. Higher level TROs 
are mainly concerned with research on curricula and textbooks and 
with compiling teaching reference books. Lower level TROs (county and 
city district level) usually carry out the executive work -- to go to schools 
to observe lessons and give advice, to organise inspection of curricula 
and teaching, to gather teachers to discuss teaching programmes and 
methods, to give lectures on INSET courses, to organise teachers to 
exchange experiences, and so on. Thus, one can see that the TRO 
occupies a somewhat similar position to the inspectorate: feedback, 
monitoring, evaluation, and advice. The difference lies in the content of 
the feeding back, monitoring, evaluation, and advice. In addition, with 
regard to the schools and their junior education authorities, the 
inspectors have administrative power whilst the TRO members only 
have the right to advise. That is to say, the inspectors, backed by their 
administrative power, have the right to give requirements which the 
schools or the lower education authorities must take seriously whilst the 
suggestions put forward by the TRO members can be turned down by the 
schools. 
It was clear from the beginning that the inspectorate would not 
become a body mainly concerned with professional matters in schools 
and lower level education authorities which are already dealt with by the 
TROs, but would have different duties. Therefore, it became very much 
orientated to the managerial and political side of schooling. This 
administrative orientation was manifested particularly in its routine 
visits to schools and lower level education authorities. In full inspections 
and large scale aspect inspections, the inspectors would have to ask for 
help from their TRO colleagues as the full inspections were supposed to 
cover every aspect of school performance including curriculum matters. 
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It seemed, according to the interview findings and questionnaire 
results, that this was almost the only occasion on which both inspectors 
and TRO members met together and cooperated. 
Is this enough? Having the duty of helping the implementation of the 
nine-year universal education, the inspectorate ought to have a part to 
play in maintaining and promoting the quality of the nine-year 
education. Moreover, the inspectorate has the duty to evaluate the 
overall standards of schooling, not only management and moral 
education. These duties will have to be fulfilled, either by the 
inspectorate itself, which seems impossible, or by the joint effort of the 
inspectorate and the TRO. Therefore, the existing degree of cooperation 
is far from sufficient. Concrete suggestions for doing this are put 
forward in Chapter Eight. 
6.3.1.5 Summary 
To recapitulate the evaluations by the administrators, one can state 
that, according to the survey results, the role of the Chinese inspectorate 
with regard to its employing education authority was very much as an 
information provider which informed the education authority about the 
state of education by means of circulating inspection reports and routine 
communication. Then, to a lower degree compared with the first role, 
the inspectorate was also an adviser to the authority's decision-making. 
This role was usually played in a limited way through the participation 
of inspectorate heads in the regular education authority's board 
meetings. To a similar extent as the role of adviser, the inspectorate was 
a supervisor of policy implementation (both national and regional 
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policies). This was undertaken by inspecting and evaluating standards 
in schools and lower level educational authorities on behalf of the 
employing education authority. 
The communication between the inspectorate and the rest of the 
authority was realised mainly by (apart from the inspectorate heads' 
attendance at board meetings) the joint inspections undertaken by both 
sides. 
Despite the fact that administrators and inspectors had a very 
similar evaluation of the inspectorate's functions, they had different 
assessments of the influence of the inspectorate on the work of the 
employing education authority. The administrators' evaluation was in 
between "little influence" and "some influence", which was 
considerably lower than the estimation of the inspectors. The lower 
score might be attributed to the unestablished position of many 
inspectorates, the lack of awareness by the employing education 
authority of the advisory function of the inspectorate, the inadequately 
purposive communication between the two bodies, and the partial 
perception of the inspectors of their roles and thus the undue emphasis 
on evaluation of lower level authorities and schools. 
6.3.2 School Heads' Evaluations 
6.3.2.1 The Functions of the Inspectorate with Regard to Schools and 
Lower Level Education Authorities 
Undoubtedly, the quality of the inspectorate is very much reflected in 
176 
Chapter 6: The Present Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
its work in schools and lower level education authorities since they are 
the objects of the inspectorate's inspections, monitoring and evaluations. 
Therefore, a discussion of the functions of the inspectorate needs to 
consider this side as well. 
The functions of the inspectorate with regard to schools and lower 
level educational authorities were: firstly, evaluating the work in 
schools and lower level education authorities, and secondly supervising 
policy implementation. These were the conclusions drawn from the 
answers of the questionnaire to school heads. The school heads were 
given 8 choices which described the possible functions of the 
inspectorate. The score that each function got is shown in Table 6.9, 
which can be compared with the administrators' answers in Table 6.4. 
Interestingly, the distribution of the views of the inspectors coincided 
with that of the school heads (see table 6.10), as it did in the case of the 
administrators' evaluations. The equation, on the basis of which the 
scores of each function were calculated, was the same as equation (6.2). 
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Scores 
Functions 
Score Place 
1. to evaluate school work 2.000 1st 
2. to supervise policy 
implementation 1.214 2nd 
3. to collect comments 
from schools 
0.786 3rd 
4. to be a professional 
adviser to schools 
0.750 4th 
5. to explain and convey 
LEA policy 
0.451 5th 
6. to disseminate good 
practice 0.193 6th 
7. to provide liaison 	 be- 
tween LEAs and schools 
0.097 7th 
8. to be a trouble - 
shooter 
0.000 8th 
Score Place 
1.579 1st 
1.066 2nd 
0.803 3rd 
0.789 4th 
0.329 5th 
0.197 6th 
0.092 7th 
0.026 8th 
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Diagram 6.5 shows these two sets of distributions. 
Diagram6.5 Comparison Between the Inspectors' and the School 
Heads' Views 
biggest A 
help 
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A list of the functions can be found in Table 6.9. 
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It was very understandable that the main function of the inspectorate 
was the supervision of national and regional policy implementation by 
means of inspecting and evaluating school work, because this was the 
purpose of setting up the inspectorate in China. The annual plans of 
those inspectorates surveyed all verified this point -- inspection always 
occupied the first priority in the plans. In some plans, even the number 
of proposed inspections was stated. In addition to the inspection, a vast 
amount of the inspectorate's time and manpower was devoted to setting 
up the criteria for evaluating the educational quality in schools and in 
individual local areas, which took into account the national mandatory 
requirements, the higher level education authorities' regulations, the 
employing education authorities' policy as well as the practical 
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situations in the locality concerned. 
However, the advisory function of the inspectorate was much less 
recognised by the school heads. It only stood 4th on the function list, 
which implies that the inspectorate paid much more attention to the 
function of inspection than to that of advice. To the author's knowledge, 
advice to schools and lower level education authorities was done mainly 
through routine visits and inspection reports. Other methods of giving 
advice and help had not yet be further developed. 
What was more surprising was the extremely low image of the 
inspectorate as a liaison between schools and education authorities, 
which coincided with the views of the administrators. The fact that both 
its partners did not recognise it as their liaisons suggested that, either 
the inspectorate lacked sufficient communication with the authorities 
and with the schools, were therefore unable to pass on or explain their 
messages to each other, or the inspectorate did not perform this function 
at all. But according to Table 6.9, the function of "collecting comments 
from schools" got higher scores than did the function of "conveying 
national and authorities' policy". In addition, the administrators also 
admitted that " to provide information on the state of education" was the 
biggest help they received from the inspectorate. Therefore, one might 
possibly infer that the inspectors conveyed more from the schools to their 
employing authorities than the other way round, because they were 
more aware of their task of providing information to their employing 
education authorities. 
Finally, the school heads offered very low scores to the function of 
"disseminating good practice", perhaps because the inspectors paid 
1 80 
Chapter 6: The Present Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
most of their attention to evaluations and inspections and relatively 
ignored other functions. But in reality, there was a growing need for the 
inspectorate to perform advisory functions. The "Head Teacher in 
Charge" system (discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Five) which 
was designed to broaden the freedom of individual schools had been 
gradually brought into practice, new experience and new problems were 
bound to emerge in all schools. Schools were in urgent need of help from 
someone who was expert at schooling or someone who could 
disseminate the good practices of other schools. The inspectors, who 
contacted schools frequently, could be the people to play that role. With 
the further development of the "Head Teacher in Charge" system, the 
need for liaison not only between schools themselves, but between 
schools and authorities would inevitably increase. The nature of their 
work determined that the inspectors were the best candidates for this 
job. 
6.3.2.2 The Work of the Inspectorate in Schools 
The work of the inspectorate on the school side is mainly reflected in 
what the inspectorate inspects, how it inspects, and further, why it is so. 
The frequency of School Inspections and Visits, The frequency of 
school inspections and routine visits was very much determined by the 
inspector to school ratio in any particular area as well as the degree of 
priority that inspections and visits were given by that particular 
inspectorate, which again had wide regional variations. The frequency 
of each school being visited varied from monthly to longer than 
annually. On the average, it was once every nine months according to 
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the survey. In addition, most of the school heads claimed that the visits 
usually lasted for half a day or one day. 
The frequencies of the aspect inspections and full inspections were 
understandably lower than that of the routine visits. The majority of the 
school heads said that their schools were inspected annually, once every 
two years, or even longer. So on the average, it was once every year and 
half. But inspections in China could last one week, one fortnight, or only 
one day. The survey showed that the average inspection duration was 2-3 
days. Here is the summary 
Table 6.11: The Frequency and Duration of School Inspections and 
Visits 
Type frequency duration 
inspection 1: 1.5 year 2-3 days 
visit 1: 0.75 year 0.5-1 	 day 
The same question took a different form when it was presented to the 
inspectors. It was: "How many days do you spend in schools or lower 
level education authorities every week?". The average time answered 
was about 2 days. (there are 6 working days a week in China). 
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Table 6.12 Number of Days That Inspectors Spend in Schools 
or Lower Level Education Authorities (N=51) 
No. of days <1 day 1-2days 3days 4days 5-6days 
No. of answer 5 23 11 5 7 
From the school's point of view, they preferred being visited to being 
inspected. In other words, they believed that inspections were carried 
out more often than they should be whilst in routine visits it was the 
other way round, which in a way confirmed that the major task of the 
inspectorate was the evaluation and inspection of schools'performance 
(see Table 6.9 and 6.10). 
The Main Concerns of the Inspection Teams. According to the 
recollections of some school heads, the full inspection team (for schools) 
was, on average, composed of 10 members who were the Chief of the 
education authority, inspectors, administrators, and retired school 
heads, unlike the inspections of lower level local government and 
educational authorities, in which case the inspection team would 
normally be larger and composed of more administrators and fewer 
school heads. 
Although full inspection covered almost every aspect of school work, 
different aspects enjoyed different priorities. As shown by the results of 
the survey, the aspects on which inspectors centred were: (1): school 
organisation, e.g. planning, quality of the leadership team, schooling 
orientation; (2): implementation of national and authorities' policy; and 
(3): political education, which has recently been renamed "moral 
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education". 
Other aspects were of less concern to the inspectors. According to the 
survey, the curricula and teaching-learning side of the school work got 
low scores. Activities like staffing and INSET, curricula and 
teaching-learning, examinations and records were all very much 
surpassed by managerial-orientated work. This strong imbalance of 
priorities was due to several factors. Firstly, it had been a characteristic 
of socialist countries, at least of China, to stress the socialist direction of 
schooling. The fundamental aim of education was to produce politically 
socialist-minded as well as intellectually educated citizens. This spirit 
ran through all aspects of school work and was especially manifested in 
school management and political education. Secondly, as repeatedly 
mentioned in the previous sections, in China the curriculum subjects 
were unified everywhere in the country (though it has recently started 
changing), and conformity with the national curriculum was ensured 
by the Teaching Research Offices at every level of education authorities. 
As there was another separate system for overseeing this aspect of 
educational standards, the inspectorate accordingly focused on the 
managerial side. Added to this was the fact that the inspectors were 
appointed among administrators and former school heads, based on 
their political background and management competency, though in 
quite a number of cases teaching experience was also considered during 
appointment, but the subject coverage of the inspectorate as a whole was 
clearly not taken into account. Therefore, the evaluation of teaching and 
learning was mainly the task of the Teaching Research Office members 
who were invited to take part in the inspections. Though evaluation of 
teaching and learning would take place during the whole inspection, its 
result did not occupy a major part in the inspection report. Even in the 
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curriculum section of the report, more would be said about the 
management of teaching instead of the quality of pupil learning itself. 
Another important cause for the emphasis on schools' organisation 
was that serious practical problems existed more in management 
matters than in curriculum matters. Although the curricula had their 
own shortcomings and need of improvement in the overwhelming 
reform process, "hot points" existed in educational administration and 
in school management. Things like "diploma disease", financial 
delegation, and the relationship between academic study and the labour 
market all had close links with administration. Therefore, inspectors 
were more concerned with school planning, management, political 
education and the proceeding of policy implementation than with 
curriculum matters. 
The inspection of lower level governments and education authorities 
is discussed in the "forms of inspection" later in this chapter. 
Inalpectors' Main Concerns Durine Routine Visits, The inspectors' 
main concerns during inspections were school organisation, 
implementation of national and regional policies, and political 
education, as uncovered in the last section. As to the inspectors' main 
concerns during school visits, the author found similar answers. This 
time, it was the inspectors who were asked the question. 
Given 9 choices describing the aspects of school work, the inspectors 
were requested to tick three and number the chosen answers in order of 
degree of concerns (i.e., the first concern, the second concern, and the 
third concern). The results are shown in Table 6.13. 
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Table 6.13 The Main Concerns of the Inspectors During Routine Visits 
(N=31) 
aspects concerned first concern second concern third concern total 
proceeding of policy 
implementation 
11 3 1 15 
school administration 
and organisation 
7 10 5 22 
staffing and INSET 
1 1 1 3 
school resources 
2 2 1 5 
curriculum and teaching 1 2 2 5 
examination and records 1 1 1 3 
schools' comments on LEA 
policies 
0 1 2 3 
pastoral care and dropout 3 2 1 6 
moral education 5 4 7 1 6 
N.B. Not all the respondents have ticked three choices. Some have 
ticked one, some have ticked two. 
The results in the table clearly show us that school organisation and 
administration, proceeding of policy implementation, and moral 
education are main concerns of the inspectors even during routine 
visits. These results, therefore, are consistent with the school heads' 
claims in the last section. 
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self-evident that the most basic way for both sides to meet was through 
the inspectors' routine visits and inspections. But did the inspectorate 
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employ other methods to fulfil its functions in schools? 
First, did the schools themselves initiate additional contact with the 
inspectors? The answer was: 40.7% of school heads did not ask or seldom 
asked for the help of inspectors; 55.6% said that sometimes they did, and 
another 3.7% ticked often. On the whole, the great majority of the schools 
did not often ask for help. Then, did the inspectors create extra contact 
with schools, apart from visits and inspections? The answers are shown 
in Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14 The Ways of Contact Between School Heads and Inspectors 
Apart From Inspections and Visits (N=30) 
ways 
answers 
inspectors 
holding 
meetings of 
school heads 
visiting other 
schools with 
inspectors 
attending LEAs• 
meetings and 
meeting 
inspectors 
do not use 
this way 
86.7% 86.7% 30.0% 
do use 
this way 
13.3% 13.3% 70.0% 
From the responses of both sides, one can see clearly that apart from 
inspections and visits, there was almost no direct communication. Even 
on the occasions in which the school heads met the inspectors when they 
attended education authorities' meetings together, the possibility of the 
purposive exchange of information may be questioned. 
Leaving aside communication in person, indirect communication 
was also scarce in most places. The central inspectorate issued regular 
publications on inspection matters to be distributed to lower level 
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governments and education authorities but not to schools because those 
publications were mainly concerned with inspecting education 
authorities instead of schools. But other levels of the inspectorates 
(provincial, prefectural and county inspectorates) usually had not yet 
developed a good system of communication with schools apart from 
inspections and visits. 
Therefore, it is fair to say that schools and the inspectorate did not 
have much direct contact between them, and the chances of 
communication were limited. Although the author did not especially 
explore the reason in interviews, one can still possibly explain it by the 
answers to other questions. The inspectors viewed themselves firstly as 
supervisors of policy implementation by means of inspection (see 
Table6.10). The role of being an adviser was relatively less important, so 
that they naturally focused on inspections which was the ideal form of 
supervision. 
This view was shared by the school heads. They viewed the inspectors 
as evaluators of schooling standards rather than as sources for 
obtaining advice, therefore they did not bother to contact the inspectors. 
6.3.2.3 The Influence of the Inspectorate on Schools 
The influence of the inspectorate on schools was acknowledged by the 
school heads. To answer the question "To what extent, does the 
inspectorate influence your school's work?", most of the heads thought 
the inspectorate did have an effect on their work. 
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Table 6.15: The School Heads' Views of the Inspectorate's Influence 
(N=27) 
degree of 
influence 
no 
influence 
a 	 little 
influence 
some 
influence 
quite 
strong 
strong 
influence 
No. 3 2 12 6 4 
11.1 7.4 44.5 22.2 14.8 
From the above table, one can see that only 18.5% of the schools felt 
that there was "none or little influence", 44.4% felt "some", and 37% 
admitted "quite strong" or "strong influence" by the inspectorate. The 
inspectors shared this view in the following table. 
Table6.16 The Inspectors' Evaluation of Their Influence on Schools 
(Ww4) 
degree of 
influence 
no 
influence 
a 	 little 
influence 
some 
influence 
quite 
strong 
strong 
influence 
No. 1 3 34 25 1 
ok 
1.6 4.7 53.1 39.1 1.6 
Both inspectors and school heads had similar evaluations. Their 
average scores fell into the same scale (see Diagram 6.6). 
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Diagram 6.6 The Comparison of Inspectors' and School Heads' Views 
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Why does the inspectorate have more than "some influence" on the 
work in schools, but only had more than "a little influence" on the work 
of their employing education authorities, as estimated by the 
administrators (see Diagram 6.4)? This was probably due to the 
administrative status of the inspectors. Because the inspections were 
carried out by the education authorities which had full jurisdiction over 
them, schools always had to pay full attention to receiving inspection 
teams. This is especially true in China where power centralisation has 
lasted for thousands of years. Therefore, the comments that came after 
inspections were usually taken seriously by the schools. Sometimes 
schools were required to submit plans for improvement after being 
inspected and to accept reinspection. With regard to the actual effect of 
the inspection, school heads had different views. One of the heads 
interviewed described the inspection they had had as very enlightening 
and very practical. But another head, who happened to be in the same 
district, felt that the two day inspection that his school just had was very 
cursory and superficial. "It was just like one of the nine "mothers 
-in-law" that I have received within these two weeks (the term 
"mother-in-law" in China refers to those powerful superiors who control 
your fate, always like to give orders and cannot be displeased). It did not 
have real meaning for the improvement of schools", he said, " If we had 
had a smaller number of inspectors and a longer duration (for 
inspection) and they went deeper into real school life, the effect would 
have been much better." 
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In the questionnaire, the question of "What do you think of the 
inspection you recently had?" was designed to reveal the heads' attitudes 
towards inspections. The majority of the heads admitted that the 
inspections did "reflect the reality of the school", but only 13.3% felt they 
gave clear directions for improvement. In short, because of the 
administrative status of the inspectorate, schools had to take inspections 
seriously. Also, inspection as a form of evaluation, would always have 
some function as a mirror, i.e., to reflect the strengths as well as the 
weaknesses of a school, especially when it was examined by outsiders. 
From this perspective, inspections were welcomed by the schools 
provided the inspections themselves were fair and realistic. But 
inspection was not only an inspection for its own sake. Rather, it was a 
means of getting work improved. It was the duty of the inspectorate to 
put forward constructive and practical suggestions for improvement of 
the weaknesses. This, according to the answers to the questionnaire, 
was the weak point of the inspectorate. Having read some reports 
produced by various inspectorates across the country, the author felt 
that the central inspectorate's reports were good examples of combining 
inspection and advice. Apart from evaluation results and requirements 
for improvement, the reports included a section "matters for discussion" 
where the issues in reality were identified, explored and discussed, and 
inspectors' practical and achievable suggestions were proposed. But the 
reports of local inspectorates were less inspiring in this respect. 
Another cause for inspectorate's belief that they had more than 
"some influence" on the work of the schools was the fact that results 
linked with rewards. In some authorities, the results of an inspection 
were treated as one of the criteria for deciding awards at the end of the 
academic year. For example, whether a school could be assessed as an 
191 
Chapter 6: The Present Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
"advanced school" would probably be affected by the inspection score it 
got. On top of that, some inspectorates were entitled to recommend to the 
education authorities the promotion or demotion of the school head, or 
even to praise or criticise heads' work. (a special section for praising 
some administrators for their outstanding work appeared in almost 
every inspection report of the central inspectorate the author has read). 
In a report submitted by Wuxi educational inspectorate, for instance, it 
was suggested that the authorities should provide more funds and better 
qualified teachers to a quite successful school to further enhance its 
achievement. But it must be pointed out that not all the inspectorates 
had this right of recommendation, nor was an inspection score 
necessarily always linked with rewards. In many places, unfortunately, 
inspectors' suggestions failed to obtain the expected response from the 
relevant authorities. So that the authority of the inspectorate dropped in 
the eyes of the schools. One school head in Shanghai complained to the 
author: "What is the point of having an inspectorate? We once had a 
formal inspection from Shanghai educational inspectorate (which has a 
provincial rank). After the inspection, it decided that because of our 
excellent achievement in mathematics, our students could be exempted 
from the university entrance examination on this subject. We were very 
pleased at first, but we were told later that we still had to sit the 
examination because the Shanghai Examination Board did not 
recognise the inspectorate's decision." One can argue that it is not 
necessary that all the recommendations made by the inspectorate 
should be accepted by the relevant authorities. But the actual problem in 
this case was that freeing the school from the maths examination was 
the inspectorate's decision, not its recommendation. In other words, 
when the inspectorate made this decision, it felt that it had the right to 
decide this matter. Unfortunately, the Examination Board dismissed the 
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inspectorate's right. Therefore, the confusion and disappointment 
resulting from the ambiguous relationship between the rights and 
responsibilities of the inspectorate and other authorities led to a decrease 
in the inspectorate's authority in the eyes of the schools. 
6.3.2.4 Summary 
To summarise the evaluations by the school heads, one can see, from 
the analyses of the questionnaire responses and interview records, that 
the functions of the inspectorate with regard to schools were mainly 
those of evaluating educational standards, and supervising policy 
implementation. These judgments were shared by the inspectors 
themselves. The frequency of school visits and inspections varied from 
place to place, as did the duration. But the aspects that were common to 
most inspectorates were the aspects that the inspectors were 
particularly concerned with, notably: school organisation, policy 
implementation and moral education. Curriculum matters were paid 
relatively less attention because of the existence of the Teaching 
Research Office network. Both the inspectorate and the schools 
recognised the influence of the inspectorate, either because of the 
administrative status it enjoyed, or the weight of the inspection results 
in deciding the annual award, or both. Admittedly, some inspections 
and visits were really enlightening and helpful, and thus, had impact 
on the work of the schools. Finally, good inspections were welcomed by 
school heads because they gave a realistic reflection of the schools' 
performance as well as a clear and practical direction for improvement. 
Unfortunately, many inspectorates had accomplished the former task 
but the latter one needed much more effort. 
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6.3.3 Forms of Inspection 
The work of the Chinese inspectorate seems to be dominated by 
inspecting and evaluating the policy implementation and the 
educational performance in local areas and individual schools, with 
special emphasis on the basic education sector. With kindergartens, 
primary schools, secondary schools, secondary vocational schools and 
secondary teacher training schools as its scope of inspection, the 
inspectorate has concentrated itself basically on primary and secondary 
schools, and occasionally vocational schools, due to the shortage of 
inspectors as well as the serious problems in the basic education sector. 
Though inspection is a predominant function of the inspectorate, the 
forms of inspection are quite limited, according to the results of the 
interviews, on-the-spot observations and literature review. At the time of 
the field work, full inspection, aspect inspection and routine visit were 
the three main means by which the inspectorate carried out inspections 
and evaluations. Other methods such as short inspection and survey 
were not employed. 
A very important feature of the Chinese inspection system is its dual 
objects, i.e., both education authorities and individual schools are 
subject to inspection. In fact, for those higher level inspectorates (central 
and provincial), lower level local governments and education 
authorities, not schools, are their main targets, because it is the local 
governments and their educational departments that recently assume 
great responsibility and freedom to make basic education universal. 
There are many fundamental and macroscopic policies at governmental 
level (not school level) that have to be properly implemented, and the 
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state of educational provision has to be closely monitored and 
maintained. Schools in China, however, are more or less still under the 
detailed leadership of the education authorities, despite that the "Head 
Teacher in Charge" system has brought some gradual changes. 
Therefore, schools are relatively powerless compared with education 
authorities. In other words, local people's governments and their 
education authorities are the real decision-makers. Naturally, they 
become the focus of inspection. 
Another interesting characteristic about the Chinese inspections, 
especially full inspections, is that the inspection team, instead of 
consisting of purely inspectors, is a mixture of inspectors, 
administrators from various branches in the education authority, 
members of the Teaching Research Office, and sometimes retired school 
heads. One inspector usually plays the role of an organiser and 
coordinator. For instance, in an report of inspection organised by a 
district inspectorate, it was mentioned that the members of the 
inspection team came from the district education authority, the 
Teaching Research Office, the moral education office, the audio-video 
aid centre, the Party Committee, the Youth League Committee, and the 
Children's Palace organisation, in all about 30 people. If the inspection 
is carried out by central or provincial inspectorates, the inspection team 
will contain more administrators with different specialities in 
administration. The main reason given for the participation of the 
non-inspectors is the shortage of inspectors, and consequently the 
incapacity of covering all aspects that needed inspecting. Another 
reason might probably be related to the assumption that the more people 
(especially officials), the greater the momentum, and accordingly, the 
higher the authority. 
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6.3.3.1 Full Inspections 
The definition of full inspection is almost identical to that in many 
other foreign systems. It indicates the overall coverage of the aspects 
that are being looked into, and probably the large number of people 
involved, and relatively long duration of inspections. It must be noticed 
that the objects of inspection in the Chinese system are both local 
government and their education authorities, and individual schools. 
Inspection of Local Governments and Education Authorities, The 
inspections of local governments and their education authorities, or as 
the Chinese called it, macro-inspection, are organised by the prefectural 
inspectorate, provincial inspectorate or central inspectorate. The 
composition of the inspection team was mentioned earlier but the 
number of team members vary according to the size of the local 
government to be inspected and the importance attached to the 
inspection. The inspections usually last from one week to ten days. 
Before the inspection, the local government will usually get at least 
one month's notice. Informed by the higher level inspectorate, local 
government (i.e., all its relevant departments like the finance 
department. staffing department, and of course the education authority) 
have to carry out a review in advance of the inspection. 
When the inspection team arrives, the first thing to be done is 
reporting. The chief of the local government and the heads of the 
relevant departments give general reports on the educational provision 
in the area, and the efforts made by the government, which gives the 
inspectorate a basic picture of the situation. 
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To go one step further, a series of meetings with relevant 
departments are then held to explore more extensively the education 
service in the area. Meanwhile, a huge number of documents are 
examined. 
The third step is to sample one or two sub-local areas (e.g., a county 
in a prefecture, or a prefecture in a province depending on the level of 
the inspected government) to actually see the educational service on the 
ground. After the repetition of the above mentioned procedures at 
sub-local government level, (but on a small scale), the inspection of 
several sampled schools will be carried out. 
After thorough discussions among the inspectors, provisional 
conclusions are reached. On the last day of the inspection, the 
inspectorate chief reports to the government head and seeks feedback. 
The evaluation criteria are closely related to the current climate of 
educational development. At the time of the survey, they were: the 
linkage between educational planning and the local economic needs; 
feasibility of the plans for realising compulsory education in the light of 
local conditions; staffing of the schools; basic schooling resources (like 
building, equipment) and schooling direction, progress in 
decentralising administration, and last but by no means least, 
educational funding, i.e., it had to fulfil the requirement of the state: the 
expenditure on education must be increased at a higher rate than the 
increase of the revenue, and the expenses per pupil should also increase 
progressively. 
Some of the criteria are quite specific, such as educational funding 
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and school building standards, but others are rather general and 
usually within the jurisdiction of the local government. (such as 
educational planning). In the latter case, the inspectorates cannot 
enforce their ideas. They can only offer comments and suggestions 
which the local government usually takes seriously. 
In the inspection report, there are certain specific requirements most 
likely to appear which required fulfilment within one or two months. 
The following are some examples of such requirements in a central 
inspectorate report: (1): 2000 m2 of dangerous buildings must be 
eliminated immediately, (2), the problem of 9000 pupils having to bring 
stools to go to school must be solved quickly, (3): the practice of charging 
pupils for a share of the capital construction fee for the school must be 
stopped immediately. 
To ensure that the requirements made by the inspectorate are 
satisfactorily met within the time limit, two methods are usually 
employed: either to ask the inspected government to submit an 
improvement report, or to send some inspectors back to check on the spot 
(reinspection). 
Inspection of Schools. Most schools are inspected by the lowest tier of 
the inspectorates --- district inspectorates in urban areas and county 
inspectorates in rural areas, as they are directly run by district or 
county education authorities. A few key schools are directly run by, and 
thus inspected by the prefectural or even provincial education 
authorities. 
During an inspection of school, a meeting between inspectors and 
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school heads is always the first item on the agenda. An overall review of 
the school is presented by the head, the purpose of the inspection 
explained by the reporting inspector, and the arrangements made. A 
full inspection team is usually composed of the chief of the education 
authority, members of relevant administrative branches, inspectors, 
and members from the Teaching Research Office. 
Then the whole inspection team will be split into several sub-groups, 
each responsible for one particular aspect of the overall quality of the 
school. After examining relevant school documents, reports, plans and 
pupils' work, those sub-groups go separately to search for relevant 
evidence. Some meet staff and students, some go to classrooms to 
evaluate teaching and learning. As a final stage, exchanges of opinions 
between both sides and writing up will take place. 
The score that a school can get usually depends on its performance 
in the following 8 aspects: (1). schooling direction, i.e., the direction of 
educating socialist citizen, of helping students preparing for the labour 
market as well as for higher education; (2). moral education; (3). quality 
of the leadership team; (4). staffing; (5), teaching and learning; (6). 
health and hygiene education; (7). pastoral care and supporting service; 
and (8). school conditions and resources. 
It seems, according to numerous inspection reports and the author's 
own observation of two inspections, that curriculum matters occupy 
some but by no means the dominant position in the inspections, even 
though they are school inspections. Political matters and management 
matters are at least as important as professional matters. 
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6.3.3.2 Aspect Inspections 
This form of inspection is aimed at particular aspect(s) of school 
performance or education authorities' administration instead of 
examining the overall standards in the schools (or education 
authorities). As the Chinese understand it, it is a very concentrated and 
economic means suitable for ensuring the completion of certain 
contemporary tasks which are important or urgent in a particular 
period of time (e.g., to eliminate dangerous school buildings). But in 
China, a reduction in the aspects to be inspected does not necessarily 
lead to a reduction of the scale. Some important aspect inspections are 
as large as full inspections. 
Generally speaking, aspect inspection is not much practised as the 
inspectors were heavily engaged in quite a lot of full inspections at the 
time of the survey. Furthermore, the uses of the aspect inspection, 
except for inspecting contemporary tasks, has not yet been further 
explored. 
6.3.3.3 Routine Visits 
This is the most common method used by the Chinese inspectors. 
Full inspection cannot be organised many times a term due to the 
limitation of manpower and resources. The rest of the information has 
to be obtained by other means such as routine visits. 
According to the survey results, 45.1% of the inspectors responded 
that they only spent 1-2 days per week in schools or in lower level 
200 
Chapter 6: The Present Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
education authorities. 21.6% spent 3 days (there are 6 working days in 
China). This also included the time spent on full inspections. The rest of 
the time was devoted to administrative work and political study (once a 
week, nationally unified), and inspector training (see Table 6.12). 
To sum up, although there are several forms of inspections and 
visits, they are not equally employed. Full inspections occupy most of the 
inspectors' time, which in a way reveals the dominant function of the 
inspectorate. 
6.4 The Expectations of the Roles of the Inspectorate 
Apart from uncovering the factual information on the work of the 
Chinese inspectorate. the author also used the survey, in particular, the 
questionnaires to find out the schools' and the education authorities' 
expectations of the roles of the Chinese inspectorate. The author first 
asked the administrators, school heads as well as the inspectors 
themselves to answer the questions. Given 17 choices, they were 
requested to select five to reflect their preferences of the roles of the 
inspectorate. (5 points for first preference, 4 points for second 
preference, 3 points for third preference, 2 points for fourth preference, 
and 1 point for fifth preference). Then the mean scores for each group 
were calculated. The results are shown in Table 6.17. 
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Many tentative conclusions can be drawn from the responses in 
Table 6.17. Firstly, all three groups had a clear understanding about the 
primary role of the inspectorate as one of the controlling bodies of 
educational performance. This controlling function is basically fulfilled 
by ensuring proper implementation of national and education 
authorities' decisions by means of inspection and evaluation. Secondly, 
both inspectors and their partners expected the "professional adviser" to 
become one of the main roles of the inspectorate. As Table 6.4 and Table 
6.9 suggest, at present, the role of professional adviser (to education 
authorities, in particular, to schools) is not played much. But in reality, 
because of the great responsibilities all local governments and education 
authorities assume, and thus the need to make sound policies, the 
inspectorate, a force possessing rich management and teaching 
experience, is expected strongly to play the role as a professional 
adviser. For example, in Table 6.17, "to comment on authority's policies" 
was expected by the administrators to be the fifth function while the 
inspectors regarded it as the 9th. As to the schools, the expectation of 
being professional adviser was further reflected in the demands for 
"encouraging school innovation", (see Table 6.17). The school heads put 
this role third whilst the inspectors put it 8th, and the administrators 
6th. According to the x2 tests (Table 6.18), inspectors and school heads 
had significantly different views on the role as a supporter of school 
innovation with the administrators somewhere in between. 
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Table 6.18 The Inspector as an Encourager of School Innovation 
as 1st 
expectation 
2nd 
3rd 4th 5th 
not 
expect 
No. 
school 
heads 
3 7 10 8 8 36 72 
inspectors 1 3 3 7 4 5 4 7 2 
administrat. 2 1 4 3 8 31 4 9 
School heads <===> Inspectors: 
X2 =11.38 df=5 	 Significant at P=0.05 level 
Administrators <-- --> School Heads 
x2  =5.76 df=5 insignificant at P4105 level 
Administrators <===> Inspectors 
X2 :1.51 df=5 	 insignificant at P4105 level 
As to the role of "evaluator of school standards", the school heads 
expected it to be the 7th, compared with the 3rd role both administrators 
and inspectors placed on it. 
These two different views between schools at one side, and the 
inspectors at the other, implies that the school side strongly expects the 
inspectorate to strengthen the advisory function instead of doing too 
many inspections and evaluations. Nowadays, the "Head Teacher in 
Charge" system has been gradually put into practice, though the pace is 
not as fast as the reform of central-local government relationships. More 
and more schools have gained a considerable degree of freedom in such 
matters as budget, staffing. Hence at the school level, reform is also 
gradually but increasingly unfolding. Therefore, schools need support 
and advice from the education authority, especially from inspectors 
because of their frequent visit to schools and because of their 
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professional experience. Interestingly, the school heads even expect the 
inspectors to facilitate resource acquisition. (Table 6.17). 
One more strong wish of the school heads worth noticing is that they 
expect the inspectors to offer some advice on curriculum and teaching 
and learning matters. (Table 6.17). Compared with the inspectors' 
self-expectation, one can see that the school side gives this function a 
much higher priority than the inspectorate. 
In brief, one thing that is clear from Table 6.17 is that both the 
expectations of the school heads and those of the administrators indicate 
the need for the inspectorate to strengthen its role as a professional 
adviser (to both education authorities and to schools). Clearly, these are 
the requests which should be taken into account by the inspectorate. 
More discussions about the balance of functions are carried out in 
Chapter Eight. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the functions and working methods of 
the Chinese inspectorate, its work with regard to education authorities, 
as well as to schools and lower level education authorities, and the 
schools' and education authorities' expectations of the roles of the 
inspectorate. Because it is a summary of field work, there could be any 
of the shortcomings which exist in research field work. Two of these are 
the representativity and reliability of the collected data. As to the 
representativity of the results, after realising the impossibility of 
sampling all the provinces, the author selected, from among 30 
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provinces in the country, questionnaire samples from 10 provinces, and 
interview subjects from 6 provinces, representing different levels of 
development of the inspection system, different types (urban and rural) 
and different ranks of inspectorates. As to the reliability of the answers 
in the interviews and the questionnaires, the author believes that there 
is evidence of some false statements and contradictions in the answers 
by different sample subjects. For example, although no administrators 
admitted that inspectors ran errands for them, there was an inspector 
interviewed who complained about this. To take another example, while 
one school head gave a high mark to the full inspection his school 
recently experienced, it might have something to do with the fact that it 
was the inspector who introduced the author to this school head. In 
another case, one school head criticised the authority of the inspectorate, 
perhaps because the inspectorate failed to keep some promises made to 
his school. On the whole, the author believes that the reliability is 
satisfactory, because in the interviews and questionnaires, the author 
stated clearly that she represented a research group in a university, not 
an inspectorate or anything else. With the promise of confidentiality, the 
replies to a neutral research group are more likely to be reliable. 
Since its birth in late 1986, the Chinese inspectorate has made 
remarkable progress. Organisations have been set up quickly. Large 
scale inspector training courses have equipped thousands of inspectors 
from all levels with the necessary theoretical knowledge as well as 
practical skills. The criteria for evaluating educational provision in 
education authorities and education quality in schools have been set up 
and put into practice. A large number of education authorities and 
schools have been formally inspected so far. In particular, the 
nationwide aspect inspections conducted in 1989 and early 1990 have 
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effectively urged provincial governments to provide better educational 
service. Preliminary cooperation between the inspectorate and all 
branches in the education authorities, including the Teaching Research 
Office, and with schools has been established. What is more important, 
is that the significance and the importance of the inspection system has 
started being understood by more and more people. 
While acknowledging these remarkable achievements, one must 
remember that there are still shortcomings that need to be improved. 
Many weak points uncovered by the survey results forecast the issues 
and difficulties that the inspectorate is likely to encounter later on, after 
the establishment of organisational structures is finished. How to 
improve these weak points and to tackle these issues? The author 
believes that the Chinese inspectors can find some references in the 
HMI practice (which has been described in Chapter Three and Four). 
But before putting forward recommendations using HMI experiences as 
references, a thorough discussion is needed in order to decide the ways 
in which and the extent to which the English experiences are 
transferable to China. This will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IN WHAT WAY AND TO WHAT 
JXTENT CAN THE CHINESE  
INSPECTORATE LEARN FROM HMI 
Extensive discussions so far have revealed much about the HMI 
system, and the recent development of the Chinese inspection system. 
This chapter examines in detail the feasibility of transferring HMI's 
experiences, i.e., to decide the ways in which, and the extent to which 
the Chinese inspectorate can learn from HMI. This analysis, therefore, 
lays the foundation for the later proposals for the future development of 
the Chinese inspection system, which, according to the logical 
framework of this study, is based on the comparisons with HMI. 
In order to decide the ways in which and the extent to which the 
English experience can be adapted to the Chinese practice, one needs to 
identify: (1). the differences and similarities between the inspection 
system in China and the system of HMI; (2). the major differences and 
similarities between the educational administration systems in the two 
countries which play an extremely important role in defining the role of 
the inspectorate; and (3). other important factors that have enormous 
impaft on educational systems and ultimately on educational inspection 
systems. 
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7.1 The Differences and Similarities Within the Inspection 
Systems 
7.1.1 Comparing Roles and Functions 
When comparing the inspection systems, one of the most important 
and distinguishable aspects is function. Before narrowing down to the 
function of the Chinese inspectorate and HMI, it is worth examining 
"function" in a broader context. Clearly, the system of inspection exists 
in a large number of other fields (not only in educational field). The 
fundamental aim of an inspectorate is to assist its employing authority 
to discharge its responsibilities by seeing the organisations or 
individuals for which the employing authority has certain 
responsibilities carrying out their duties. This behaviour of "seeing" 
usually refers to the close examination of the quality or correctness of 
the overall work, or aspects of work of the inspected object, and implies 
the possible actions which might arise as a result of this examination. 
According to Rhodes, the duty of those organisations or individuals 
for which the inspectorate's employing authority has certain 
responsibilities falls into two categories. In the first place, there are 
general administrative responsibilities, e.g., magistrates are made 
responsible for running prisons, whilst other entities have to meet more 
specific requirements (usually statutory) e.g., a shop keeper has to use 
accurate weights and measures. (Rhodes, 1981, p2). 
In accordance with these two different kinds of responsibilities, 
inspectorates are divided into two types: inspection to ensure compliance 
with certain specific statutory requirements, and inspection to secure, 
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maintain or improve standards of performance. That is to say, there are 
two groups of inspectorates: enforcement inspectorate and efficiency  
inspectorate (ibid). 
In Rhodes' view, all inspectorates can be divided into these two 
categories, which differ in purposes of inspection, power, approaches 
employed, and the background in which the two inspectorates are 
embedded. 
The purpose of the enforcement inspectorate is to ensure that those 
inspected meet specific external requirements regulated by legislation. 
Although the efficiency inspectorate is equally concerned with 
standards and performance, it usually has no precise criteria which 
must be met. To put it in another way, what the enforcement 
inspectorate is looking for is the ends of implementing statutory 
requirements whilst the efficiency inspectorate pays more attention to 
the means by which the ends are achieved. 
As a result of the difference in purpose, the two inspectorates have 
different powers: enforcement implies an element of compulsion backed 
by legal sanction, usually prosecution or fines. So that once an inspector 
discovers a failure to carry out statutory requirements, he can take legal 
action. By contrast, an efficiency inspectorate only has the power to 
inspect the institution or individual. Although it is not armed with 
specific statutory power, it is backed by its employing authority. Its 
response to an unsatisfactory standard or performance would probably 
be to use persuasion rather than legal sanctions, or to count on its 
employing authority to take administrative action. Withdrawal of 
resource is one example. 
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Furthermore, as a result of the difference in power, the two 
inspectorates employ different approaches. One can deduce that 
although the enforcement inspectors have the power to initiate legal 
sanctions, their power is more or less specific. On the other hand, the 
efficiency inspectors would be expected to emphasise more the 
persuasive approach. So that these people are usually specialists with 
professional knowledge and skills. In addition, they would try to 
increase their influence by providing advice and persuasion in other 
aspects apart from offering suggestions on the spot. 
Apart from the differences in role, power, and approach of the two 
inspectorates, there is also a dissimilarity in the contexts in which 
inspectorates work. As Rhodes points out, the enforcement inspectorate 
works under a certain legislation or law, whilst the work of the 
efficiency inspectorate, as in the case of the British HMI, must be viewed 
in the light of central-local relationships. In many respects, local 
government assumes great power and freedom in administering the 
service within its area, despite the fact this freedom has been reduced in 
recent years. In addition, regulations in education sector usually cannot 
be specific, unlike those in some other sectors of public administration, 
for example, transport and trading. Thus, many educational matters 
can only be done by persuasion. 
Examining Rhodes' theory, one can argue that what he identifies are 
simply two extreme cases of inspectorates: and certainly the reality is 
more complicated than the theory. Many inspectorates carry out a 
combination of these two functions. Take the LEA advisory services in 
England as an example: local advisers play a supporting role to schools 
by offering advice and sometimes even by working alongside the 
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teachers over a period of time. In this respect, their role is more or less 
that of efficiency promoter. On the other hand, they do have the duty to 
see that LEAs' policies, sometimes quite specific policies, are 
satisfactorily implemented by schools. So they are both efficiency and 
enforcement inspectorates. A more typical example is the Social 
Services Inspectorate in the Department of Health and Social Security, 
as studied by Henkel (1991). It is concerned with both compliance with 
the law and regulations and maintaining and promoting standards of 
performance. The inspectors carry out inspections to enforce local 
authorities to properly implement the legal requirements and 
governmental regulations. In the meantime, inheriting their 
professional tradition, they act as agents for change. During their 
inspections and routine work, they identify and disseminate good 
practice and encourage innovations. Thus, the Social Services 
Inspectorate is a combination of enforcement inspectorate and efficiency 
inspectorate. 
In addition to the complexity of the nature of the inspectorates, there 
is another complexity in terms of the methods employed. Efficiency 
inspectors usually only take persuasive approaches, as Rhodes argues. 
But enforcement inspectors do not necessarily rely only on legal 
sanctions. In the case of the Social Services Inspectorate, for example, if 
the local authorities breach legislation or regulations, the Secretary of 
State usually does not take legal actions. Instead, he probably refuses or 
withdraws regislation of certain categories of provision on the advice of 
the inspectors (Henkel, 1991). Similarly, many educational inspectorates 
employ both administrative means and legal means (particularly the 
former) when they enforce the compliance with specific regulations. The 
Chinese inspectors, for example, often take such administrative means 
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as withdraw resources and redeploy personnel (through their education 
authorities, of course) to achieve the aim of enforcing policy 
implementation. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that, instead of dividing inspectorates 
into two sharply distinguished groups, we can put inspectorates on a 
continuum with the two extremes as pure enforcement inspectorate and 
pure efficiency inspectorate. Other points on this continuum have a 
combination of both functions. But where a particular inspectorate is 
located on the continuum is determined by the various functions it 
performs. For example, the LEA advisory services would fall 
somewhere close to the pure efficiency end but not at the extreme point. 
To reconsider the differences in purpose, power, and approach of 
different inspectorates in line with the concept of the continuum, one 
can deduce that those inspectorates in between perform some function of 
enforcement and some of efficiency promotion, the proportion of each 
depends on where it is located. These inspectorates tend to enforce some 
specific requirements as well as observe general standards, they have 
certain executive power in certain aspects whilst in other aspects they 
can only use persuasion and advice as a means of increasing efficiency. 
Coming back to the role of HMI and that of the Chinese inspectorate 
using the perspective suggested above, one can see that HMI is almost a 
pure efficiency inspectorate. This can be explained by the feature of 
central-local-school relationship -- partnership. Before the 1988 
Education Reform Act, central government, local government and 
schools all had certain responsibilities for educational service. Bearing 
the duty of promoting educational standards in England and Wales, the 
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DES had the statutory duty to ensure that the educational provision in all 
LEAs was satisfactory and quality of education in schools was 
acceptable. But it could not directly interfere in the business of LEAs 
because the power for day-to-day running of the publicly maintained 
education service was retained by the LEAs. It could hardly interfere in 
curriculum matters either, because the professional matters were 
virtually controlled by the school teachers. Therefore, HMI, entrusted 
with the task of safeguarding educational standards, acted as a 
"watchdog without teeth". The purpose behind its inspections was not to 
ensure that particular institution complied with certain specific DES' 
requirements. Instead, as it had no power to do so, its inspections were 
aimed at assisting DES' monitoring of state of education and policy 
making and the improvement of standards in individual institutions. 
However, HMI did have very limited power to enforce certain 
compliance. For example, HM Inspectors had the power to enforce the 
closure of a science laboratory if the safety conditions were inadequate. 
In the case of the Chinese inspectorate, the elements of enforcement 
carry more weight than in the HMI case. It has the duty to ensure 
conformity with specific national requirements (in the form of 
legislation or administrative regulations), with the help of their 
administrative power. It is also expected to monitor the general state of 
administration in lower level education authorities and schools, and to 
maintain and promote standards by persuasion and guidance. 
Therefore, on the enforcement-efficiency inspectorate continuum, the 
Chinese inspectorate is neither a pure enforcement inspectorate 
(because in education, few goals and criteria are specific and clear-cut 
and can be easily achieved by enforcement), nor a pure efficiency 
inspectorate (because there are some specific directives which need to be 
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met). It performs a combination of both functions. In addition, these 
specific requirements (e.g. the rate of increase in educational 
expenditure must be higher than that of local revenue) are unlikely to 
occupy a major position in the evaluation criteria. But at present, as 
discussed in Chaf ter On e 7 there are difficulties in the 
implementation of the law of compulsory education in reality, so the 
Chinese inspectorate carries out relatively more checking and 
enforcement functions. Apart from that, the inspection and evaluation 
of a particular school or an education authority is also designed to 
promote its educational standards or the efficiency of administration, as 
the English inspectors do in their inspections. Therefore, the purposes 
behind inspection, in the case of the Chinese inspectorate, are to ensure 
compliance with certain specific requirements and to maintain overall 
standards. The former function will be particularly needed in the initial 
period of implementing the law of the nine year compulsory education 
when there is some resistance (see Chapter One for details). 
The presence of both functions in the Chinese inspectorate can be 
better understood by examining the central-local relationships in China 
-- the delegation of power. This means that the central educational 
government (The State Education Commission) delegates part of its 
power to local educational authorities. But, the ultimate power is still in 
the hands of the SEdC. Therefore, in those nationally-unified aspects: 
e.g. national curriculum, the basic educational provision, all education 
authorities will have to work in accordance with the national 
requirements. As to the basic national policies and legislative 
requirements, the education authorities also have the duty to do what 
they are told. Only those things which within their relatively limited 
jurisdiction, compared with the English LEAs and schools, can the 
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Chinese education authorities make decisions on their own. 
Nevertheless, the education reforms launched five years ago have given 
the Chinese education authorities more power and freedom in 
administration, especially in the field of basic education. It is stipulated 
in the law of compulsory education that "the responsibility for 
administering compulsory education belongs to local government", 
which implies a changing relationship -- education authorities are 
gaining more power and freedom and of course more duty in 
educational administration. 
In short, different educational administration systems result in 
different relationships between central and local government, and thus 
the power that each part enjoys. The inspectorates in different contexts 
play different roles. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the 
educational service as opposed to that of regulatory administration, e.g., 
in industry, the non-specific criteria always occupy the main part. On 
the whole, these two inspectorates are much more concerned with the 
general administration and overall standards of the service than with 
specific aspects of requirements. So they do have common features---
they both belong to efficiency inspectorates. However, the transferable 
points exist in those efficiency promotion functions, not enforcement 
elements. 
More differences exist in the purpose behind the inspections, that is 
in the HMI case, to collect information on the state of education to report 
to the Secretary of State in order to assist the formulation of national 
policy, and to improve educational standards in individual schools as a 
result of the inspection; in the Chinese case, to enforce policy 
implementation, to collect information and to improve educational 
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standards. What is comparable is the function of collecting information 
on the state of education, the function of offering advice to those 
responsible for the educational service, and of course, the function of 
inspection itself. For example, how do HMIs decide on what should be 
inspected? How do they organise inspection? How do they balance full 
inspection, survey inspection and routine visit in order to balance the 
collection of general information and more concentrated and specific 
information? How do they manage to deliver information from the 
headquarters to the field and vice versa? How do they process the mass of 
information into the kind of information which can assist 
decision-making effectively? How do they ensure the information 
communication from the organisational structure point of view? These 
are points that can be learned to various degrees. 
Despite the differences in roles and aims, there are some common 
features in both inspectorates. Both inspectorates are expected to assist 
decision making by their respective employing authorities and by the 
inspected institutions, not only by supplying large amounts of 
information, but also by offering judgment and advice based on gathered 
information and evidence and on their professional experience. Here, 
the transferable points emerge again: who is involved in providing 
advice? How do they do it? What is the mechanism of this service? Where 
do inspectors obtain their experience and expertise? How can the 
Chinese inspectorate adapt English experience in the light of the 
Chinese administrative context? 
As a result of the differences in roles and aims, the methods used by 
the English and the Chinese inspectorate are also different. HMI 
usually uses only advisory approaches to influence the people who have 
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responsibility for the education system, the Chinese inspectorate can 
instruct the inspected institutions to stop or change the practices which 
seriously breach the legal requirements or the administrative 
regulations issued by the SEdC. But things within the scope of education 
authorities are not subject to inspectorate's directives. They can only use 
terms like "matters for discussion" in the inspection report to exert their 
influence. Therefore, the method used by the Chinese inspectorate is a 
combination of directives and persuasion and the former is in practice 
not very often employed. 
To conclude, the role of the Chinese inspectorate differs from that of 
HMI in that the Chinese inspectorate has both efficiency promotion and 
enforcement functions, whilst HMI is mainly concerned with efficiency 
through maintaining and promoting general educational standards. 
These differences are largely the result of the different central-local 
relationships. Accordingly, the methods they use are different in some 
respects. Nevertheless, they are both efficiency inspectorates on the 
continuum. Thus, they have many things in common. Their role of 
promoting efficiency and standards is similar, their inspecting schools 
to collect evidence to assist authorities' policy-making is an identical 
role, both of them are expected to collect information and to contribute 
professional expertise to help decision making. They have to use 
persuasive approach to different extents. In addition to these, it can be 
further argued that the development of the Chinese inspectorate is in the 
direction of carrying out more efficiency promotion functions. The main 
reason for the present inspectorate to exercise certain enforcement 
function by administrative means is the considerable resistance and 
difficulty in realising compulsory education. After this has been done, 
along with the further delegation of power, the inspectorate will have 
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less of an enforcement function and more of a general maintenance 
function. In short, the similarities listed above and future trends provide 
the basis for comparison. Nevertheless, it is believed that some 
alterations must be made even to these "transferable" points. 
7.1.2 Comparing Authority and Power 
Another difference that makes comparison difficult may be the 
different types of power that two inspectorates have, and the different 
bases from which the powers are derived. This is partly due to the 
different functions of the two inspectorates. 
Needless to say, both inspectorates have the legitimacy and authority 
to carry out inspections and to perform other relevant functions (except 
for the Chinese inspectorate which encounters some confusion when it 
inspects its next lower level government, as described in Chapter Five 
and Six). But the basis of the legitimacy and authority is different in two 
systems. 
According to Weber's bureaucracy theory, authority has three 
legitimate bases. The first is the traditional authority based on beliefs 
established over a long period of time. The second base is charisma, i.e., 
personal qualities that make people accept someone's authority. The last 
one, usually exist in bureaucratic settings, is the rational legal authority 
based on organisational rules and procedures. This type of authority is a 
relationship between jobs and does not depend on the characteristics of 
the individuals concerned. (Weber, 1947, p328). Another important 
distinction worth making is the difference between power and influence. 
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Power is usually defined as the capacity to get decisions and actions 
taken and situations created which accord with one's interests. 
(Dawson, 1986, p147), whilst influence is usually thought to be the effect 
on someone or something without the use of direct force or command. 
The main feature of influence, therefore, is persuasion in contrast with 
compliance in the case of power. 
Examining the bases of authority of the Chinese inspectorate, it is 
clear that the traditional base does not exist as the inspectorate was set 
up not long ago. The charisma base is hardly to be regarded strong. The 
major foundation is rational legitimacy, i.e., the authority which is 
derived from organisational rules and procedures. 
As discussed in the last few chapters, the Chinese inspectorate 
organisationally belongs to administrative units in the education 
authorities. Despite the fact that the SEdC requires at least 15 years of 
teaching experience on average -- with different requirements for 
different posts in the inspectorate (SEdC,1983,p2), and that most 
inspectors are more experienced in school teaching and management in 
comparison with other administrators in education authorities, they are 
essentially administrators. Therefore, they automatically qualify for 
administrative power. At present, the inspectors are heavily loaded with 
the task of inspection in order to ensure the implementation of the new 
legislation, the administrative power becomes even more important. 
However, their administrative power is different from that of other 
administrators in the education authorities. Inspectors do not have the 
power to initiate policy and to require schools to carry out the policy, 
unlike other administrative branches in the education authorities which 
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have the power and the duty to make decisions and plans and assign 
work to the schools and lower level education authorities. To their 
employing education authorities, the inspectors have no right to directly 
take part in the process of education authorities' policy making. This is 
the responsibility of other branches. They could be asked for advice on 
policy making but they do not have final say. Furthermore, they have no 
power to decide sanctions or rewards after an inspection, unlike the 
administrators in other branches. They only have the right to suggest to 
the authorities that they praise, reward, criticise, or punish some 
personnel, schools or authorities. 
In addition, because inspectors are selected from either 
administrators with rich teaching experience or directly from school 
heads, they are comparatively more professional than other 
administrators both in terms of teaching and administration. So they 
are in a better position to provide professional advice to lower level 
education authorities and schools. In this respect, their authority is also 
based on professional experience and expertise. 
In short, the Chinese inspectorate is given administrative power to 
help to ensure implementation of national and authorities' policies. But 
its power is not as direct as that of other administrative branches. 
Meanwhile, its authority is mainly based on its administrative power. 
But the relatively richer professional expertise also helps its work. 
Consequently, when the inspectorate asks the inspected schools or 
authorities to meet certain specific requirements after inspection, they 
will have to follow these instructions. However, when inspectorate's 
opinions are presented in the form of "matters for discussion" in the 
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report, schools or lower level education authorities are not obliged to 
follow because those are the areas that belong to the discretion of the 
inspected institutions, they can only be influenced but not decided by the 
higher level inspectorates though in reality they are taken seriously. 
Examining HMI's authority, one can see that HMI's authority is 
built on almost all the three bases. Its long history and its fine 
reputation certainly help the HMI's advice to be more willingly accepted. 
Although HM Inspectors' authority is not built on their charisma, their 
professional expertise does increase the chance of successful 
persuasion. It is believed by many teachers, according to Haigh, that to 
become an HMI is to reach a career pinnacle (Haigh, 1989, p24). Hence, 
not only the ability of individual HMI, but also the HMI as a collective 
body is regarded as one of the most professionally experienced and 
capable groups in the educational field. Undoubtedly, this perception of 
HMI as a whole makes the HMI's advice more convincing and 
trustworthy. But one should never ignore the rational ground of HMI's 
authority. The legitimacy of HMI's existence and its practice rest 
primarily on various clauses in educational legislation. The 
empowerment of carrying out inspection and other tasks by law 
automatically establishes the legitimate authority for the inspectorate. 
Furthermore, the functions of HMI with regard to the Department of 
Education and its influence on central policy makers enhances its 
authority and influence in the country. In short, all the three bases of 
authority in Weber's theory, particularly the history one and the rational 
one, are applicable in the case of HMI. 
However, although HMI has the authority, it does not have any 
administrative power - because it is not responsible for enforcing policy 
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implementation. It was once rumoured that HMI would probably 
embark on the task of enforcing implementation of the national 
curriculum (introduced by the 1988 Education Act), in which case it 
might be equipped with executive power. But a recent reply by the 
Secretary of State removed this possibility. (see Chapter 4 section 4.3 for 
detail). Therefore, its function in this respect remains that of monitoring 
rather than enforcing. The monitoring may include the task of 
explaining the policy to LEA administrators and school teachers and 
reporting the results of policy implementation to the DES, but it is not 
directly involved in enforcing implementation. In addition, because the 
day-to-day running of school was left to the discretion of LEAs and 
schools (particularly before 1988), the DES had little to enforce. 
Therefore, HMI's authority was and still is largely based on its 
professional expertise and its independence. The purposes of HMI's 
inspections are to collect information on the state of education and to 
help improve educational standards of individual schools. Inspection is 
not a means of deciding reward or punishment towards schools. 
However, one thing that should be pointed out is the publishing of HMI's 
inspection reports. Since 1981, all the full inspection reports are 
available to the public. HMI's evaluations obviously affect schools' 
reputations. In this respect, HMI's authority, or influence, has been 
increased by this decision. In addition, along with the central 
government's increasing involvement in educational affairs, HMI is 
expected more and more to offer advice on policy making. Thus, in this 
respect, HMI exerts its influence on the education system through its 
influence on the DES. By and large, HMI is trusted because of its high 
professional expertise and its unique independence. Therefore, although 
the advice of HMI is purely advisory and the inspected schools can 
refuse to listen to suggestions, in reality, many suggestions offered by 
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HM inspectors are still adopted by schools and teachers. 
One more difference related to authority is the degree of 
independence that two inspectorates enjoy. In England, although HM 
Inspectors are civil servants, they do have a certain degree of 
independence, partly for historical reasons, and partly due to their 
prestigious professional expertise. Senior Chief Inspector has direct 
access to the Secretary of State; HMI's reports cannot be revised by 
anyone other than HMIs, HMIs are relatively free to decide their 
working programme by themselves (but they still have to take into 
consideration the policy priorities of the DES). Although HMI cannot be 
totally free from the pressure of the DES, this "conditional" 
independence makes it possible to safeguard educational standards to a 
certain extent. 
The Chinese inspectorates, by contrast, are dependent on their 
employing authorities. They usually make their working programmes 
according to the general plan of the authorities. These programmes 
must be finally approved by the head of the education authority. They are 
encouraged in theory to criticise the decisions of their education 
authorities, (in the Chinese expression: "to put on a rival show"), but 
there is no organisational measure to protect this right. So that 
inspectors basically are the representatives of their employing education 
authorities though occasionally the inspectors do raise questions about 
policies as a feedback of the state of policy implementation. 
In short, owing to the different functions that two inspectorates 
perform, the Chinese inspectorate enjoys certain administrative powers 
the use of which can enforce policy implementation whilst HMI can only 
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offer purely advisory advice which could be turned down by teachers and 
politicians. The Chinese inspectorates are dependent on their employing 
authorities whilst H1VII has a certain degree of independence. 
It is obviously unrealistic to suggest that the Chinese inspectors 
should seek the same degree of independence as HMI has. Thousands of 
years' centralisation and the tradition of lack of public supervision on 
the work of the government prevent the inspectorate, and indeed, any 
body in the country, from having any real independence. However, the 
Chinese inspectorate can certainly benefit enormously from studying 
how HM Inspectors maintain their high authority and influence 
without using administrative power. For example, how HM Inspectors 
acquire their professional expertise? How the inspectorate as a whole 
balances different kinds of expertise and forms an appropriate mix of 
specialities? Apart from inspectors' personal qualities, are there any 
ways of increasing authority by improving the balance of functions? 
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7.1.3 Comparing Objects of Inspection 
As discussed earlier, before the 1988 Education Reform Act, the 
responsibility for the educational service in England was shared mainly 
by Department of Education and Science, Local Education Authorities 
and individual schools. Each partner had its own areas of responsibility 
which were influenced but not determined by others. In other words, 
much of the work of LEAs and schools could not be legally enforced by 
the DES, rather, it could be improved only by means of persuasion. This 
feature determined that because they were not in a relationship of the 
leader and the led, the DES could not, in practice, inspect the 
administration of LEAs itself, it could only reveal the quality of LEAs' 
work by way of inspecting schools it ran. In recent years, HMI has 
conducted several inspections of LEAs. Its main concern was the 
standards of educational provision which were reflected in the 
educational quality in schools. But this inspection of LEAs was not a 
major task for HMI, it occupied only a small part of the HMI 
programme. 
Comparing the HMI inspection reports of this kind with the Chinese 
ones, one can see that the Chinese inspectors have more power to 
comment on the management of LEAs (financing, planning, staffing 
etc) than HMI. Because quite differently from the English case, 
educational administration in China is a relatively centralised and 
hierarchical system, despite some forms of sharing responsibility. The 
relationship between higher level authorities and lower level 
authorities, to a large extent, is the superior and the subordinate. This 
feature decides that not only the SEdC (the State Education Commission) 
can inspect local education authorities, but also those higher level 
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education authorities can inspect lower ones. The Chinese call the 
inspection of education authorities "macro-inspection" as opposed to the 
"micro-inspection" -- the inspection of schools. Apart from this, there is 
often a task of checking policy implementation during inspections 
because the State Education Commission, unlike the DES which was 
mainly concerned with allocating resources and supply and training of 
teachers, often draws up relatively more detailed regulations in 
addition to the formulation of broad national policies. 
The task of inspecting local governments and their educational 
authorities is a major task of the Chinese inspectorates, especially those 
at higher levels. Because it is the education authority level that is 
undergoing dramatic changes, the school has always been, and still is a 
very weak partner in educational administration. Another reason for 
the higher level inspectorates to concentrate on inspecting education 
authorities instead of schools, is the impossibility of conducting 
inspections of a satisfactory number of schools by their own limited 
number of inspectors. Thus, they try to maintain educational standards 
in schools by ensuring the standards of educational provision --
inspecting education authorities to maintain the efficiency of the 
educational administration. 
To summarise, as a result of the different relationship between 
central and local educational government, the objects of inspection are 
different. The Chinese inspectorate has dual targets of inspection. The 
higher level inspectorates usually inspect lower level education 
authorities rather than schools and leave the latter task to the lowest 
level inspectorates. On the other hand, HMI usually inspects individual 
schools and colleges. Inspecting LEAs is not its major concern. 
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7.1.4 Comparing the Relationship Between Central and Local 
Inspectorates 
Another difference in the inspection systems as a result of the 
different central-local relationship is the relationship between central 
and local inspectorates. In China, because the relationship between 
higher and lower level education authorities is hierarchical, the 
Chinese inspectorates -- the entities within the education authorities, 
naturally and legitimately form another line of hierarchy from the top 
down to the bottom. Meanwhile, because they are one branch of the 
education authorities, they are obliged to accept the supervision of their 
education authorities. Thus, in the case of the Chinese inspection 
system, there is a dual leadership except for the central inspectorate 
which has only one leader. The provisional regulations of inspection 
issued in 1983 state clearly that inspectorates should work under the 
dual control of their employing education authorities and the 
inspectorate at its next higher level. The former is responsible for setting 
work priorities for the inspectorate as well as for managing the 
inspectorate e.g., financing and staffing. The latter, as the provisional 
regulations claim, tends to be only concerned with inspection work 
itself, i.e., spreading good practice by organising various 
experience-exchange meetings among inspectorates, organising 
in-service training for inspectors and so on. Both superiors have 
different degrees of influence on the work of the inspectorate. At present, 
it is the employing education authorities that have a decisive say. The 
leadership of the higher level inspectorates on the lower ones is 
manifested in the routine submission of inspection reports and annual 
inspection programmes, and is particularly manifested in the 
requirement of lower level inspectorate's cooperation when the 
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inspection is going on. If the prefecture is to be inspected by the 
provincial inspectorate, for example, this prefectural inspectorate will 
be made responsible for sorting out all the necessary preparations, 
including all kinds of reviews by relevant authorities, all kinds of data 
from economic figures to school enrolment figures, all kinds of mock 
inspections of various schools. When the inspection team actually 
arrives, this prefectural inspectorate becomes one of the inspection 
objects of the provincial inspectorate as well as the member of inspection 
team when the inspection goes further to the sub-prefecture level. In 
addition, The Chinese inspectorates at different levels perform similar 
but not duplicate functions as every inspectorate inspects its next lower 
level governments and education authorities. 
In contrast, the English central and local inspectorates are two 
totally separate and independent bodies. Working solely for their 
respective authorities, HMI and Local Advisory Services have no legal 
or administrative relationship at all, though a certain amount of contact 
and joint work does exist in reality. Although they are separate 
monitoring organisations, the two bodies perform different but 
complementary functions. HMI is more inclined to information 
gathering whilst the local advisory services lay their emphasis on 
supporting and clinical advice to schools and colleges (at least before 
1988 ERA); HMI works across the whole of England whilst the local 
advisory services work within their boundaries; HMIs are only entitled 
to offer advice whilst the local advisers have some influence on resource 
allocation and teacher appointment. 
In short, the relationships between central and local inspectorates in 
the Chinese and English systems is different. It is hierarchical in the 
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Chinese case, but separate in the English case. Both the central and 
local inspectorates in China perform similar functions whilst those in 
England perform different but complementary functions. 
72 The Differences and Similarities Outside the Inspection 
SYstem 
As analysed earlier in this chapter, the functions of both HMI and 
the Chinese inspectorate are a combination of efficiency promotion and 
legislation enforcement. The former function possesses a dominant 
position in the HMI case and a major position in the case of the Chinese 
inspectorate. However, such similarities do not mean that experiences 
in one can easily be transferred to the other because factors outside the 
inspection system matter more than those inside. An educational 
inspection system is directly determined by its surrounding educational 
administration system which is again determined by ultimate factors 
such as political and economic systems. In other words, the inspection 
system is only a sub-system of a bigger system which itself is a 
sub-system of an even bigger system. Only when the bigger systems are 
similar, can fundamental aspects of the sub-system be borrowed. 
Otherwise, blind copying regardless of the actual conditions can only 
result in failure of the inspection system itself as well as damage to the 
bigger system. Therefore, one system's merits could be other systems' 
weaknesses, and vice versa. One has to be very careful when making 
comparison and transferring experience. 
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7.2.1 Comparing the Relationship Between Central and Local 
Government 
The social conditions in China and England are obviously very 
different. One of the fundamental differences lies in the ideology of 
government. China, with a long history of centralisation, has always 
emphasised unity and compliance. Before the Communist Revolution, it 
was the emperors, since then, it has been the Communist Party and its 
government that has the supreme power of making national decisions. 
So that the absolute leadership of the state, seen as an assurance of 
unified implementation and balanced national development, is 
repeatedly stressed and continuously manifested in almost every aspect 
of social life including education. Most policies are initiated from the 
state, each portion of the tasks is received, adapted and implemented by 
various levels of local governments. However, things began to change in 
the 1980s, the economic reform which loosened central control and 
broadened local freedom has been developing so fast that it requires 
other superstructures including educational system to match its 
development. The education reform, started in the mid '80s, has brought 
the Chinese local governments and education authorities greater power 
and discretion in administering education (particularly in the basic 
education sector) in their areas. Though certain elements of partnership 
have been formed, it is, on the whole, a centralised system. 
By contrast, the ideology and practice of the public administration in 
England was, and to a measurable extent, still is, very much a "national 
system, locally administered" (though things began to change after the 
1988 ERA) as opposed to the Chinese "national system, locally 
delegated". On many matters, instead of forming a bureaucratic 
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hierarchy, central government and local government were 
constitutionally equal, both received their authority from the same 
parliament, although in fact central government was politically more 
powerful, especially since the 1970s. It was believed by the state as well 
as the locality, that sharing responsibility was one way of ensuring 
democracy and encouraging initiatives of every interest group. In many 
affairs, particularly in the welfare services, central government was 
mainly concerned with setting up general legislation and providing 
funding and other promotional services to local areas. Local government 
had great autonomy in dealing with overall administration in its area. 
as Regan analyses, a large amount of power and duty were statutorily 
assigned to local governments directly, which meant that the centre 
could not be a dictator. (Regan, 1984, p31). Despite changes of the power 
balance amongst the partners since the 1970s, English public 
administration is still a decentralised system on the whole. 
As far as education is concerned, it had been the tradition until the 
middle of the 19th century for the British government not to interfere in 
educational affairs. This contrasts with the Chinese case in which 
education has always been one of the realms of the state. Until 1988, the 
DES formulated national policies and controlled major resources; local 
authorities were entrusted with building, staffing, and maintaining 
educational institutions; and teachers in schools were free to decide 
what to teach and how. However, instead of doing their own business, 
these three partners influenced the others. None of them enjoyed a 
monopoly of power. Power over decision-making was diffused amongst 
the partners. Though things have changed since the passage of the 
Education Reform Act in 1988 which increased the power of central 
government and reduced the freedom of the professionals and the LEAs, 
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the system still remains in a fairly decentralised position as compared 
with many other countries. 
This basic difference in philosophy of public administration leads to 
more differences in educational administration in both countries, which 
inevitably affect the features of the English and Chinese inspectorates. 
7.2.2 Comparing Territory Size and Level of Economic Development 
The second but equally important difference is the geographical size 
of the two countries. China, the country which has the world's largest 
population and the third biggest territory, has approximately 937,000 
primary and secondary schools together with 8,339,000 teaching staff 
(The SEdC,1986, p3), which is about 20 times as many as English 
teachers and 30 times as many as English maintained schools. The 
whole country, instead of being divided into two levels -- central and 
local, is administratively composed of five ranks -- central, provincial, 
prefectural, county and township. Clearly, it is utterly unrealistic to 
copy the English system and to have a huge central inspectorate. On a 
proportional base, the number of central inspectors would be more than 
10,000 and it would take 3 days for many of them to get to the capital to 
attend a meeting ! 
However, it does not mean that the Chinese central inspectorate can 
not have regional bases. If one considers the dual leadership of the 
inspection system, it is then not difficult to understand that the 
hierarchical relationship has, in effect, made all the local inspectorates 
become to some extent regional extensions of the central inspectorate, 
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because the local inspectorates have to follow the general plan of the 
central inspectorate and have a certain accountability to their 
corresponding higher inspectorates. In addition, because the Chinese 
local inspectorates actually perform some functions for the local 
authorities, and some for their superior inspectorate, in a way, they 
perform both the functions that the English central and local 
inspectorates perform. Excluding the leadership of corresponding 
education authorities, there is a need to further explore the relationship 
between the centre and the regional bases. -- the cooperation and 
communication among different level inspectorates. In this respect, the 
HMI's experience of managing the whole force, especially the 
experience of directing its divisions and collecting information from its 
regional bases can be tentatively explored. 
China's large area.also contributes to the division of labour between 
higher level inspectorates and lower level inspectorates with regard to 
the object of inspection. As mentioned earlier in this and previous 
chapters, HMI devotes its main resources and manpower to inspecting 
and visiting schools. The inspection of LEAs only occupies a small 
position in the HMI working programme. By contrast, all the Chinese 
inspectorates except the lowest ones aim at the lower level governments 
and education authorities as the object of inspection. Of course, the 
hierarchical relationship among different level education authorities is 
an important reason, but one cannot exclude the practical factor that the 
large geographical size makes the higher level inspectorates incapable 
of inspecting a reasonable number of schools by themselves. Take the 
second lowest level -- the prefectural inspectorates for example, if they 
had to concentrate on school inspection, 6-8 prefectural inspectors would 
have to cover an average of 2750 primary and secondary schools, which 
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is obviously impossible. Not to mention the provincial and national 
inspectorates which control much larger areas. Thus, the higher 
inspectorates, instead of inspecting schools by themselves, prefer to 
direct their efforts towards the inspection of lower level authorities 
trying to ensure the educational standards in individual schools by 
making certain that the education authorities are implementing 
relevant policies and providing satisfactory resources to schools. 
Another difference lies in the composition of the inspection team. In 
the HMI case, all the inspections and school visits are carried out by HM 
inspectors themselves. In contrast to the HMI practice, the Chinese 
inspectors usually have to seek help from the administrators in the 
authorities to conduct inspections, which is partly due to the imbalance 
between the large size of the country and small number of inspectors. 
According to the SEdC plan, a county inspectorate with 6-8 inspectors 
will have to cover 350 schools on average. But most of the county level 
education authorities have not yet established inspectorates up till 
present stage, which consequently adds more inspection load to the 
higher level inspectorates. Thus, the incapacity of the Chinese 
inspectorates to carry out inspections, especially large scale inspections, 
on their own naturally makes the inspectors turn to non-inspectors 
such as administrators of other branches, members of the Teaching 
Research Office for help in order to cover the necessary areas. Here, how 
those different groups of people will cooperate during inspections and 
how those acting inspectors' inspection skill can be assured in order to 
conduct successful inspections is left to the Chinese to find out, but the 
experience of HMI's seconding manpower from different divisions can 
have some relevance to its Chinese counterparts. 
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The considerable disparity in the levels of economic development in 
the two countries inevitably limits the degree of learning. Though its 
effect is not on the fundamental issues of the inspection system, it does 
create substantial limitations in practical terms. To a certain extent, the 
practices of HMI supported by modern technology will not have 
immediate application to China as similar facilities are so scarce that 
they are rarely available to inspectors. For instance, HMI was 
computerised in 1984. The ample number of computers enormously 
facilitate the communication among inspectors at different levels and in 
different divisions. By storing notes of school visits and surveys in the 
computer, and by obtaining useful information through the inspectors' 
computer network, every HMI, particularly every senior HMI, is able to 
send as well as to receive information quickly and extensively. This 
method of communication would be extremely helpful to the Chinese 
inspectorates which are scattered all over the country. But given the 
present economic conditions, the possibility of doing so is rather dim. 
Similarly, other resources easily available to the HM Inspectors such as 
cars and fax machines will be extravagant hopes for the Chinese 
inspectors. 
In short, being in a developing country where many people are still 
struggling for bare necessities of life, the Chinese inspectors will have to 
make the best use of the existing resources. Some of the HMI experience 
based on advanced economy will have to be ignored despite its potential 
usefulness to its Chinese counterpart. 
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7.2.3 Comparing the Internal Structure of the Education Authorities 
Despite the fact that the functions of the English education 
authorities (the DES and LEAs) are different from those of Chinese 
authorities, their internal structures have some similarities due to the 
similar nature of administration. For example, there will always be 
financial branches to allocate funds to schools or to local education 
authorities, they will probably have personnel branches to manage 
teaching staff, and there will be various branches to administer different 
education sectors. 
In spite of the similarities in the internal organisation, particularly 
in those administrative branches, there is a difference in the position of 
the two inspectorates. To explain, one should look into the internal 
compositions of education authorities in both countries. In the DES, 
apart from general administrative branches (e.g. finance) and sector 
and aspect administrative branches (e.g. primary education branch, 
teacher education branch), there is HM Inspectorate as a professional 
wing of the DES. One of its main concerns is curriculum matters 
including syllabus, textbooks, and teaching methods. In China, 
curriculum matters are overseen by the TRO network. The Institutes of 
Education which are also attached to each level of education authorities 
(except for township) organise in-service training for teachers and 
administrators. Organisationally speaking, these two bodies are the 
professional wings of the education authority. The inspectorate, though 
composed of experienced professional teachers and administrators, 
belongs to the administrative part of the education authority. Because 
the curriculum matters are looked after by a long established system, 
they do not become the priority of the inspectorate. Instead, managerial 
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matters become the inspectorate's major concerns. Nevertheless, the 
inspectorate needs the help of the TRO when conducting formal 
inspections as it has to assess overall educational standards in 
individual schools and in areas. 
The division of areas of concerns between the Chinese inspectorate 
and the TRO system, together with comparisions with HMI is shown in 
Diagram 7.1. 
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Diagram 7.1 Division of Areas of Responsibilities 
to enforce legislation and national or regional policies 
THE  CHINESE  INSPECT O
RATE 
to participate in school headship appointment and assessment 
to provide information on the performance of schools (lower 
level education authorities),(mainly management matters) 
to inspect and evaluate the overall performance of schools 
to evaluate the educational provisions in lower level areas 
to advise on school management and LEA administration 
to liase between its own education authority and schools 
(lower level education authorities) • 
\
• 
to advise on policy making of education authority 
to oversee and advise on curriculum matters —1 
rn 
-I 
0 
0 
to organise in-service training of teachers 
to provide education authorities with information on the state 
of implementing national curricula and education quality 
to publish various booklets and pamphlets 
5 
I 
In brief, there is a big difference in the attitudes of the two 
inspectorates towards curriculum matters. In England, HMI treats it 
as one of the most important tasks, whilst in China, inspectorate is not 
the main body to deal with it since there is another separate system. 
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This difference suggests that the HMI experience concerned with 
curriculum cannot all be transferred simply because the Chinese 
inspectorate is not very much involved in it. And those problems that 
China is facing cannot find answers in the English model. For example, 
how the inspectorate and teaching research office members can 
cooperate well, more importantly, how the inspectorate ensures that the 
quality of the inspection conducted by non-inspector "inspectors', 
reaches a satisfactory standard. 
7.3 Summary 
To summarise the differences discussed above, one can see clearly 
that: 
(1). While HMI is almost a pure efficiency inspectorate concerning 
with reporting the performance of educational system and promoting 
efficiency of educational service, a certain amount of the Chinese 
inspectorate's work is concerned with the ensuring implementation of 
specific requirements of national legislations and policies. Compared 
with its English counterpart, the Chinese inspectorate is much more a 
combination of efficiency inspectorate and enforcement inspectorate. As 
a result: 
(2). The Chinese inspectors have certain administrative powers tO 
enforce legislation and policies whilst HM inspectors have no 
administrative power. Again, as a result: 
(3). The authority of the Chinese inspectors is mainly based on their 
administrative status and power, though their relatively rich expertise 
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does help, whilst HMI influences various educational partners largely 
on the basis of its rich experience and professional expertise though 
other measures also contribute to the increase of its authority (e.g. 
publication of inspection reports, the growing influence on DES' policy 
making); 
(4). The nature of the Chinese inspectorate is administrative whilst 
that of HMI is professional; 
(5). The Chinese inspectorate is relatively more concerned with 
managerial side of the education provision (at least for the time being), 
whilst HMI plays an important part in curriculum development and 
planning; 
(6). The organisational relationship between central and local 
inspectorate in China is hierarchical whilst in England it is separate; 
(7).The Chinese inspectorate assumes the duty of inspecting both 
local education authorities and individual schools, whilst in the HMI 
case, inspecting individual educational institutions is its main concernl; 
(8). The Chinese inspectorate is employed by its education authority 
and thus totally depend on the leadership of the education authority, 
whilst HMI enjoys a certain degree of independence for historical 
reasons as well as for its unique professionalism. 
All these differences, in the final analysis, are due to the basic 
difference in principles of public administration --- centralisation and 
decentralisation. 
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In the case of comparing HMI and the Chinese inspectorate, one can 
see that some problems that China has cannot find an answer or even a 
reference in the HMI model, (for example, how to enforce policy 
implementation more effectively). Moreover, some of the HMI's 
experience cannot be applied to the Chinese situation, (for instance, the 
HMI's engagement in curriculum matters). Nevertheless, there are a 
considerable amount of HMI's experience can be learned on the 
condition of adaptation. From a functional perspective, the function of 
monitoring and assessing the state of education, the function of 
collecting information to report to the education authorities, the function 
of providing professional advice, all have varying degrees' of similarity 
between the two systems. From the methods' perspective, the experience 
of organising a variety of inspections, and their rational combination 
will be particularly beneficial to the Chinese inspectors. From the 
organisational perspective, the communication mechanism among 
different rank inspectors and the communication with the DES are most 
enlightening and certainly provide various alternatives to the Chinese 
inspectorate. But still, it may usefully be repeated, learning from HMI 
will have practical value only when the experience of the HMI can be 
appropriately adjusted in the light of Chinese domestic conditions. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PROPOSALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE CHINESE INSPECTORATE  
The last few chapters have described the functions and structures of 
the two inspection systems. The results of the field work have shown 
some shortcomings in the present practice of the Chinese inspectorate. 
Efforts have also been made in the last chapter to discuss the differences 
and similarities within as well as outside the two inspection systems so 
that the degree to which the HMI experiences are transferable and 
adaptable can be decided. 
As the last but certainly not the least step, this chapter discusses 
some issues in the present practice of the Chinese inspectorate, based on 
the comparisons with relevant HMI practice as well as on the field work 
findings. This chapter also offers practical suggestions for the 
improvement and future development of the Chinese inspectorate. This, 
again, is carried out with references to the HMI practice. 
Undoubtedly, as argued in the last chapter, transferring HMI 
experience to China has considerable limitations not only because of the 
differences in the functions that two inspectorates perform and methods 
they use, but also because of the differences in their educational 
administration systems and other social factors. Therefore, a great deal 
of adaptation is needed when transferring HMI experiences. 
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8.1 To Diversify the Means of Educational Administration in 
the Development of Decentralisation 
The context in which HM Inspectorate works is a relatively 
decentralised and partnership system in comparison with many others 
countries. As argued in the last few chapters, this kind of system is 
usually operated not only by administrative means, but more 
importantly, by other means such as legislation and finance control. 
Before the passage of the 1988 Education Reform Act, for example, the 
DES was mainly responsible for school building programme, teacher 
supply and finance. LEAs were responsible for the day-to-day running of 
schools and colleges. The DES also employed certain administrative 
means to influence the work of LEAs. But their relationship was not 
hierarchical, both of them carried out their duties within the framework 
of the 1944 Education Act. Thus, one can see that during that period, 
legislative means, financial means, administrative means were 
frequently used. 
The Chinese educational system was administered in a rigid 
centralised way before 1985 when the Decision on Educational Reform 
was announced jointly by the CCP and the State Council. The power of 
making decisions was in the hands of the then Ministry of Education 
high officials who formulated national policy in accordance with the 
fundamental strategies laid down by the CCP and the State Council. 
From provincial level downwards, these decisions were interpreted and 
transferred, and finally hierarchically distributed and implemented. In 
that period, administrative means supported by bureaucratic authority 
and strict regulations and rules was the predominant method, if not the 
sole method, by which educational administration was carried out. 
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As a result of the overwhelming economic reforms aimed at 
loosening central control and encouraging local and individual 
initiatives, the educational service was strongly affected so that it had to 
innovate radically in order to respond to the economic developments. 
The first change in educational administration was the delegation of 
power from central to local government which was designed to give 
more freedom to local government to let the education service develop 
alongside the local economic development. In certain respects, the 
traditional top-down hierarchy of educational administration (i.e., 
managing the educational service according to the instructions of the 
higher level education authorities only) is now gradually changing into 
a kind of two dimensional bureaucracy, i.e., not only does the higher 
level education authority has an influential say in educational affairs, so 
does the horizontally corresponding local government. In fact, the latter 
determinant seems to be increasingly powerful. 
Under the new circumstances in which central government (in fact, 
any higher level government in relation to its lower level government, 
for example: provincial government in relation to prefectural 
government, prefectural to county) is becoming a key controller instead 
of a commander of educational service and the rigid hierarchy is 
gradually collapsing, administrative means which achieves results in a 
rigid hierarchical system can no longer fully meet the challenges. To 
take an example, according to the Law of Compulsory Education, the 
responsibilities for and the freedom to administer basic education have 
been delegated to local governments at various levels under the macro 
control of the state. Finance, staffing, by-legislation, manpower 
planning, and a certain degree of freedom in curriculum matters have 
fallen into the jurisdictions of these governments and their education 
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authorities. The SEdC is giving up the power to make detailed plans and 
begins to shoulder heavy loads in the so-called macro-administration, 
i.e., organising the drawing up of educational legislation, setting out 
national guiding principles, formulating general policies, coordinating 
local efforts and strengthening inspection and monitoring forces. 
Obviously, these functions can no longer be fulfilled by administrative 
means alone. In other words, the administrative means (government by 
rules and regulations) is most suitable for running a rigid hierarchical 
bureaucracy, but definitely not for a flexible and less rigid system in 
which both central and local government have a certain degree of 
freedom. Therefore, reform of the means is essential at the present 
stage. Using English experience as reference, the author believes that 
legislative means, financial means, supportive means, and supervisory 
means need to be greatly strengthened: 
Legislation stipulates broad and long term responsibilities and rights 
of each participant in the educational service. Thus, it can maintain the 
efficiency of the educational service when many partners do not have a 
direct or hierarchical relationship. The current Chinese educational 
administration is developing towards the sharing of responsibilities, 
especially in the basic education sector. Considering the fact that only 
one important piece of educational legislation has been passed since the 
foundation of new China in 1949 (the Law of Compulsory Education), it 
seems that there is a long way to go before a sound legislative framework 
can be established. 
Secondly, financial means are powerful methods of bringing 
attention and sometimes even action to the activities favoured by the 
senior level authorities through allocating more funds or giving 
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preferential treatments to certain activities by the lower level 
authorities. This is another powerful means by which a higher level 
education authority can influence its junior authorities and local 
services. Because nowadays funding to basic education (and much of the 
tertiary education) is made directly by the corresponding local 
government, extra funds from the SEdC (or from higher education 
authorities) will help it to balance regional developments and to 
influence the national or regional development in its preferred way. 
The third important function which ought to be performed by the 
higher level education authorities, especially central authority, is 
support and coordination. As much power has been delegated to various 
levels of local governments today, many important decisions must be 
made by them. In order to make sound policies, information and the 
ability to make policies are crucial. As the delegation of power has just 
started, local governments are not yet accustomed to formulating 
legislation and policies on their own after too long a period of obeying 
and interpreting instructions from their superiors. In order to facilitate 
the formulation of policy, more information, more training of policy 
makers and more facilities would be appropriate supportive measures. 
In addition, by doing this, the SEdC (and other higher education 
authorities) can influence and coordinate various situations in the 
country so as to guide the development of the whole nation or whole 
region. 
The final means which needs strengthening is the monitoring and 
supervisory function. Loosening control through bureaucratic 
regulations and strengthening rule by legislation challenges the 
traditional forms of inspection. The inspectorate must play the role of a 
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monitor to keep looking closely at local situation in order to maintain the 
efficiency of the service and reasonable educational standards. At the 
same time, it must play the role of a policeman in order to ensure that, 
after the rigid central control has been loosened, the specific statutory 
requirements are still satisfactorily met. 
It must be remembered that in the present circumstances, the cases 
of violating the law of compulsory education are innumerable (see 
Chapter One for more details), thus it is necessary for some specific 
national requirements to be enforced. In addition, though the SEdC is 
giving up its command role, it is still a major controller of the 
educational service. The administrative method is still useful in many 
respects, as are the regulations. Therefore, the inspectorate in China 
cannot avoid performing the function of ensuring the implementation of 
legislation and national policies. 
In short, inspection and supervisory methods in educational 
administration must be strengthened due to the changing central-local 
relationship and the emergence of a less rigid bureaucracy. These four 
methods, (legislative, financial, supportive and supervisory), should be 
developed strongly alongside the traditional administrative method to 
meet the new challenges in a less centralised system. This suggestion is 
directed not only to the State Education Commission, but is also perfectly 
applicable to every local authority with regards to its lower level 
education authorities. 
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82 To Provide Legislative Backing for the Inspectorate 
All the methods mentioned above are interrelated. For instance, the 
degree to which supervisory means can be successfully used in practice 
and bring about effects depends partly on administrative or legislative 
backing which provides the inspectorate with the necessary legitimacy. 
The current situation in China is that, while the administrative 
instrument is being weakened, the creation and strengthening of other 
means are not keeping pace with practical needs. 
As described in Chapter Five, the Chinese inspectorate assumes the 
task of not only inspecting lower level education authorities, but also 
inspecting its next lower level government which makes major 
decisions on universal education and decides funding and other decisive 
provision to educational service. But next lower level government is 
administratively one rank higher than the inspectorate (rank: 
inspectorate < its employing education authority; its employing 
education authority = next lower level government, therefore, 
inspectorate < next lower level government, see Diagram 5.3). According 
to the administrative regulations, the subordinate cannot inspect the 
superior. But with the gradual loosening of hierarchical control, the 
administrative regulations are not as dominant and rigid as they were. 
Inspecting the next lower level government becomes possible. But there 
is no official document that clearly empowers the inspectorate to do so. 
Therefore, there is some confusion as to whether the inspectorate has 
sufficient legitimacy to inspect its next lower level of government. In 
many places where administrative rank is still vital, and the legitimacy 
to inspect is still largely based on administrative status, this 
inspectorate's activity is being challenged. 
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Due to this kind of awkward position, many inspectors in the country 
appeal for promotion of the inspectorate's status, i.e., to transfer the 
inspectorate from under the education authority to under the 
corresponding government, so that the inspectorate can at least have the 
same administrative rank as its next lower level government. Beijing 
Education Inspectorate, for example, enjoys the status of Beijing 
Government's direct office, and is administratively equal in rank to the 
Beijing Education Authority. Cooperation between these two is quite 
close. In fact, nothing is different from other inspectorates except for the 
administrative status. 
Undoubtedly, this measure would enable the inspectorate to 
accomplish inspection and supervision tasks by raising its 
administrative authority. In particular, it facilitates the conduct of 
inspection of the next lower level of government. But the author has 
some reservations about this solution. It can be argued that the 
administrative chain (policy making, implementation and evaluation) 
would disintegrate if the inspectorate (the third component) breaks away 
from the other two. If the educational inspectorate can do so, there is no 
reason why other evaluation bodies in other governmental departments 
cannot do the same? It can also be argued that the implementation stage 
is equally important to the whole process of administration, so that those 
administrative branches are also eligible to break away. It can be 
further argued that only when it comes to enforcement, does 
administrative rank become a major consideration. In other words, 
when inspectors carry out tasks other than enforcement, such as 
routine visits, administrative rank is less important. Therefore, there is 
not sufficient justification for this way of promoting the inspectorate's 
status. It is understandable for the Chinese inspectors to want to adopt 
250 
Chapter 8: Proposals for the Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
this method for the time being. But in the author's opinion, it cannot 
and will not be a long term solution. In addition, by so doing, it makes it 
more difficult for the inspectorate to cooperate with its education 
authority, whether physically or organisationally. 
In view of the present difficulty of the inspectorate in carrying out 
inspection of the next lower level local government, it can be suggested 
that, instead of separating the inspectorate and its education authority, 
it might be possible to give the inspectorate some special privileges. For 
example: inspectors could be appointed by the government instead of the 
education authority, but still work within it. Thus, the inspectors would 
be seen to have certain privileges to carry out their inspection missions. 
In addition, some special rights might be given to the inspectorate, for 
example: direct access of the inspectorate's head to the corresponding 
government, so that the inspectorate is able to express their views which 
would be difficult otherwise. 
Although these measures can increase the inspectorate's authority 
to a certain extent in a short term, they are not solutions to the 
fundamental issue -- the inspectorate needs a long term and more 
formal backing to empower it to inspect next lower level government. 
In England and Wales, HMI has the right to inspect any educational 
institution including local education authorities, though in practice, 
HMI spends much more time on school inspection than on inspection of 
LEAs. That is, HMI does not have the same difficulties as its Chinese 
counterpart. Its legitimacy to inspect is given by the law. The 1944 
Education Act provides the statutory base for the work of the HM 
Inspectorate. It requires the Secretary of State (Minister) to cause 
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inspections to be made of every educational establishment. Therefore, in 
the English case, it is legislation, not the administrative status that 
entitles the inspectorate to carry out inspections. 
In the author's view, this might be a hopeful solution to the Chinese 
problem. As argued earlier, along with the development of education 
reform, administrative means should no longer be treated as the sole 
instrument of educational administration. Other important means such 
as legislative and financial could be greatly strengthened to meet the 
challenges of a less centralised situation. In this case, the legitimacy of 
the inspectorate to carry out inspections should be recognised and 
written into the Education Act which is in the process of drafting and 
consultation at the moment. If it had the backing of an educational law, 
the inspectorate would be in a much better position, and, the need for 
promoting inspectorate's administrative status could be removed. 
The Chinese inspectorate needs backing not only for inspecting the 
next lower level of government, but also for other necessary rights. 
There is no national document which formally spells out the basic rights 
and responsibilities of the inspectorate. At the regional level, only a few 
cities have done so (e.g., Beijing). 
The circular "Some Observations on Realising Compulsory 
Education" transmitted in 1986 by the State Council on behalf of the State 
Education Commission required the restoration of the inspection system 
in the basic education sector to be responsible for inspection and 
guidance on implementing compulsory education. However, the 
circular specified neither the basic regulations of the inspectorate nor 
the time limit for its establishment, which implied that these matters 
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were up to the local governments to decide. 
Thus, the fate of the inspectorate is decided by the local government 
by which it is supervised. First of all, a personnel quota must be 
approved, extra funding must be allocated, and proper administrative 
rank must be decided which is again related to the administrative quota. 
But local governments at all levels (except township level) value the 
inspectorate and even the educational service itself differently. In 
practice, there are some places where very low importance is attached to 
the educational service. Education authorities are in a junior position 
among all governmental departments. Support for education is 
insufficient, and some funds for education are diverted to other uses. 
Hence, in these places, inspectorates are regarded as an extra burden 
on finance and staff quotas for local governments. Under these 
circumstances, how much support an inspectorate can get from an 
unwilling local government is doubtful. Thus, the work of these 
inspectorates cannot be carried out effectively, or even normally. 
Moreover, the authority of the inspectorate will definitely be limited 
when their recommendations are responded to indifferently by its 
government. 
The inspectorates in Beijing and Ninbo city are among those which 
are paid great attention by their governments. They have relatively 
adequate staffing and supporting facilities, and most important, strong 
backing from the government all the time. By contrast, the inspectorate 
in Shandong province, for instance, is among those most recently 
established largely due to the indifference of its local government. 
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In short, a legislative framework is needed in educational inspection 
to give the inspectorate basic rights and authority so that it can carry out 
its duty effectively. This process is very much related to the legislation in 
overall education system, which is an important aspect of education 
reform in China today. 
8.3 To Increase the Influence of the Inspectorate 
Restored to help government and education authorities implement 
the nine year compulsory education, the Chinese inspectorate should 
influence the work of education authorities as well as schools and lower 
level education authorities. But according to the field work findings, the 
inspectorate has only between "little influence" and "some influence" on 
its employing education authority. On its junior education authorities 
and schools, its influence is between "some" to "quite strong" (see 
Diagram 6.4, and Diagram 6.6). Many inspectors are very much 
concerned with their limited influence and authority. 
In England, the reputation of HM Inspectorate has long been good. It 
exerts enormous influence on the schools and education authorities it 
visits and inspects to help them keep up with national developments, By 
applying their rich professional expertise, HM Inspectors offer 
suggestions to promote standards of education in schools. It also plays 
its role by means of indirect contact with schools and education 
authorities through methods like publications. Its influence on central 
government is recognised by the DES (see Chapter 4). It provides 
information to keep the DES well informed and offers influential advice 
on the formulation of national policy as well as on policy 
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implementation, though the degree of adoption largely depends on the 
willingness of the DES politicians. Two key reasons for its success are its 
professional expertise and its "conditional" independence of political 
and administrative influence. 
For historical reasons, HM Inspectors are appointed by the Queen in 
Council, though the executive appointment is carried out by senior 
HMIs, and the Civil Service Commissioners. Compared with other civil 
servants, this special privilege helps the inspectorate, to a certain 
extent, to express its views more freely and more openly. Being 
independent, HMI manages to be able to say what it sees instead of what 
others want it to say. Additionally it enables HMI to comment more 
freely than other civil servants on the actual state of educational 
standards, which in one way or another reflects the correctness of the 
central government policies, the sufficiency of LEAs' educational 
provision, and the soundness of school teaching. This independence 
helps to ensure a certain degree of objectivity in the evaluation of 
educational performance. Thus, it enables HMI to retain its role as the 
safeguard of educational standards. However, this independence is not 
unlimited. On the contrary, it is conditional. 
Firstly, the appointment of HM Inspectors, especially the Senior 
Chief Inspector, can be influenced by the choice of the politicians in 
power though this influence had been used with caution. Secondly, HMI 
has the statutory duty to work for the Secretary of State. Therefore, 
whatever HMI decides to do, it usually has to take into account the policy 
priorities laid down by the Secretary of State. Thirdly, although the 
Secretary of State has no right to revise whatever HMI has written, he 
(she) does have the right to refuse to publish them. And finally, the 
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advice offered by HMI is purely advisory, which means they can be 
ignored by politicians and civil servants. Nevertheless, the strong 
influence of HMI on the DES, on education authorities, and on school 
teachers is very much related to its independence. 
In the Chinese case, the inspectorate lacks independence. 
Theoretically speaking, the inspectorate does not directly participate in 
decision-making and implementation though it can exert influence. The 
independent monitoring and feedback can help to ensure the objectivity 
of judgment on the consequences of policy implementation, which will 
usually result in either the adjustment of implementation, or the 
adjustment of policy itself. But as the previous chapters have shown, the 
majority of the inspectorates are under the supervision of their 
employing education authorities. Inspectors are exactly like other 
administrators: appointed by the education authority, financed by it, and 
receive instructions from its chief. They are virtually the representatives 
of the education authority. 
What will happen if the inspectorate does not have due independence 
or does not perform the function of evaluating its authority's policy? 
Take the example of the central inspectorate which works under the 
direction of the State Education Commission. It is a dependent 
department of the SEdC and mainly carries out the mission of 
supervising the implementation of SEdC's policies in the whole country. 
If it only has the power to supervise, but has not adequate freedom to 
comment on SEdC's policy, should the SEdC's policy be incorrect, the 
consequences all over the country would be disastrous, as China is still 
more or less a centralised state. The same reason is applicable to local 
authorities. Although generally controlled by their higher level 
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authorities, local education authorities do assume greater 
responsibilities to operate educational affairs. Hence the feedback and 
the evaluation of the policy itself is essential for education authorities to 
do their job well. 
Therefore, the inspectors, being in the position of providing feedback 
and evaluation, have the duty to evaluate the results of the other two 
steps in administration: implementation as well as policy making. (see 
Diagram 6.2). Hence the authority and legitimacy of the inspectorate 
must be sufficient to ensure the supervision of policy implementation 
and to offer sound advice to subordinates on one hand, and to truly 
reflect the real situation in the field and to comment on, or criticise if 
necessary, the policies made by its own authority on the other. 
Some people might argue that, if the inspectorate is transferred from 
under its education authority to directly under the government, it would 
have some independence, because it is now separated from its education 
authority and enjoys the same rank. But according to interview findings 
and literature review, most of the inspectorates, though directly 
accountable to their governments, are still concurrently headed by the 
chief of the education authority. Therefore, this measure does little to 
increase the independence of the inspectorate. Apart from 
administrative rank, in all other aspects they are almost the same as the 
education-authority--led inspectorates, despite the theoretical 
assumption that the government-led inspectorates can have an 
independent voice in commenting on educational quality and 
educational provision as they are administratively equal to education 
authorities. The reason is that the education authorities are still the 
determinants of the work of the inspectorates. 
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In brief, the Chinese inspectorate not only needs sufficient authority 
to carry out inspection of any lower level government, education 
authority and school and to enforce legislation, but also needs due 
freedom to comment on the policies of its own education authority in 
order to effectively perform the function of evaluation. It is obviously 
impractical for the Chinese inspectorate to seek the same degree of 
independence as HMI, because HMI's independence is largely due to 
historical reasons as well as the unique feature of the English education 
system. But some measures can certainly be introduced to ensure that 
the inspectors can voice their views. For example, the head of the 
inspectorate can have direct access to the leaders in the government; 
inspectors have the right, and indeed the duty, to criticise any unsound 
policy or decision. 
The second, and perhaps more direct reason which accounts for 
HMI's high authority is its high professional expertise. As all HMIs are 
selected from the most experienced teaching professionals or sometimes 
from seasoned professionals outside teaching circles (this usually 
happens in the higher education sector), their advice and assistance are 
trusted by teachers, administrators and even politicians to be 
authoritative professional opinions. Consequently, they are willing to 
accept HMIs' advice and put it into practice. 
According to the survey conducted during the field work, the Chinese 
inspectors are selected from proficient administrators with previous 
teaching experience and from skilful head teachers who are good at both 
teaching and administration, so that professional competence should be 
considered sufficient. But the problem lies in the application of their 
professional experience and competence. At present, the main focus of 
258 
Chapter 8: Proposals for the Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
the inspectors is enforcement of legislation and inspection, in which 
case the professional competence cannot be fully utilised. In the 
author's view, the inspectors should seek other ways that can prove 
their expertise, e.g.,advisory and persuasive methods, to gain trust and 
respect from teachers and administrators. 
The final way in which the influence of the inspectorate (especially 
on schools and lower level education authorities) may be enhanced, and 
which is drawing from the experience of HMI, is the publication of 
inspection reports. Since the early 1980s, all the HMI's full inspection 
reports have been made available for public scrutiny. Though the 
original purpose was not for the advancement of HMI's authority, its 
influence did increase largely for the simple reason that the reputation 
of a school is heavily affected by the publicised HMI reports. In the 
current Chinese circumstances, it does not seem likely that the Chinese 
inspectorate would adopt this measure to achieve its aims. However, 
this method does have some potential hints. For example, the 
inspectorate could make the reports open within an appropriate scope, 
for example, to all the school heads, or make use of the mass media to 
publish some suitable information, or make the reports available to 
parents. All these measures are aimed not only at increasing the 
inspectorate's influence, but also at helping disseminate good practice 
and revealing the factual state of education in an area and to make 
education more accountable to the public. 
Other important ways of increasing the inspectorate's influence are 
to establish a closer link with education authorities, and to balance its 
various functions and perform them effectively, so that the education 
authorities and the inspected institutions can actually benefit from its 
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discharging functions. These are discussed in section 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6. 
8.4 To Establish Closer and Clearer Links With Education 
Authorities 
It becomes clear, after the analysis of research findings, that the 
inspectorate has not established a stable and systematic relationship 
with the rest of the education authority. One very likely reason is that the 
inspectorate at this stage is concentrating on completing its own 
organisation and thus has little time to consider further improvement. 
However, this is the issue that the inspectorate will inevitably encounter 
after the completion of the organisation, which is obviously of vital 
importance to the successful achievement of its goals. 
First, the inspectorate does not have many channels through which 
the role of professional adviser to policy making can be fully played. The 
participation of the head of the inspectorate in the education authority's 
board meeting is certainly the most effective way of letting the 
inspectors' voice be heard. However, among so many branches, the voice 
of the inspectorate is not equal to other branches. And often, because of 
its junior position, the voice of the inspectorate is not paid special 
attention. Nevertheless, it is the most frequently used channel to express 
inspectors' view on policy directions. Indeed, most inspectorates do not 
have other channels. In a few inspectorates, the chief of the education 
authority concurrently holds the post as chief of the inspectorate though 
he does not do any executive work. The advantage of this, obviously, is 
the more frequent exchange of information and the heavier weight of 
inspectors' voice. However, it does create a problem for the inspectors 
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because all the inspection activities must be approved by the chief. 
Theoretically, if the policy making and the policy evaluation are carried 
out by the same person or the same group of people, the objectivity of the 
evaluation may be questioned. 
Policy makers need advice, so do administrators in the education 
authorities. The recipients of professional advice should also include 
those administrators who are responsible for implementation. The 
results of implementation in practice should be constantly evaluated and 
implementers ought to be informed about the evaluation results so that 
they can adjust their way of working. At present, except for 
administrators' participation in large scale inspections, neither side 
has any other way of purposive cooperation. Therefore, as far as this 
aspect is concerned, there is much room for improvement. For example, 
how to establish some purposeful ways of communication so that both 
sides at least get to know what and how the other is doing. Apart from 
that, one would expect to see all inspectors, not only the head, having a 
part to play in advising their administrator colleagues. 
In England, HM Inspectorate has existed for 150 years. Its influence 
has been recognised all over the country. Its credit is based on high 
quality inspections, objective assessment of education standards, 
supportive professional assistance and excellent monitoring and 
safeguarding of the system. By monitoring the system nationally and 
professionally, HMI continuously supplies information about the state of 
education to central government to help maintain standards of 
education in a decentralised system in which local government and 
individual schools both have a considerable degree of autonomy. Apart 
from the function of monitoring and reporting, HMI more importantly 
261 
Chapter 8: Proposals for the Development of the Chinese Inspectorate 
performs the function of advice, by applying their unique professional 
expertise. Its assessment of the performance of the educational system, 
its professional anticipation of a proposed policy, its judgments on the 
effect of the DES policy in practice, are very helpful to the Secretary of 
State in his formulating national policies. The participation of many 
HMI in various levels of policy groups greatly enhances the chance for 
HMI to exert its influence. As to civil servants in the Department, many 
HMI, especially Staff Inspectors and Chief Inspectors, work closely with 
them, though there is no fixed meeting intervals. 
If the Chinese inspectorate can establish a closer relationship with 
its education authority functionally and organisationally, strengthen its 
advisory function to its education authority, open up more channels of 
communication, and find more ways of collaboration, sooner or later, its 
position in the education authority will be recognised. 
HMI has a close relationship with the DES. But this does not mean 
that HMI mixes itself up with the rest of the DES. It is a close yet clear 
relationship. It firmly retains its position as a professional wing of the 
Department and confines itself to its own duties. Although the line 
between policy making, implementation, and evaluation is not clear-cut 
in practice, as all the branches of the DES necessarily have to cooperate, 
the inspectorate tries to influence, instead of being directly involving in, 
the policy-making and implementation processes which it sees as 
necessary to ensure the best possible objectivity of evaluation. 
In some Chinese education authorities, however, responsibilities and 
rights are mixed up between the inspection branch and other 
administrative branches. Before the establishment of inspectorate, the 
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function of feedback and monitoring, and implementation of policy were 
concurrently carried out by the sector administrative branches, (e.g., 
primary education branch), which had received strong criticism. After 
the setting up of the inspectorate, the redistribution of responsibilities 
and rights has not yet been completed. In some education authorities, 
responsibility among branches for decision-making, implementation 
and supervision is still unclear. The inspectorates sometimes draw up 
directives and regulations for the education authorities and sometimes 
help other branches by doing administrative work for them, whilst in 
some other places, inter-branch communication is so inadequate that 
one does not have much idea of what the other is doing. Sometimes 
when the inspector visits schools, he gives directions that are different 
from those of other branches in the education authority. Sometimes he 
cannot offer prompt advice because he does not know the plans of other 
branches. Another typical example is the administrators' participation 
in large scale inspections (full inspections and sometimes aspect 
inspections). Due to their incapacity to cover all aspects which need 
inspecting, and perhaps also due to their insufficient authority, the 
inspectors often invite members of other branches of the education 
authority and very often the heads of the authority to conduct the 
inspection together. Consequently, the limited number of inspectors 
actually play the role of coordinator instead of inspector. In other words, 
many judges of educational quality are still the administrators, rather 
than the inspectors. In this respect, one cannot help wondering whether 
the establishment of a separate inspection branch within an education 
authority has any real meaning, if the function of implementation and 
inspection are still, to a considerable extent, carried out by the same 
group of people -- the administrators. Although one can argue that the 
administrators' involvement in inspection strengthens the enforcement 
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and cushions the shortage of inspectors, but the objectivity of the 
evaluation of the quality of education can well be questioned. 
Therefore, there is a need to define the rights and responsibilities of 
the inspectorate as distinct from other administrative branches in the 
education authority. In China, such specification of responsibilities is 
usually done by us ing SEdC statements or administrative circulars. 
At present, there is no such formal statement for the inspectorate. 
There are only two reference sources: "Guiding Regulations of 
Educational Inspection" (draft) in 1983 and the "Summary of Conference 
on Educational Inspection" in 1987. Both of them are out of date to 
varying degrees. Without formal regulations, the Chinese inspectorates 
have difficulty in defining specifically their functions, responsibilities, 
and rights, which is perfectly understandable when one considers the 
fact that the Chinese are used to doing things according to directions 
from superiors. Since the responsibility for administering basic 
education has been delegated to local authorities, local governments at 
provincial, prefectural and county levels have the right to organise the 
inspection system in their own ways, of course taking into consideration 
the requirements of the higher level authorities. In addition, since 
China is such a large country with great variations in economic 
standards, cultural development and education quality, there cannot be 
a specific central statement on the inspection system which every 
inspectorate must follow. Regulations have to be made only on the basis 
of the actual environment within which the inspectorate is working. 
Although being aware of the changing power distribution among 
central and local authorities, and among different level education 
authorities, as well as the impossibility of the SEdC making detailed 
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regulation, local inspectorates are still expecting something detailed 
from central government. However, from the inspectorates' point of 
view, they are faced with an absence of experience, with a lack of explicit 
job descriptions (in some places), and worst of all, with overlapping 
responsibilities and rights with other administrative branches in the 
education authorities. 
To solve this problem, both sides (the SEdC and various levels of local 
education authorities) should make some efforts. The SEdC could make 
very general statement to give local inspectorates a basic framework. 
Local education authorities could try to define the inspectorate's rights 
and responsibilities in the light of their own situation, instead of waiting 
for SEdC's circular. 
As long as the inspectorates stick to their own duties and become an 
indispensable part of their education authorities, their influence will 
certainly increase. 
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8.5 To Strengthen the Cooperation Between the Inspectorate 
and the Teaching Research Office System 
Determined by the functions of the inspectorate, most Chinese 
inspectors are chosen from either existing administrators within the 
education authorities or school heads experienced in both management 
and teaching. Fairly speaking, despite the fact that inspectors are 
seldom selected directly from the present teaching force, both these two 
groups of personnel are good at teaching as well as at administration 
because the administrators in China (especially those in 
"educational-content-branches", for example, the primary education 
department as opposed to the finance and building department) were 
good teachers originally. Having a close look at Table 6.3d and 6.3e in 
chapter 6, one can discover that 74.6% inspectors have more than 15 
years of teaching experience and 40.3% have more than 15 years of 
administration experience. 
However, these inspectors' expertise or say specialities are not yet 
fully made use of as their tasks only require them to apply some of their 
knowledge and skills. Or, even if the expertise of individual inspectors is 
quite satisfactorily used, the district as a whole is still not balanced 
when it has, for example, two inspectors good at biology but only one at 
maths. Currently, the inspectorates either divide themselves (each 
inspectorate at all levels consists of 10-12 people on average) according to 
one of the following three criteria: district, phase, and task, though the 
chance of using the final one is quite rare; or simply do not divide at all. 
Virtually no inspectorate divides its force by subject specialities. 
It is worth noticing that the higher the inspectorate's rank, the 
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higher the possibility of dividing by district. For instance, the national 
inspectorate in the SEdC divides the whole country into six regions in 
accordance with the national general administrative division and forms 
six groups corresponding to these six areas. While the higher level 
inspectorates are generally unable to divide labour by phase as it is 
economically and geographically infeasible, the lowest tier - county or 
city district inspectorates have a greater possibility of adopting this 
criteria as they are dealing directly with educational affairs in schools. 
However, as mentioned above, determined by the administrative nature 
of the inspection system, dividing by subject is unusual both in higher 
and lower inspectorates. This inevitably makes the inspectors less 
concerned with curriculum and teaching-learning matters during 
inspections and visits to schools and lower level education authorities. 
Now the problem is, with only 6 inspectors every some 420 schools in 
a county, (in addition, inspectors are usually specialised in only one 
subject owing to the Chinese initial teacher training system), how is it 
possible to get a general picture of quality of teaching and learning in 
assigned schools? Only certain subjects which these few inspectors are 
good at can be covered and effectively inspected. Others are neglected or 
superficially visited, not to mention the fact that there are many 
inspectors whose teaching skill and knowledge has already become 
more or less out-of-date after so many years of doing administration. If 
so, one might naturally ask whether the function of monitoring and 
evaluating overall educational standards in schools can be satisfactorily 
achieved. 
One will probably answer this question by saying that the 
responsibility for evaluating teaching and learning, and curriculum 
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matters belongs to the Teaching Research Office, which is a professional 
organisation under the leadership of the education authority. But the 
office site is usually inside the Teacher Training College or Teachers 
Centre instead of within the building of the education authority. 
Therefore, the inspectorate which is more concerned with management 
matters needs not to get involved in curriculum matters. 
It is true that the two bodies have their own priorities, but they stand 
in similar positions in the administrative structure: feedback and 
evaluation. Although the inspectorate is more inclined to managerial 
side while the TRO oversees professional matters, they are closely 
interrelated and complementary. Management of a school or an area 
creates the environment in which professional matters can occur. In 
other words, the quality of pupil learning is the final criterion for 
judging management in schools and education authorities. Therefore, 
the evaluation of educational quality occupies an extremely important 
position in the overall evaluation of the educational performance. 
The present separation of the inspectorate and the TRO disperses the 
evaluation of overall aspects of educational standards in schools, 
particularly when there is not much systematic and frequent 
collaboration between them, except for the TRO's involvement in full 
inspections. It becomes difficult to monitor and report the overall state of 
education promptly. Thus, the education authority receives different but 
interrelated information from two separate sources. In order for it to 
form a picture of the state of education, it would be preferable if the 
information came in as a whole. To the schools, teaching and learning 
is the core of education. Aspects other than that are regarded as the 
environment which influence the core. Therefore, these two parts are 
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closely interrelated and have the relationship of cause and effect. But the 
usual TRO practice is that it does not touch upon anything beyond the 
curriculum matters, teaching-learning and staff development. So that 
problems in these areas, which sometimes could be the result of 
managerial mistakes, would not be solved promptly when the TRO does 
not contact the inspectorate in time. In short, it is not only the 
separation of two organisations in terms of their work emphasis 
(inspectorate: organisational matters; TRO: professional matters) and 
in terms of their geographic office sites, but also their infrequent 
cooperation that results in the separation of monitoring schooling 
standards and providing advice, and thus causes inconvenience to both 
education authorities and schools. 
Bearing in mind the different stresses in the functions of the 
inspectorate and that of the TRO in China, it is well worth looking at the 
way in which HMI divides its force. There is no such division of labour 
in England -- one body for inspecting administrative affairs and the 
other for professional matters. One single HM Inspectorate is 
responsible for monitoring and advising both professional matters, 
managerial affairs and resource provision. However, it does have what 
is in many respects a similar division -- general inspector and specialist 
inspector. Every ordinary HMI (i.e., those inspectors other than SCI, CI, 
SI, DI) assumes both the duties to look after and monitor overall aspects 
of educational quality in a range of schools and colleges, and to inspect 
and advise one or more specialised subjects in a larger number of 
establishments, as they were all successful teachers before joining HMI. 
If a general inspector discovers a problem that needs attention, he or 
she would ask the help from the relevant specialist inspectors who are 
closely cooperative. To make it clearer, instead of dividing personnel into 
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two groups, HMI divides the responsibilities of each inspector. By doing 
so, the professional specialities of every inspector can be effectively made 
of use, and helping each other become inevitably possible. 
The difficulty of transferring the English experience to the Chinese 
context is the clear bureaucratic division between the inspectorate and 
the TRO. Unlike HMI which has total control of its personnel, they are 
under the leadership of the same education authority. 
It is not recommended by the author that the Chinese inspectorate 
should be organised exactly the same as HMI - that is: to recruit 
hundreds of inspectors and make them both general and specialist 
inspectors. Neither is the author suggesting that inspecting curriculum 
and teaching learning must, as in the English case, occupy a dominant 
position in the work of the Chinese inspectorate. But considering the 
present inadequate cooperation between the TRO and the inspectorate 
and the importance of a close relationship, there is a need for some 
improvement. 
There are several possible solutions. One is to merge the inspectorate 
and the TRO into one integrated organisation since both bodies are 
responsible for monitoring and advising on different but closely 
interrelated educational aspects. Alternatively, if the two forces are not 
combined organisationally, they might work in the same building as the 
transportation and the communication system are still not yet developed 
in China. However, it seems that at present, the only practical answer is 
to strengthen cooperation between the two units. In order to do that, not 
only the inspectors and TRO staff but the heads of the education 
authority stand in broader and higher perspective, should devote major 
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efforts, because being bound by the bureaucratic rules, what the 
inspectorate and the TRO themselves can do is limited. How to 
redistribute the responsibilities in order to avoid overlapping or omission 
and how to allocate the personnel taking the other side's personnel 
structure into account so that all the aspects of education could be looked 
after by a well balanced force? Both these questions need careful 
consideration and perhaps some pilot experiments. 
In the author's opinion, the first thing should be the necessary 
consideration of inspectors' subject specialities when recruiting them. 
Similarly, the TRO members should also have a certain degree of 
familiarity with school management. Thus, both teams would have 
different expertise of their own but generally know something about 
everything. This would provide the basis on which the cooperation 
between the two bodies can be built. Secondly, the inspectors usually act 
as general inspectors carrying out the task of implementing national 
and regional policies, monitoring the overall state of education 
including curriculum and teaching learning. But if certain professional 
matters need particular attention, the TRO staff could offer prompt help. 
Similarly, the TRO members are mainly responsible for implementing 
the national curriculum and syllabus. But, if some problems in 
curriculum and teaching learning are brought about by the 
non-professional factors, the inspectors could be promptly informed and 
proper action could be taken. In addition, the inspectors and the TRO 
members should plan the work, especially the surveys and full 
inspections, jointly instead of separately. That is to say, the TRO staff 
should contribute to the planning and be active participants in the 
inspections and school visits, instead of passive guests invited who are 
not so well prepared (see Appendix C). Moreover, it could be suggested 
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that both units should have frequent exchanges of information between 
them as well as with the education authority so that feedback could be as 
all encompassing as possible. All these require a much closer 
relationship between the inspectorate and the Teaching Research Office. 
In summary, bureaucratic separation plus inadequate cooperation 
between the inspectorate and the TRO hinders the overall monitoring 
and evaluation of educational standards in schools and in regions. It 
also causes some inconvenience to their education authorities. So 
suggestions have been made with the aim of bringing these two bodies to 
work more closely together, if not a total merger. But the author also 
feels that more could be done by the leaders of the education authority 
than by the two units themselves. 
8.6 To Strengthen Other Functions Apart From Enforcing 
Policy Implementation 
Being in the position to provide supervision, feedback and 
monitoring, the functions of the Chinese inspectorate are multiple. 
According to the draft regulations produced by the State Education 
Commission in 1983, the inspectorates are supposed to "check, 
supervise, and guide the implementation of national educational 
legislation and policies", to "evaluate the standards of education in 
schools and the quality of educational administration in education 
authorities", to "report to the authorities on the comments and reactions 
of the schools, education authorities and educationists," and finally to 
"help education authorities and their local governments in the 
discharge of their educational responsibilities." The results of the field 
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work in China confirm that these are the main functions of the 
inspectorate in practice. 
However, the field work findings also show that different functions 
carry different weights. For example, because of the contradiction 
between the urgency to realise universal education in the country and 
the innumerable problems in reality, the Chinese inspectorate treats 
"ensuring implementation of compulsory education legislations and 
other national policies" as the prior function above all. Therefore, to the 
school and education authorities, it is inspection rather than advice that 
is provided. The function of evaluating educational standards and 
administrative efficiency and supervising policy implementation carried 
much more weight than the function of "providing professional advice" 
(see Table 6.9). To its employing education authority, it leans towards the 
function of "providing information on the state of education". The 
function of "providing professional advice" was performed considerably 
less (see Table 6.4). 
Now the question is: "Is this the right balance between different 
functions? What should be the appropriate balance"? 
If one looks at the expectations of the teachers and administrators, 
which are shown in Table 6.17, one can see that both the expectations of 
the administrators and those of the school heads signal the need for the 
inspectorate to reconsider the balance of different functions. The 
research findings on the working methods of the inspectorate draw a 
similar conclusion that more methods should be introduced and the 
balance should be adjusted (refer to section 6.3.3). At present, full 
inspection and routine visit are the most commonly used methods 
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because the inspectorate wants to give every school an evaluation as the 
first task after its establishment. To the education authorities and 
various level governments, aspect inspection is the most popular method 
because obviously frequent full inspections cannot be afforded. But it is 
clear that the provision of the information on the state of education 
cannot merely rely on a limited number of full inspections. In addition, 
though the routine visit is flexible and relatively frequent, it is more 
suitable for monitoring the general state of education than for collecting 
special aspects of information to enable particular decisions to be made. 
What new methods should be employed, how to obtain a well balanced 
combination of working methods in order to fulfil the different functions 
which themselves need adjustments, are questions worth considering by 
the Chinese inspectors. 
Looking at the ways in which HMI deals with the issue of balancing 
different functions and working methods, one can see that although 
carrying out inspection is the major task of HM Inspectorate, it does 
keep a more reasonable balance of different functions. Apart from 
conducting inspections and surveys, HM Inspectors spend a certain 
amount of time visiting schools advising on teaching and management, 
though this time has been reduced due to the increased contribution of 
the local advisory services as well as the DES' growing interest in the 
formulation of national policy. In addition, they conduct many INSET 
courses for school teachers using their professional expertise and rich 
nationwide experience. Furthermore, HMI publishes not only 
inspection reports but also a vast number of pamphlets which offer 
comments on educational standards, express professional views on 
certain matters, and give advice on curriculum and teaching. Moreover, 
HMIs often participate in various meetings of professional and amateur 
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organisations to contribute their expertise. In short, though inspection 
occupies a major position, other functions, especially advisory functions 
do have a reasonable place. 
In current Chinese practice, most of the inspectorates the author 
visited (and indeed, most inspectorates in the country) are busy 
evaluating educational standards in all schools in their areas, "in order 
to test our newly established evaluation criteria as well as to give every 
school a basic idea of their schooling standards", claimed the inspectors. 
Senior level inspectorates are engaged in inspecting education 
authorities and governments on their implementation of national 
regulations. This inspection work occupies most of the time. The 
inspectors usually pay routine visit to schools only at the beginning, 
middle, and the end of the term. 
Learning from HMI, and adapting in the light of the Chinese 
conditions, one can propose recommendations as follows: 
Firstly, there is no need to evaluate all the schools in a short period, 
especially in the places where universal education has been achieved. In 
some prefectural and county areas, some evaluation criteria include 
very complicated mathematical formula. Evaluation is a very serious 
business, it is not a fashion. Testing the evaluation criteria is necessary 
at this stage, but sampling would be sufficient. Too much time devoted to 
this would be a waste. 
On the other hand, once local governments and education authorities 
gain more autonomy in managing educational affairs, the need to 
strengthen an advisory force to assist decision-making naturally arises. 
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When those governments and education authorities have not yet 
adjusted themselves completely to the new style of administration, 
advice is especially needed. In addition to the government side which 
needs advice, schools also require help. As mentioned before, the "Head 
Teacher in Charge" system has been gradually put into practice and the 
power of the school is also increasing. Thus, decision-making at the 
school level is also eager for advice. 
The work of the inspectorate and the way it works, and the fact that 
most inspectors possess rich experience in both teaching and 
administration, cause the author to believe that the Chinese inspectorate 
should have some part to play in assisting decision-making by those 
responsible for running the educational system. In other words, the 
advisory function should be strengthened without delay. The ways of 
doing it can be multiple: to increase the frequency of contact between 
inspectors and heads of education authorities and other administrators; 
to let every inspector (not only the head of the inspectorate) have a role to 
play in advising relevant administrators; to plan a reasonable 
combination of full inspections, surveys, and routine visits; to give 
lectures in school management and teaching, or organise school heads' 
seminars, in cooperation with the Teaching Research Office; to 
disseminate good practice by publishing summaries of experience and 
advisory pamphlets, and so on. 
In summary, while admitting that ensuring policy implementation 
must remain a major function for a long period of time, other functions, 
especially those advisory functions, should be strengthened as quickly as 
possible to respond to practical needs. 
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8.7 To Establish a Dynamic and Effective National Network of 
Inspectorates 
The organisational structure of the inspection system in China, both 
central and local, has been introduced and analysed in considerable 
detail in Chapter Five. One feature worth mentioning again is that every 
local inspectorate is jointly supervised by its corresponding education 
authority (or in some cases by corresponding government) and by the 
inspectorate of its next higher level, though the recent emphasis lies on 
the former in accordance with the call for decentralisation. The 
supervision of the next higher inspectorate is quite weak at present, 
largely due to the incomplete organisation of the inspection system. 
Generally speaking, if the system of educational administration is 
totally decentralised and the central education government does not 
have any leadership or supervision function towards the local education 
authorities (or any higher level authorities towards lower ones), the 
inspectorates at these two levels would be likely to be independent of each 
other and not to have the relationship of leading or being led. In a 
system that is more or less a partnership, like the one in England and 
Wales, the inspection system is composed of two separate inspectorates 
(central and local). A feature is that though organisationally these two 
bodies are independent of each other, they do have reasonably frequent 
and a wide range of cooperation through contacts between the district 
inspector (HMI) and the local advisers, through inspectors' association 
meetings and through some joint activities. But still, one is not 
dependent upon or supervised by the other. What they do is not 
controlled by the other though influence does sometimes exist. In a 
highly centralised system, however, like the one China used to be, the 
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inspectorates themselves form a hierarchy within which every 
inspectorate is accountable to the next higher level and implements the 
orders from the one above. In this case, the inspectorates are highly 
dependent and obedient to their superior inspectorates. 
The current situation in China is somewhere between the last two 
models, i.e., not as highly centralised as it was, but definitely not as 
partner-like as the English one. In other words, decentralisation takes 
the form of power delegation more than of power devolution. The central 
and higher authorities still have considerable influence and control over 
the decision-making of the lower level authorities, particularly over 
matters of principle, general directions and problematic issues. 
Meanwhile, local governments have obtained greater freedom to make 
their own policies and by-legislation which do not contradict the state 
spirit. 
Control has started to become less rigid and local freedom has been 
increasing. The inspectorates, as part of the administration 
mechanism, should adjust themselves to the present situation. This 
means that the relationship among different level inspectorates should 
be a reasonable combination of control and freedom. At present, the 
relationship is neither stable nor sound. There are a number of 
shortcomings that need to be improved. 
First is the weak role of coordination and liaison played by higher 
level inspectorates (i.e., every inspectorate to its next lower level 
inspectorates). Since the inspection system started building up not long 
ago, virtually no inspectorate has any experience. In these 
circumstances, disseminating good practice and exchanging experience 
278 
Chapter 8: Proposals for the Development of the Chinese inspectorate 
is extremely helpful for all inspectorates. In addition to this, keeping a 
certain degree of balance of the development among lower level 
inspectorates is also the responsibility of higher level inspectorates. But 
currently higher level inspectorates have done very little about this for 
an understandable reason --- they are unable to fend for themselves. 
Nevertheless, this might be a direction of improvement later. 
The second is the lack of proper division of responsibilities and 
cooperation among different level inspectorates. If all the inspectorates 
assume the same task of inspecting schools, it is clear that the higher 
the level, the more difficult for the inspectorate to oversee the whole 
area, because of the large size of the country and the limited number of 
inspectors. (provincial level: 8-10; prefectural level: 6-8; county: 5-6). In 
other words, with that limited number of inspectors, the information 
they collect in person through a limited number of inspections and visits 
to schools and lower level education authorities is not typical and 
general enough to reflect the overall state of education, thus to enable 
their authorities to make sound decisions. Therefore, there is a need for 
different level inspectorates to divide the responsibilities and take 
different priorities. One solution which is the case in the present 
practice, is to let the higher inspectorates (provincial, prefectural) 
inspect lower level governments and education authorities, and let the 
lowest level inspectorates (county) inspect schools. 
While acknowledging the soundness of this solution, one can still 
argue that the higher inspectorates should allocate a certain amount of 
time and manpower to inspect schools regularly (perhaps not as 
frequently as the lowest level inspectorates) instead of being content with 
merely inspecting lower level education authorities. Inspecting 
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education authorities serves the purpose of ensuring proper 
implementation of policies and monitoring the state of administration. 
It also contributes, to a certain extent, to the monitoring of the state of 
education in grass roots schools. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the information of the state of education in grass roots schools 
through this channel is second hand and indirect, and may well be 
incomplete. To be able to provide sound and thorough advice to their 
education authorities, inspectors should have some first hand evidence 
both of the educational provision of lower education authorities and of 
the educational standards in schools. 
The final issue concerning the poor relationship among 
inspectorates is the weak cooperation among inspectorates at the same 
level. The impression emerging from the interviews is that the 
inspectorates of the same rank seldom meet except at higher education 
authorities' infrequent meetings. Undoubtedly, every inspectorate works 
under different conditions, and therefore has different experiences and 
different ways of working. But the author believe that common elements 
do exist, especially in the neighbourhood inspectorates. This area has 
considerable potential for development. 
Paying some attention to HMI, one can see that though HMI is an 
integrated inspectorate (as opposed to the Chinese inspectorate which 
consists of tiers of individual inspectorates), its experience in organising 
and managing seven divisions still has some enlightenment (the 
detailed account of the organisation of HM Inspectorate can be found in 
chapter three). Firstly, in the annual programme of HMI's work, nearly 
two thirds of the inspectors' time is devoted to the so-called "issue-led 
inspection" which really refers to those predetermined activities 
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including inspections, surveys, and INSET courses. In so doing, the 
central part of the inspectorate, (i.e. the decision-making body of 7 Chief 
Inspectors and 1 Senior Chief Inspector) can ensure the close 
monitoring of the general state of education as well as the satisfactory 
collection of special information to respond to the policy priorities set 
down by the Secretary of State. This ultimately serves as the basis for 
judging educational standards and offering professional advice to those 
with responsibilities for the educational system. 
This feature of clear central determination of the programme cannot 
fully apply to the Chinese inspection system because, instead of being a 
single inspectorate, they are a network of numerous inspectorates. The 
existing difficulty is that the limited manpower cannot cope with the 
task of closely monitoring large areas and of collecting adequate 
information. It is especially true in senior level inspectorates, bearing in 
mind that the higher the level of the inspectorate, the more difficult to 
monitor the assigned area, especially when the number of inspectors is 
small. This might be partly solved by strengthening cooperation among 
inspectorates. That is to say, every higher inspectorate could entrust its 
lower inspectorates with a certain number of predetermined missions. 
These missions could be the combination of long-term, medium-term, 
and short-term tasks. The content of these missions could include such 
tasks as the collection of certain information required by the policy 
priorities, the participation in inspections and surveys, and the 
contribution of publications, depending on the actual needs in a 
particular period. These tasks should not, however, be as many as those 
in the HMI programme because the lower inspectorates have their own 
duties entrusted by their local governments. Apart from assigning some 
predetermined tasks to the inspectorates at lower level, the higher level 
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inspectorates can also request the submission of all the inspection 
reports, or could ask for themselves to be briefed regularly to strengthen 
communication. 
With the help of the corresponding lower level inspectorates, each 
next higher inspectorate can, to a certain extent, cushion the shortage of 
manpower, because some information would be sent by lower level 
inspectorates instead of having to be collected in person by inspectors at 
higher levels. One could even think of the possibility of employing 
computers to facilitate this work. Given the present economic level, it is 
unlikely for the Chinese inspectors to have as many computers as their 
English counterparts. But there are some national computer products at 
affordable prices. Even a few of them in the whole country will greatly 
speed up communications among different level inspectorates which are 
scattered in a large country. Having obtained the information sent by 
lower level inspectors, plus its own observations, the senior level 
inspectorates would be more able to judge the standards of education 
and administration in its area, and to form a more solid basis for 
offering professional advice. In addition, inviting inspectors from lower 
inspectorates to take part in inspections and surveys can increase the 
position of the inspectors in the inspection team and weaken the 
influence of administrators who, theoretically speaking, should not be 
on the list of the inspection team. 
One might wonder if the problem of manpower shortages would be 
even more serious when the inspectorate had to devote some of its 
manpower to the tasks from the higher level. The answer is "not 
necessarily". Bearing in mind that the inspectorate has some duties 
towards its higher rank inspectorate in the first place, therefore, 
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carrying out some tasks is perfectly justifiable. Secondly, by asking its 
lower inspectorates to offer help, each inspectorate (except the ones at 
lowest level) can actually reduce some work load, which will 
automatically save some room for the tasks from the higher 
inspectorate. Thirdly, by carrying out work for higher ranking 
colleagues, the inspectorate can keep abreast of recent developments and 
future tendencies in a broader perspective, which will be very helpful to 
its own work. Finally, as was said before, the task load given by the 
higher inspectorate should not be as much as to disrupt the work of the 
lower inspectorates. Having said that, the fundamental solution will 
have to be a much greater number of inspectors. 
The role of the HM Staff Inspector and Division Inspector might have 
some applications with regard to liaison between the Chinese higher 
and lower level inspectorates. In the HMI system, Staff Inspectors are 
responsible for digesting the general decisions made by the CIs and 
conversely, sorting out and processing information obtained from the 
field. Division Inspectors are the people who oversee and coordinate all 
HMIs' activities within their divisions. Therefore, they are the key 
people forming a connecting link between decision-makers and actual 
implementors. 
To continue the suggestions to the Chinese inspectorate, in order to 
increase the collaboration between different level inspectorates, one 
senior inspector could be selected among the ordinary inspectors to be 
the liaison among inspectorates. This "liaison inspector" would digest 
the tasks from the higher level inspectorate and make detailed plans 
which integrate an overall plan for his (her) own inspectorate, and 
report to the higher inspectorate regularly about the tasks being carried 
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out. This is a function somewhat similar to that of Staff Inspectors of 
HMI. It is believed by the author that the assignment of predetermined 
tasks and the appointment of liaison inspectors would help to establish a 
dynamic network in which the inspectorates could regularly 
communicate. Certain necessary information from different areas could 
be gathered quickly and truthfully, whilst local freedom is maintained. 
The third consideration is related to cooperation among inspectorates 
of the same organisational rank. In the case of HMI, there are seven 
divisions which cover the whole of England and Wales. Because every 
member of HM Inspectorate is deployed by the headquarters in London, 
the usual exchange of manpower between different divisions usually 
takes the form of joint inspection and surveys. This practice is out of the 
consideration to ensure objectivity of judgment and with the intention of 
bringing inspectors up-to-date. 
At present, Chinese inspectorates at the same administrative tier do 
not have much contact and collaboration except seeing each other at the 
meetings held by the higher inspectorate. In many places, higher level 
inspectorates themselves have not been completely set up, thus the 
chances of gathering them together are rather slim. Increasing 
communication among not only different rank inspectorates but 
different inspectorates of the same rank could be very beneficial. Three 
limitations are: in the first place, moving HM Inspectors around is 
mainly centrally controlled and coordinated (though personal help does 
exist), whilst in China, the higher level inspectorate seldom perform 
this function. In the second place, the exchange would only be feasible 
among neighbouring inspectorates as the long distance from one area to 
the other prevents those far-reaching inspectorates from joining. 
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Finally, each inspectorate is a separate body, unlike the division in HMI 
which is an integral part of a single inspectorate. Therefore, the 
frequency of exchange could not be as often as to affect the normal work 
of the inspectorates. 
The final application of HMI's organisational experience is the 
division of labour within the inspectorate. As analysed in Chapter Four, 
the whole inspectorate is actually composed of three types of people: 
decision maker; planners; and implementors -- the structure by which 
two-way communications can be effectively carried out. 
If we examine the inner structure of each Chinese inspectorate, 
these three components do exist: the head of the inspectorate is the main 
decision-maker, and the other two functions are covered by both the 
heads and the inspectors as every local inspectorate is small with 6-12 
people. But if one looks at the national network of inspectorates as a 
whole, one can see that the division of responsibilities is not clear 
enough. Every inspectorate, no matter what level it is, performs similar 
though not duplicate functions. There is no clear division of priorities 
between different levels. 
In the author's view, the basic work, and indeed most of the work 
ought to be similar in inspectorates at different levels, as they are all 
integrated inspectorates rather than different parts of one inspectorate. 
In addition, they all have a duty to help their own education authorities 
(or local governments) discharge educational responsibilities. But, 
because of the centralised nature of the system, and because of the 
difference in administrative positions, the inspectorates of different rank 
should have some different roles to play. To elaborate, the central and 
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provincial inspectorates should spend more manpower and resources in 
planning the building of the whole inspection system in general. They 
should also focus on the collection of vast amounts of information to 
inform their employing authorities in order to help make important 
decisions which will have a strong effect on the nation or on the 
province. One more role that the central and provincial inspectorates 
should start to strengthen is the role of coordinator, which was not been 
paid much attention to in the past when all the subordinate units 
carried out the same directives. But today every local inspectorate, under 
the leadership of its own education authority and local government, has 
its own way of working. As time goes on, different features and possible 
imbalances are likely to appear. Thus the coordination function of the 
higher level inspectorate is required in order to let all its subordinate 
inspectorates have a reasonable balanced development. 
To summarise this section, drawing from HMI's experience of 
managing its force, the following suggestions could be put forward to 
improve the Chinese system: 
(1) higher level inspectorate should add a small amount of 
predetermined work to the regular plans of its lower level inspectorates; 
(2) every inspectorate should set up "liaison inspectors" to facilitate 
its cooperation and communication with inspectorates at higher levels 
as well as with those at the same level; 
(3) collaboration among neighbouring inspectorates should be 
strengthened in order to exchange experience and to enhance objectivity 
of judgment; 
(4) Certain differentiation of the roles of different level inspectorates 
is needed. Higher level inspectorates should concern themselves more 
with assisting important policy making. 
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In conclusion, there is a great deal of experience that can be learned 
from the HMI system by those responsible for developing the Chinese 
inspection system. Some are directly applicable, whilst others need 
various adaptations. All the discussions above are the author's own 
suggestions to the Chinese inspectors and administrators after making 
comparisons with HM Inspectorate. Obviously, some of the suggestions 
have immediate implications. But others will not be realised in the near 
future. Chapter Nine tries to speculate on possible directions for the 
future development of the Chinese inspection system. 
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CHAPTER NINE  
CONCLUSION 
This concluding section of the thesis summarises its major points 
and speculates on possible directions for the development of the Chinese 
inspection system on the basis of the suggestions made in the preceding 
chapter as well as the present practical conditions in China. 
9.1 Summary 
The adoption of the law of nine-year universal education in 1986 and 
the rising need to enforce this legislation, together with the delegation of 
power in educational administration as a part of the overall education 
reform, resulted in the reestablishment of the Chinese inspectorate in 
late 1986. The Chinese inspectors, being aware that they lacked 
experience in this field, initiated a series of exchanges with foreign 
inspectorates. Of all the inspectorates with which China had had 
contact, HM Inspectorate in England was the one with which there had 
been the most frequent and extensive cooperation and which was 
certainly seen by the Chinese as being a valuable reference. This 
inspired the author, who happened to be beginning a period of 
post-graduate study in England, to undertake this thesis on the 
functions and organisational structures of both HMI and the Chinese 
inspectorate as a basis for putting forward relevant suggestions to the 
newly restored Chinese inspectorate. 
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A great deal of effort has been made by the Chinese education 
authorities and inspectors to set up inspectorates at almost all 
administrative levels (except the township level) and to perform the 
functions required by the existing circumstances in educational service. 
Because the inspectorate has been created to help ensure the successful 
implementation of the law of nine-year universal education, the 
inspectors are equipped with certain administrative powers. They are 
expected to enforce the Law and other relevant national and regional 
policies. They are entitled to make recommendations to their authorities 
that they praise or criticise school heads and leaders in lower level 
education authorities. But their power is not unlimited. It is only derived 
from their right to enforce national and regional legislation and 
important policies. According to official claims and the author's similar 
research findings, the work of the Chinese inspectors is, at present, 
dominated by the supervision and enforcement of the Law and policies, 
and by the evaluation of educational provision in regions and 
educational standards in schools. This fact is obviously consistent with 
the reasons for the establishment of the inspectorate. Apart from the 
implementation of the Law, the delegation of power from centre to local 
areas and from education authorities to individual schools also 
contributes to the demand for inspectorate. An increasing number of 
education authorities have begun to realise the function of monitoring 
and feedback that the inspectorate can offer. Along with the deepening of 
decentralisation, the need for monitoring (as opposed to controlling) the 
work in lower level areas is rising. Therefore, the inspectors' biggest 
contribution to their employing education authorities, as revealed by the 
research findings, is to provide up-to-date information about the state of 
educational provision in areas and educational standards in schools. 
Enforcement of legislation and the provision of information to 
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educational authorities seem to be the most important tasks for the 
Chinese inspectors at this particular time. 
The field work carried out by the author also exposed some issues in 
the inspection system that are existing or are likely to emerge in the not 
too distant future. Firstly, the inspectors concentrate on the supervision 
of policy implementation and give much lower priorities to other 
functions. Such functions include encouraging innovation in schools 
and in lower level education authorities, disseminating good practice, 
and offering professional advice to those who run schools and 
administer education service. To their employing education authorities, 
inspectors give a much higher priority to the function of providing 
information than to other functions. Such functions include the 
professional assessment of the performance of the system on the basis of 
the collected information and evidence, the identification of the issues 
and trends in the implementation of the nine-year compulsory education 
and in the education reform, and the offering of professional advice to 
the education authorities on policy making and implementation. Many 
of the functions mentioned above are becoming increasingly important, 
particularly in the present circumstances when every local government 
and education authority has gained considerable freedom to make more 
independent decisions. 
The present working methods, which result from the existing 
dominant function of enforcing legislation and evaluating standards, 
include full inspections, aspect inspections and routine visits. Apart 
from that, few extra activities, either in person or indirectly, have been 
initiated by the inspectorate to supplement its communication with 
schools and lower level education authorities. In relation to its 
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employing education authority, the inspectorate's involvement in the 
policy-making process is, at the moment, exercised only through the 
participation of the inspectorate head in the authority's board meetings. 
Cooperation between ordinary inspectors and their administrator 
colleagues is mainly reflected in joint inspections. Although informal 
contact and cooperation do exist, the extent is by no means satisfactory. 
The Teaching Research Office (TRO), a national network of professional 
organisations whose task is to ensure compliance with the nationally 
unified curricula, is often invited to take part in the full inspections 
organised by the inspectorate. But cases of further collaboration between 
these two bodies are hard to find. In the author's opinion, although 
there are certain divisions of labour between the inspectorate and the 
TRO (the inspectorate is more concerned with administrative and 
organisational matters whilst the TRO is more concerned with 
professional matters), they both perform functions of monitoring and 
supervision. Because of their similar position of feedback and 
evaluation, and particularly because of the highly interdependent 
relationship between organisational matters and professional matters 
in any educational establishment, these two bodies should have 
considerable degree of integration, or at least cooperation. In brief, better 
working methods have yet to be invented and put into practice. The 
cooperation mechanism with the employing education authority 
including the TRO is not yet an effective network. Not only the head of 
the inspectorate but also all the inspectors ought to have a role to play in 
influencing the work of the education authorities. 
Changing the perspective of analysis from individual inspectorates 
and their relationships with various bodies to the network of 
inspectorates nationwide, the author feels that although the immediate 
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task is to complete the organisation of the system and to establish 
relationships among various level inspectorates, the long term issue 
will be to set the right balance between control and autonomy among 
them. Clearly, this distribution is very much affected by the power 
distribution among different level education authorities. Because the 
latter is still at an early stage with certain confusions and ups and 
downs, one would expect that a stable relationship among inspectorates 
will not be achieved in the near future. Basically, under contemporary 
Chinese conditions, an effective and dynamic network of inspectorates 
requires the inspectorates at different levels as well as those at the same 
administrative level to have sufficient communication and a certain 
degree of cooperation. It expects the senior level inspectorates to play the 
role of coordinator and supervisor rather than the role of commander. It 
needs reasonable differences in functions and in responsibilities among 
different level inspectorates. 
Looking at the functions, working methods and organisational 
structure of HM Inspectorate, one can observe considerable differences 
from those of the Chinese inspectorate. The primary duty of HMI is to 
report to the Secretary of State on the performance of the education 
system nationally in order to enable him (her) to formulate and 
implement national policy. Other associated functions include offering 
professional assistance and advice to those with responsibilities for or in 
the institutions in the system to help maintain and promote educational 
standards. In order to carry out these functions, HMI employs full 
inspections, short inspections, surveys and routine visits as its main 
methods of collecting evidence and carrying out evaluations. In 
addition, frequent publications and regular INSET courses are 
additional ways by which professional advice can be offered. Inside the 
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DES, the Senior Chief Inspector holds the rank of Deputy Secretary and 
has direct access to the Secretary of State, which obviously increases the 
influence of the inspectorate in the Department. In addition, inspectors' 
participation in various planning committees opens up more channels 
through which the voice of the experienced professionals can be heard. 
HMI also offers professional judgments and advice to the civil servants 
in the DES through their day-to-day contact. 
The organisational structure of HMI provides an efficient 
environment in which its functions can be well performed. The three 
groups of people, namely, Senior Chief Inspector and Chief Inspectors, 
Staff Inspectors, and HMI assume the tasks of decision-making, 
planning and execution respectively. The division of labour among these 
three groups of people is very clear. Dividing ordinary HMIs into 
general inspectors and specialist inspectors ensures the efficient 
collection of both general and specialist information required by the 
headquarters in London. Meanwhile, by so doing, both the overall 
performance and individual subjects in schools and colleges can be 
looked after by relevant HMIs. The post of District Inspector establishes 
the linkage between HMI, as a national inspectorate, and the local 
education authorities and their advisory services. 
Not all the merits of the HMI system are transferable to the Chinese 
system because, as repeatedly argued earlier, the system of inspection is 
very much influenced by its educational administration system. HMI's 
prime task is to report to the Secretary of State on the efficiency of the 
education system whilst the Chinese inspectorate is there to supervise 
and enforce the implementation of the Law. Therefore, while both 
inspectorates belong to efficiency inspectorates, the Chinese inspectorate 
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does have certain elements of enforcement. The difference in power that 
the two inspectorates possess, the difference in the aspects that the two 
inspectorates are mainly concerned with, the difference in objects that 
are being inspected, the difference in relationship between central and 
local inspectorates, the difference in the degree of independence that two 
inspectorates enjoy, more importantly, the difference in the basic 
ideology of administration -- centralisation and decentralisation, as well 
as the geographical size and the level of economic development, all have 
given rise to the difficulties in making comparisons and in transferring 
HMI experience to China. Nevertheless, both inspectorates perform the 
function of maintaining and promoting the efficiency of the education 
service, the function of providing up-to-date information to education 
authorities, the function of offering assistance and advice to various 
partners in educational system. Both inspectorates employ similar 
methods to fulfil their functions. Both inspectorates have something in 
common in terms of the organisational structures. All these similarities 
provide the basis on which comparisons can be made and provisional 
recommendations can be proposed. 
Learning from HMI from a contextual perspective, the author has 
put forward following suggestions to the Chinese inspectors: (1). to 
diversify the means of educational administration in the course of 
decentralisation; (2). to provide legislative backing for the inspectorate; 
(3). to increase the influence of the inspectorate; (4). to establish closer 
and clear links with education authority; (5). to strengthen the 
cooperation between the inspectorate and the Teaching Research Office 
system; (6). to strengthen other functions apart from enforcing policy 
implementation; (7). to establish a dynamic and effective national 
network of inspectorates. The detailed analysis and arguments can be 
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found in the previous chapter. 
9.2 Possible Directions for the Development of the Chinese 
Inspectorate 
9.2.1 To speed up the Completion of Organisation 
Needless to say, the first step in establishing a system is to set up 
organisations. This includes many organisational and managerial 
matters such as deciding the levels at which the inspectorate should be 
set up, appointing inspectors from various sources, and allocating the 
necessary resources to maintain its day-to-day activities. 
When the field work was conducted in May 1989, the author learned 
that 24 out of 31 provinces and 138 out of 334 prefectures had completed 
the organisation of an inspectorate. County level education authorities 
were starting to do so. When he came to visit England in June 1990, the 
head of the Central Inspectorate told the author that all the provincial 
level inspectorates had been set up, so had the majority of the prefectural 
inspectorates, (although he failed to give an exact figure), and more and 
more county level education authorities were starting to do so. Bearing 
in mind that the Law requires the majority of the areas in the country to 
make nine-year education universal by the end of 1995, the desire is to 
speed up the establishment of inspectorates so that the system can be put 
into operation as soon as possible. In order to do that, several steps have 
to be taken. Firstly, more resources and particularly more inspectors 
are needed because inspection work inevitably requires an adequate 
number of inspectors and a considerable amount of funds and other 
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facilities. In a few education authorities, inspectors have priority for 
vehicles for their inspections and routine visits. But most inspectorates 
are struggling very hard to try to persuade the Staffing Department of 
the local government (which is responsible for deciding personnel quota) 
even to allow an adequate number of inspectors so that the inspector 
school ratio can be reduced to a reasonable figure. But the present 
governmental policy of cutting the personnel quota in public 
administration authorities makes the inspectors' campaign difficult. 
Provincial governments, under direct pressure from central 
government, are usually more likely to give in to inspectors' demands, 
whilst the junior level governments (e.g. county) are more difficult to 
convince as they do not face as much pressure as the provincial 
governments. In most education authorities, inspectors either have to 
work overtime or have to give up some of their work because of the 
shortage of staff. Since the support that an inspectorate can receive 
depends very much on the attitudes of individual local government, their 
determination to enforce the Law and their recognition of the role of the 
inspectorate in this process, further publicity is needed in order to make 
known the importance of the inspection system. In 1989, when the field 
work was conducted, many inspectors expressed concern about their 
governments' lack of interest in inspectorates. They felt that the 
government regarded the inspectorates as personnel and financial 
burdens. But it is believed by the author that along with the progress of 
the education reform, more and more responsibilities for ensuring the 
successful implementation of the Law of the nine-year universal 
education will fall on to local governments and their education 
authorities at various levels. This will inevitably create great demands 
on law enforcement. Meanwhile, more and more power to make detailed 
and contextual decisions will be delegated to lower levels. The need for 
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close monitoring and evaluation will also rise. Thus, the roles that the 
inspectorate can play will eventually be recognised by politicians, 
administrators and professionals at large. Moreover, this recognition 
will certainly be reinforced when the inspectorate shows its effects and 
functions in practice. 
9.2.2 To Provide a Statutory Base for Carrying Out Inspections 
As analysed in the preceding chapters, the Chinese inspectorate has 
been challenged by many administrators when it carries out the 
inspections of the government at the next lower level. A suggestion was 
offered, with reference to HMI experience, that the legitimacy to inspect 
should be guaranteed by legislation rather than by administrative 
circulars. 
Over recent years, the State Education Commission has been 
organising various bodies to draw up a series of educational legislation. 
Two basic pieces are the Teacher Act and the Education Act. It is 
desirable that the inspection system, as one part of the educational 
administration, be mentioned in the Act, especially if it is intended to be 
kept in existence for some length of time. 
Therefore, with the help of the Law, the inspectorate should be able to 
inspect whatever the Law empowers it to, whether it is school, education 
authority, or government. More importantly, the law could stipulate 
statutory requirements about the fundamental functions of the 
inspectorate so that all the inspectorates in the country can have a basic 
uniformity in their work. It is also expected that the SEdC will assign 
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some primary tasks to the inspectors nationwide from time to time in 
accordance with government priorities. More concrete instructions will 
be given by government and education authorities at every level 
according to the practical needs in local areas. It is hoped that by so 
doing, a proper combination of central missions and local tasks can be 
achieved and a balance of central supervision and local autonomy can be 
maintained. 
9.2.3 To Improve the Inspection System Itself 
After the improvement of the environment, it is the improvement of 
the inspectorate itself that has the decisive influence on the success or 
otherwise of this system. As far as this thesis is concerned, the author 
can foresee the following areas of progress: 
9.2.3.1 The Function of Enforcing the Law Will Remain Dominant 
The goal of making nine year basic education universal has almost 
been accomplished in a few large cities such as Shanghai and Beijing 
where most of the people take universal education for granted. In these 
cities, the inspectors can spend less resource and manpower on 
enforcement and more on evaluation and monitoring. The problem lies 
in small cities and, in particular, rural areas where underage 
employment and farm labour are the direct causes of increasing school 
dropout rates. 75% of the areas in the country are required by the Law to 
make education universal by 1995. But this aim seems difficult to 
achieve without frequent pushing and tightened enforcement. Thus, the 
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function of enforcing the Law will probably be high on the agenda at 
least for the next five or ten years. An effective way of enforcing the Law 
is inspections of various kind. A typical example was the nationwide 
inspection organised by the central inspectorate with the participation of 
various high ranking officials including the deputy head of the SEdC. It 
took place between 1989 and 1990 and lasted for nearly half a year. All 
provinces were inspected without exception. A few regions within each 
province, and a few schools within each region, were selected and 
inspected so that inspectors could get to know the reality at the 
grass-roots levels. The results, claimed by the central inspectorate and 
also believed by the author, was satisfactory because it collected a great 
deal of information about the state of Law implementation. In addition, 
it succeeded in urging some provinces that were behind to keep up with 
the others. But obviously this kind of nationwide inspection can neither 
be frequent nor be in depth. Most of the work has to be done by inspectors 
at lower levels, especially county level inspectors. Therefore, the author 
would anticipate no immediate change of major function in the near 
future. In other words, to inspect to enforce legislation and national and 
regional polies will remain to be the prime function. 
9.2.3.2 Other Functions Will Gradually Emerge 
Although at present there is no urgent need for the Chinese 
inspectorate to develop rapidly functions other than the function of 
enforcing the Law, others will progressively emerge if the 
decentralisation process is meant to go on. It seems to the author that 
two functions will probably be of particular importance. They are 
monitoring and evaluation, and advice. As argued earlier in the thesis, 
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the responsibilities for universal education has been continuously 
delegated to various levels of governments. Thus, instead of 
comprehending, interpreting and then implementing the directives 
from the higher level authorities, as it was in the past, all local 
authorities find themselves facing more independent policy making, 
overall planning and implementation. In order to formulate sound 
policy, frequent and reliable feedback of the state of policy 
implementation and the results of the implementation will become 
increasingly important. This is something in which the inspectors can 
play an active part. Furthermore, the politicians and senior 
administrators also need professional assistance from experienced 
administrators and educationists. The relatively higher quality of the 
inspectors both in terms of teaching and administration experience, and 
in terms of academic qualification obliges inspectors to make 
contributions by monitoring the performance of education system, by 
identifying issues and trends in reality, and by offering professional 
judgments and advice, all on the basis of their expertise and collected 
information. 
At present, in the big municipalities mentioned above, there is less 
need for the inspectors to be concerned with matters like dangerous 
school building, high dropout rate, and irregular teachers' pay, 
compared with those in remote rural areas. Apart from supervising 
other national policies, their attention is focused on setting up 
evaluation criteria and conducting constructive and quality inspections 
so that inspection can become an effective way to promote efficiency of 
the education system instead of a matter of going through the motions. 
Therefore, for these inspectorates, assessing the standards of education, 
not enforcing the Law, is their major task. 
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It must be remembered that after the accomplishment of universal 
education, or even in the process of it, there will be other national 
policies that need enforcing or at least need supervising which might or 
might not be relevant to nine-year compulsory education. The inspection 
of school political education in 1990 in response to the national policy, for 
instance, was an additional task for the inspectors. Therefore, the 
functions of supervision and if necessary enforcment of important 
national policies will still remain a major function of the Chinese 
inspectorate. Nevertheless, in less than a decade, this function will be 
less dominant than it is now and other functions such as monitoring 
and advice will be on the increase. 
9.2.3.3 More Working Methods Will Be Invented and Employed as a 
Result of the Rise of Other Functions 
When functions like the monitoring and evaluation of the 
performance of the education system and the provision of professional 
assistance to both employing education authorities and to lower level 
education authorities and schools have come into play, the 
corresponding methods of performing these functions will certainly 
follow. Full inspections, short inspections, aspect inspections, surveys, 
and routine visits might be employed to serve different purposes. Apart 
from their supervisory and enforcement function, they might be used as 
part of the rolling programme to keep up with the general development 
of education, or used as efficient methods to collect overall information of 
the state of education, or used to gather information on particular 
aspects of the system, or used as ways of offering advice, or simply used 
as channels of communication with lower level education authorities 
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and schools. 
Obviously, what methods will be employed and to what extent each of 
them will be employed are determined by practical needs. But it is very 
likely that all these methods will be used sooner or later depending on 
the emergence of other functions. 
9.2.3.4 The Inspectorate's Influence on the Education Authorities Will 
Increase 
As a result of the strengthened function, with respect to its 
employing education authority (providing advice and up-to-date 
information), and also as a result of a more established position, the 
inspectors will gain a much higher influence on the work of their 
education authorities. Because the inspectorate makes more 
contributions to the decision-making and planning of the authority, it is 
bound to have more cooperation with it. This means that not only the 
involvement of the head of the inspectorate in authority board meetings 
will continue and become more active, but also other members of the 
inspectorate will be expected to establish more frequent and more 
extensive relationship with relevant administrator colleagues so as to 
offer information and advice to help their planning and implementation. 
Closer cooperation can be expected between the inspectorate and the 
TRO. When the functions of monitoring and evaluation of the state of 
education in regions and in schools become more important, one would 
expect that the TRO will not only be taking part in joint inspections at the 
invitation of the inspectorate, but also be involved in planning inspection 
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programme as an active participant. Indeed, there should be more 
TRO's participation not only in large scale inspections, but also in other 
works of the inspectorate such as surveys. Because each side is expert at 
only one particular aspect of evaluation, therefore, only through joint 
planning and action can the overall information be collected and the 
general standards of education be evaluated. This, the author believes, is 
and will remain to be the basis of their cooperation. 
To conclude, during its first few years of existence, the Chinese 
inspectorate has made remarkable contributions to the enforcement of 
the Law of the nine-year compulsory education and to the evaluation of 
the performance of schools and education authorities. By continuing to 
do so, and by strengthening other functions that will probably rise in the 
future, it will certainly play a more and more active role in promoting 
educational standards and in raising the efficiency of the education 
service. 
9.3 Conclusion 
This study aims to propose practical suggestions to the newly 
restored Chinese school inspectorate. These suggestions are the results 
of the comparative study. The last but certainly not least suggestion, is 
that China should not copy any foreign systems as none of them is totally 
relevant to the Chinese situation. These foreign experiences only serve 
as references for China. 
This is the first substantial piece of research in English on the 
system of educational inspection in China. Due to the limit on time and 
303 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
resources, the thesis focuses on HM Inspectorate in England as the 
object of comparison. The author believes that there are a number of 
areas that are worth being studied further. The LEA advisory services in 
England, for example, are the quality control forces operating at local 
level. They provide LEA officials with up-to-date information on the state 
of education and offer professional advice on their policy formulation. 
Some of their functions are highly relevant to those of the Chinese 
inspectorate. More importantly, to the Chinese, they show some 
examples of how to design and operate an inspection system which 
responds to local conditions and needs. The Chinese inspectorate, 
particularly the local inspectorates at various levels could benefit much 
from learning from LEA advisory services. 
This thesis examines the HMI practice prior to 1988, for the reason 
that the effect of the 1988 Education Reform Act on HMI has not been 
stabilised. The post-1988 HMI practice, therefore, has not taken into 
account. With the gradual unfolding of the education reform, in 
particular, with the further implementation of national curriculum and 
more DES' participation in educational affairs, some of the HMI 
practice will inevitably change in response to the needs of central 
government. How the future practice of HMI in a more centralised 
system can be introduced and adapted to meet the needs of the Chinese 
inspectorate (which itself is in a process of development) is another 
interesting area worth to be explored. 
To move the perspective from England to other foreign countries, 
there is even more choice of topics. Experiences of the inspectorates in 
other countries can also be introduced to China. In particular, the 
education inspection systems in France and Russia will probably be 
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more helpful because all the three countries have a similar feature in 
educational system -- centralisation. Thus, in some respects, the 
practice in French inspectorate and Russian inspectorate might be even 
more relevant to the Chinese situation. 
Another area for future research, is, of course, the research on the 
Chinese inspectorate itself. As repeatedly argued earlier, there is no 
foreign practice in the world that is totally relevant and transferable to 
the Chinese system. The principal way of improving and developing the 
Chinese inspection system is through its own practice and reflection. 
Therefore, there is a great deal of work need to be done. 
The road is tortuous, yet the prospects are bright. 
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Annendix A: The Outline of the Field Work 
The field work was carried out both in England and in China, with 
the permission and assistance of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Schools, 
and the Chinese National Inspectorate. Though it was conducted 
mainly from October 1988 to June 1989, the English part was done 
intermittently whilst the investigation in China was rather intensive. 
Following is the summary of the field work. For the reason of 
confidentiality, the names of interviewees and the names of inspected 
schools will not be revealed. 
L The Field Work in England: 
1. 5 observations 
(1). 1 observation on HMI full inspection of one secondary school 
Date: January 1989 
Duration: One week 
(2). 1 observation on HMI full inspection of a primary school 
Date: March 1989 
Duration: One week (3). a observations on three day visits in southern England by LEA 
inspectors 
Date: November 1988 
April 	 1990 
Duration: Three days 
2. 10 Interviews 
(1). 6 interviews with Her Majesty's Inspectors including Senior Chief 
Inspector, Chief Inspectors, Staff Inspectors and "ordinary" 
HMI. 
(2). 2 interviews with school head teachers including primary and 
secondary heads. 
(3). 2 interviews with local inspectors.  
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II. The Field Work in China 
1. 2 observations 
(1). .1 observation on an aspect inspection of an secondary school in 
Shanghai conducted by prefectural rank inspectors. 
Dag: May 1989 
Duration: Two days 
(2). 1 observation on a day visit to a primary school in Shanghai by a 
provincial rank inspector (Shanghai Education Bureau 
inspector). 
Date: May 1989 
Duration: One day 
2. 23 interviews 
(1). 12 interviews with inspectors at different ranks: national, 
provincial, prefectural and county. These 12 interviewees were 
chosen from 7 out of 30 provinces in the country. (Shanghai, 
Beijing, Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, and Jiangsu). 
(2). 4 interviews with administrators at prefectural rank. These 4 
interviewees belong to 3 education authorities. 
(3). 7 interviews with primary and secondary school head teachers. 
These interviewees mostly came from Shanghai which was the 
survey base. 
3. 3 sets of questionnaires designed for 3 groups of people: school 
head teachers, administrators, and inspectors. Samples were 
selected from 11 out of 30 provinces, crossing 6 out of 8 large 
administrative regions. (Fujian, Shandong, Henan, Shishuan, 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Beijing, Jiangsu, 
Shanghai). 
110 questionnaires each group were distributed by post. The 
follow up letter was sent one month later. By the closing day, 205 
samples responded. They are: 
77 school heads 	 response rate = 70% 
52 administrators 	 response rate = 47% 
76 inspectors 	 response rate = 69% 
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Appendix B: Observation on HMI Full Inspections 
L General Information 
Object of the inspection: 
Type of inspection: 
Conductor: 
Location: 
Date: 
Duration: 
Number of inspectors: 
one secondary school 
full inspection 
HM Inspectors of schools 
one of HMI's divisions, England 
January 1989 
one week 
22 (but not all were present every 
day) 
IL Schedule of the Week 
Day One (1) HMI arrived at the school 
(2) found relevant heads of 
department and staff and 
discussed schedules 
(3) started their assigned tasks. 
Most of HMI observed classes. 
Some of them talked with 
teachers, head teachers, 
toured around the school 
(4) HMI had a brief meeting after 
school, raised questions and 
gathered evidence 
Day Two (1) some HMI began to talk with 
relevant 	 heads 	 about 
accommodation, 	 staffing, 
financing,curriculum,assessment, 
staff development and so on. But 
some preferred to leave it to 
Wednesday 
(2) continued to observe classes 
(3) continued to talk with school 
heads 
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Day Three 
Day Four 
(4) after school, examined pupils' 
work by sampling good, middle 
and poor levels for one and a 
half hour 
(1) continued to observe classes and 
talk with staff 
(2) HMI filled in some slips 
concerning various aspects of 
education,quality and handed in 
to relevant HMI 
(3) after school, HMI had a three and 
a half hours' meeting. Every HMI 
reported his (her) findings, and 
the whole team reached some 
provisional conclusions about 
this school 
(1) HMI reported back to the 
relevant departmental heads (or 
school heads) about his (her) 
findings 
(2) afternoon, every HMI reported 
back to the school head teacher 
and deputy heads the results of 
his (her) assignment 
(3) had a four hours Thursday 
evening panel meeting, and 
reached an agreeable view on 
the school 
Day Five 	 (1) continued to report back 
N.B. An overall evaluation of the education quality in this school was 
given by the reporting HMI on the following week because the Friday 
reporting back ran out of time. 
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ILL Observations 
1. Different bases of the inspectors 
All members of the inspection team were HMI. But instead of 
coming from the local division, they were selected by their 
headquarter to gather here from different bases in the country. 
Some even came from south of England. 
2. Very cooperative and perceptive team 
Although some HMI had never met before, the whole team was 
extremely cooperative and effective. 
3. Well defined purpose and clear division of labour 
Before the inspection, every HMI had been allocated certain 
tasks --- subjects, quality of work, general and cross curriculum 
issues. So that every HMI had a very clear target throughout the 
inspection 
4. Adequate preparation beforehand 
Most HMI had studied the submitted school documents in 
certain depth before the inspection started. So they had a 
preliminary idea of the inspected school 
5. Special position of the curriculum matters 
Curriculum matters were paid particular attention by the 
inspectors who believed that the standards of education were 
eventually mirrored in pupils' learning. Inspectors went 
straight to the classrooms as soon as they arrived at the 
school without going through any formality. 
6. Large coverage 
The inspection was all round and thorough. With 87 teachers 
in school, (several absent from time to time), all of them had 
met HMI, either in class, or in tutorial group. According to the 
figure by Thursday afternoon, 90% teachers had been observed 
teaching for an average of 2.7 times; and 65.5% teachers had had 
discussions with HMI for 1.65 times on average. 
7. Cost 
The expenses for inspectors to come by car, by train, or even 
by plane, and the expenses of staying in hotel should not be 
neglected. 
8. Observations of the school head teacher 
The head teacher said that this evaluation was done by 
professionals outside his school. It gave them a fairly objective 
view of their school, and it was also very helpful to the future 
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improvement of their school. 
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Appendix C: Observation on an Aspect Inspection 
by the Chinese Inspectors  
L General Information 
Object of inspection: 
Type of inspection: 
Conductor: 
Location: 
Date: 
Duration: 
Number of inspectors: 
one secondary school 
aspect inspection (moral education) 
the Chinese prefectural rank 
inspectors and their colleagues 
Shanghai, China 
June, 1989 
two days 
14 (5 of them were professional 
inspectors, 9 were "acting" inspectors) 
IL Schedule of the Two Day Inspection 
Day one 	 (1) observed raising national flag and 
pupils' morning exercises 
(2) read school documents about 
moral education and discussed 
allocation of tasks among inspectors 
(3) school heads and political cadres 
reported the work they had done 
(4) met teachers and pupils 
(5) all the inspection team members 
and school heads observed one 
well prepared moral education 
class 
(6) after school, some inspectors held 
a meeting with moral education 
teachers, some inspected 
extracurricular activities 
Day Two (1) several inspectors observed classes, 
others held meetings with staff of 
political organisation: the Chinese 
Youth League, the Chinese Young 
Pioneer, and so on 
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(2) held pupils' meeting during lunch 
(3) observed moral education classes 
(4) participated in school seminar on 
moral education 
TM Observations 
1. Mixed sources of inspection team members 
All members of the inspection team were from the same 
education authority. But not all of them were inspectors. In 
fact, only 5 out of 14 were professional inspectors. Other 
members came from the Communist Party committee of the 
education authority, the Teaching Research Office Moral 
Education group and so on. The reason for this mixture of 
sources has been given in the thesis. 
2. The role of the professional inspectors 
Five inspectors, making up nearly one third of the total 
inspection team, played the role of an organiser, coordinator, 
and of course, participant of the inspection. They contacted 
the school before the inspection took place, they discussed 
with non-inspector "inspectors" the allocation of tasks, they 
gathered all the findings, and finally they summed up the 
results and wrote the report. 
3. Allocation of tasks on the spot 
The allocation of tasks took place after the inspection began. 
Though every member of the inspection team eventually got 
his (her) task, they were not very well prepared in advance. In 
addition, school documents were read and examined during the 
inspection instead of before the inspection. 
4. Formality 
The inspection, like any other Chinese inspections, started 
with a meeting with school heads and relevant staff at which 
the head reported their work. In the whole process, meetings 
and school's reporting occupied a large proportion. It seemed 
to the author that, to some extent, the inspectors based their 
report more on what the head and the teachers said what they 
had done than on the reality of pupils' attitudes (as this was 
an inspection on moral education), though the latter was 
explored to some extent during the inspection. 
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5. Less importance of the class 
The observation of classes, according to the inspection 
schedule, did not take place until the second day (which was 
also the last day) except the observation of that well prepared class 
on the first day. In addition, not all inspectors were observing classes 
on that day. Some were still meeting relevant staff. This was partly 
due to the nature of the Chinese moral education --- academic classes 
are only one part of the political education mechanism. In addition, 
not every moral education classe was observed by specialists of moral 
education (TRO members and inspectors). Some were perfunctorily 
observed by administrators and politicians. 
6. Absence of inspectors' general meetings 
The inspection team had numerous meetings with teachers 
and pupils of the school. But during the inspection, they 
themselves did not have a meeting to gather information. 
Obviously they could not make use of the evenings, like HMI 
did. Perhaps they would have a meeting in the education 
authority's building after the inspection. Or the inspectors 
would somehow gather those information from every member 
of the inspection team. 
7. Observations of the school head teacher 
He said that they had not been able to sit down to have a look 
at what they were doing. The inspection urged them to have a 
review. In this respect, the inspection was helpful. He said 
that the inspection also revealed some problems in his school 
and helped them identify issues. But he also expressed some 
reservations about the way the inspection was conducted. He 
said: "Dragging in so many people, and making such a 
perfunctory evaluation is a waste of my time as well as 
theirs. If we had much fewer people and a deeper study of the 
state of moral education in the school, the results of the 
inspection would be more valuable." In addition, he thought 
that the inspection had only uncovered problems which he 
himself and his colleagues had already noticed. He complained 
that the inspectors failed to give him some advice and help on how to 
solve these problems. "So, after this inspection, I still don't know 
how to solve these problems", he concluded. 
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Question List 
Interview Former Chief Inspector 
1. Would you please tell me your position and responsibility in the 
Inspectorate? How long had you been an HMI? What did you do before 
you became an HMI? 
2. What are the channels of communication within the Inspectorate? In 
other words, who and how decides what you will do? And how does 
the information gathered in the field flow to London headquarters? 
3. What, do you think, according to your experience, are the 
expectations of politicians, civil servants, and teachers of your role? 
Do each part's expectations affect your work? In what way? 
4. Would you please describe the Inspectorate's relationship with the 
DES and the teaching body? What would you do about different 
expectations? 
5. What are the channels of communication between HMI and the rest 
of the DES? 
6. What do the Chief Inspectors do? What is their role in performing the 
overall functions of the Inspectroate? 
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Appendix Interview with Former Chief Inspector of HMI 
Date: Dec. 12th. 1988 
Q — interviewer A — interviewee 
(after greeting and chatting) 
Q: Ok, let's begin with the questions. First, what did you do as a Chief 
Inspector? What did you do before became an HMI? 
A: I spent x years as a x, and x years as a higher school teacher. 
Q:The second question is about the channel of communication inside the 
inspectorate. I know it's a kind of two ways, of communication, top 
down, down to top. But who and how decide the programme, the 
inspection programme? How does the information gathered through 
visiting schools and surveys etc flow to London headquarter? 
A: Well, my job was to advise the ministers, Chief Inspectors are 
ministers' chief advisers. That was my full time job, providing advice 
to ministers, to the elected politicians. The advice which we gave 
them is based on the information which we got from HMI in the field. 
Therefore, the whole of the inspection programme was in the hands 
of the Chief Inspectors, that's to say, the five Chief Inspectors, who 
were the five phase inspectors, one for primary, one for secondary, 
one for further education, one for teacher training, one for higher 
education. Those five Chief Inspectors determine the priorities for 
the inspection programme. 
Q: You have seven Chief Inspectors? 
A: Yes, but these five are the phase Chief Inspectors. That is the ones 
who are responsible for a part of the education system. There is one 
Chief Inspector who's responsible for curriculum matters, and LEA 
inspections, and there is one Chief Inspector who is responsible for 
personnel matters and information flow and all the rest of it. They 
don't have a phase responsibility, so they don't have any claim on the 
inspection programme. It was the five of us that decided the 
inspection programme, the phase Chief Inspectors. In fact, it was 
only very recently that there were 7. There were 5 Chief Inspectors up 
until about 1983, and then six until about 1985, and then 7. The 7 
includes the one for information flow, personnel matters and so on. 
The main reason was that we needed somebody with very tip-top 
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computer expertise because the whole of the inspectorate went fully 
computerised in 1984. 
Q: According to what, you make the inspection programme? For 
example, for next term or next year? 
A: I am sure you have been told by other people. You need to talk to 
somebody who is up-to-date now. We used to change it every year. In 
the days when I was there, it was 60% nationally determined 
priorities, 20% locally determined, 20% subject inspection. 
Q: Nobody told me that. 
A: Really? That's probably different. It used to change every year. What 
we used to do, then, was that we played with the percentage. We 
played with it every year. When I left, it was 30% determined by 
political activities, that is, you know, the introduction of national 
curriculum, something like that. 30% determined by our rolling 
programme of national inspection. There was a basic minimum 
number, how many secondary schools were inspected every year, 
how many primary schools were inspected every year, how many 
polytechnics were inspected every year. But it was nationally 
determined because it was actually computerised sample. We used to 
tell the DES statisticians that we needed, say, if there were 45 
secondary schools being inspected, then the statisticians would pick 
for us, geographically, size, stratified sample, that sort of thing. The 
computer would deliver the people to go on the inspections. That's the 
most complicated task. If you have a very packed inspection 
programme and we were all trawling the same manpower for 
teacher training and for a lot of the higher education inspection. It 
was much better off in engineering. There was not a lot of 
engineering schools, so the Staff Inspector could divide his 
programme more or less with a well defined relation: engineering, 
architecture and so on. Whilst to inspect history, whether it's in 
teacher training or in higher education, or in secondary school, or 
even in primary school, we were trawling the same little team, 15 
historians, that spread across the whole of the programme. So the 
computer copied out the people for us. And then each individual HMI 
received a computer printout of what their programme was for the 
term. For instance, now, in December, they would get their 
programme for the spring term, although as far as the CIs are 
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concerned, they finished planning the spring term in August. 20% of 
the programme was regionally determined by Divisional Inspectors, 
another 20% was taken up by the HMI, days, they used to call "IP1" 
days. They used to send in the form called "IP1": Inspection 
Programme 1, which was what they said they had already committed 
on personal activities. They were asked to speak at conference, or 
they were sent abroad. That took up the other 20%. 
Our politicians are the only politicians outside the Dutch, the French, 
and ourselves, who have that first hand information about how 
education really is, on which to base the policy decisions. And it gives 
the HMI enormous strength throughout the minister's discussions. 
The Secretary of State was looking for a direction for policy, of course, 
he's got his ministry adviser there, he's got his legal advisers there, 
and so on. But he's got one or two people there who can say: Secretary 
of State, we have visited 40,000 classrooms and we have seen this and 
that, that is how it is. And that's, I mean, nobody can argue with 
that. 
Q: Professional. 
A: That's right. And it's first hand evidence, it's not professional 
opinion. HMI are not professors of education. They are people who 
have first hand evidence. We would send off for retraining, any HMI 
who start trying to behave like a professor of education, and give his 
own views not based on first hand evidence. That's an absolute 
crucial point, I hope you write it down when you catch your tape 
recording. 
Q:Another question is: what do you think, according to your experience, 
the expectations of politicians, civil servants and teachers? 
A: I'm talking about the past. Each politician uses HMI differently. 
Q: Do civil servants also request HMI to provide some information? 
A: Yes, but they have no right to demand an inspection. Nobody has, 
nobody except HMI, has the right to ask HMI to do something. The 
Secretary of State can cause the inspection to be made. 
Q: But you, in practice, do you cooperate? 
A: Of course, on a day-to-day basis, we worked together. 
Q: Would you please describe your relationship with the DES and the 
teaching body. What do you view your relationship? And what will 
you do when you receive different expectations? 
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A: We don't "work with" the teaching body. The key difference between 
local authority inspectors and national inspectors is that they have no 
official role in relation to teachers' careers at all. The point about 
HMI is that they don't promote teachers, they don't hire them, they 
don't fire them, they have nothing to do with teachers' careers at all. 
HMI is there to report on the system, not on the individual teachers. 
Whilst the local authority advisers, of course, they sit on the 
appointment panel for teachers, they recommend promotions for 
teachers. So they are very much concerned with the careers of 
teachers. HMI work for the government. They are government's 
inspectors. They work for national government and our teachers are 
not employed by the national government. So, what the expectations 
of teaching profession are towards HMI, I hope, will be that HMI will 
give good advice, unbiased advice to the government. That's all HMI 
tries to do. HMI is not a pressure group. 
Q:What is the channel of communication between HMI and the rest of 
the Department. You have mentioned, you had contact with the civil 
servants on the daily, not official -- 
A: That's as the Chief Inspector, not as HMI. Ordinary HMI are in the 
field, haven't so much contact with the DES. So their channel of 
communication is through the CI team. They are normally through 
the Staff Inspectors. Each of the phase Chief Inspectors, those 
"phase" Chief Inspectors, has a team of 4 or 5 Staff Inspectors who 
work in the DES alongside the Chief Inspectors. They are responsible 
for the day-to-day contact with HMI. They direct the work of HMI, 
they provide the schedule on which the inspections are conducted. 
For example. the HMI will go out on a national inspection. It is the 
Staff Inspectors who prepare that schedule. And the reports, that 
HMI write, come into the Staff Inspectors ad they edit them. So, the 
channel of communication really is: HMI in the field, to the Staff 
Inspectors, and then the Staff Inspectors to the Chief Inspectors, and 
the Chief Inspectors to the DES. 
Q: In the past, when you were the Chief Inspector, did you meet the 
Secretary of State often? 
A: Possibly, at times, at least once a day. That's what the Chief 
Inspectors are there to do. 
Q: Did you meet a lot with the Senior Chief Inspector? 
319 
Appendix D: Interview with Former Chief Inspector of HMI 
A: Yes, the Senior Chief Inspector is the orchestrater of the team, the 
chairman of the team of the Chief Inspectors. Although very often, 
outside, it's particularly now, the press tends to personalise people in 
government, so it's the Senior Chief Inspector's name gets used. 
Internally, it's not very hierarchical at all. The Senior Chief 
Inspector is very much the chairman of the CIs committee making 
CI policy. We used to meet once a week for two hour short working 
session altogether with the Senior Chief Inspector in the chair, and 
then once a month for whole day meeting which was a policy 
meeting, concerned with policy matters. But the Senior Chief 
Inspector, for example, never took any part in the inspection 
programme. The CIs had to plan that amongst themselves. 
Q:The last question, I think you have answered this question: what is 
the role of the Chief Inspector? 
A: Chief Inspectors are the advisers to the ministers. That's what they 
exist to do. That's what they are paid their salaries to do, to provide 
advice. The minister can demand the advice at any point. It's their 
job to provide constant advice. Obviously, the amount of advice is 
according to what the ministers' preoccupations are. I would 
imagine while the national curriculum was being discussed and 
debated, XX spent hours every day with the ministers, because he 
was the person responsible for curriculum. It would be a unusual 
day when, say, four out of the five phase Chief Inspectors haven't 
seen any of the ministers. Contact of the other two with the ministers 
would be less because they were more concerned internally with the 
administration of the inspectorate. In the same way, the Deputy 
Secretaries in the DES, they only exist to be the ministers' advisers. 
That's how our government works. It's very different from yours and 
must be very hard for you to understand. 
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Question List  
Interview Senior Chief Inspector 
1. Would you please describe the channels of communication within the 
Inspectorate? 
2. Is your inspection programme often changed by the request of the 
Secretary of State or other influences? 
3. What are the ways of communication with the DES? How do you and 
Chief Inspectors provide advice to politicians and civil servants? 
4. What, do you think, are the expectations of the politicians, civil 
servants, and the teaching body? What would you do about different 
expectations? 
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appendix E: Interview With Senior Chief Inspector of HIM 
Date: November 30th. 1988 
Q — interviewer A— interviewee 
Q: I know the time is very limited. So, the first question is about the 
communication channel within the inspectorate. I've read some 
books. You have the committee meetings, and computer input of the 
visits reports, something like that. And the individual Staff 
Inspector, they can require the ordinary HMIs to do some work for 
them. That's all I know about the communication channels. Is there 
any other ways of communication? 
A: We have to plan the work nationally, because there is a great deal of 
government policy, and our main task is to be in a position to inform 
and advise that policy. So we have a national inspection programme. 
That is what our main work is about. So that although the HMI are 
all over the country, apart from those who are based in this building, 
we have to have our routes by which we communicate. Now, first of 
all, the Chief Inspectors, there are 7 of those, they are all here, and 
they have teams of Staff Inspectors who deal with people in our 
divisions. So the secondary Staff Inspector will have a group of 
secondary inspectors in each of the 7 divisions. They will discuss 
issues and plan issues. So it is a two-way track. 
But we also have a awful lot of mail. We have a series of what are 
called "Memorandum to Inspectors". "M to I" is memorandum to 
inspectors. They are the things that are not going to change, that is 
not asking somebody to do something, it's actually to explain, for 
example, changes in the law of education, so the law now says, such 
and such, so this goes out to HMI to say: therefore, certain people will 
have certain responsibilities. So, that's the memorandum. They, as I 
said, tend to be the things that are going to stay in place for quite a 
long time. They go out to all HMIs, or to that group of inspectors for 
which they have a special interest. 
We also have Working Instructions, WI. They are quite often linked 
to the M to I. In the M to I we write and say: the Education Reform 
Act says such and such about religious education; the Working 
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Instructions say: we are doing such and such, and will you all please 
gather information and let Staff Inspector so and so have it by -- . So, 
that is the formal work, some of those jobs occur only once, so that the 
Working Instruction goes out of date automatically as soon as the job 
finishes. Others are about activities that go on for long time, such as 
school closures. The local authority wishes to close a school, it has to 
get the permission eventually of the Secretary of State, here. So we 
have an important job to do in commenting on the request to the 
Secretary of State, telling the ministers here, what we think of the 
local authority's proposals. That goes on all the time. It's part of the 
education law, section 12. So, those Working Instructions stay in 
existence. So, that's an important part of communication. 
And then, as I said, there are various national committees, for 
example, a national committee on higher education. We have our 
own central committee, that is my committee of the 7 Chief 
Inspectors and myself. That is the most senior management of the 
inspectorate, in terms of managing our work and the personnel. But 
it's also a main policy determining body of the inspectorate. We 
decide what the priorities are for our inspection. And then, there are 
national secondary committee, national primary committee, national 
higher education, further education committee --. Then there is a 
national, central committee for Staff Inspectors. And there is a 
central body of Divisional Inspectors (those are 7 Divisional 
Inspectors who run each of our divisions). All of them are 
interrelated. They are related through people; that is members of one 
committee are also members of another. So they could interrelate 
with each other. So, there is communication across from one body to 
the other. In addition, every subject of the curriculum has a national 
committee: English committee, Maths committee, and so on. It's all 
programmed. They are not allowed to meet all the time. They have 
the time set out to arrange their meetings. 
Q: How often do they meet? 
A: Well, I suppose each subject committee probably meets three times a 
year, once each term. 
Q: How about you, I mean, the central committee ? 
A: I meet with the Chief Inspectors. We have a Chief Inspectors' full 
meeting once a month. But I meet also with most of them once a 
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week. Because I am constantly in meetings, and so they are. We have 
a meeting less than an hour and no more, once a week, usually on 
Thursday morning, for immediate matters, matters that have to be 
handled quickly. It is simply passing information between us what's 
going on. Whilst the Chief Inspectors' meeting will take bigger 
items. 
Q: say, the programme, the broad programme is determined by you and 
the Chief Inspectors, and -- 
A: Yes, we determine, as a group, what the broad priorities for 
inspection are in relation to what we know about government policy 
on one hand, and what we know from the inspectors, and the things 
that are happening out there. So, it's two ways. From that, we decide 
what should be the priorities. Then, each Chief Inspector discusses 
with his (her) Staff Inspectors to decide what particular things they 
should do. So, if we decide, for example, that standards of work is a 
priority, then the primary Chief Inspector will decide how he is going 
to report on standards of work over the next term. What sort of things 
should we do in primary schools. Now, that might be quite different 
from what they choose to do and what is the key issue in standards of 
work in secondary schools. We might have up-to-date information on 
standards of work in GCSE, but we are really not sure at all the 
standards of work in certain kinds of schools, say, secondary schools 
in the middle of our big cities, so those might be what they will 
consider. So, they decide that. Then, the Staff Inspectors prepare 
particular inspections. 
Q: detailed programme? 
A: That's right. Say, we will inspect 6 schools, it will take so much time, 
it will cost so much money. And that comes back then, comes to the 
Chief Inspectors. The Chief Inspectors decide from all those: well, I 
can only do ten, those are the ten I am going to do. Then they come 
together as Chief Inspectors to try to make all that into the inspection 
programme. I have to see that programme looks sensible as a 
programme overall. I tend not to get involved in the details. That's up 
to them. They have to get the information needed, that's their 
responsibilities. I ought to see that we are, in fact, properly 
addressing ourselves to the priorities. 
Q: How often, I mean, for example, one programme, is it for one term or 
for one year? 
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A: Yes, In the main, it's for one term, although quite a large parts of it 
lasts much longer than that. Some of our big inspection programmes 
take three years to do. If we are inspecting 10% of all secondary 
schools in the country, and we can't do that in a term. So that, for 
example, recently we have to inspect every teacher training course, 
and that took us three years to do. So, you know that that is going to 
go on for a long time. But each term we have to send out to HMI, to 
every HMI, not only the full programme, but what they are going to 
be doing, their individual programme. So, HMI has to know which 
inspection, because although that HMI might be working in the 
North, that might be where he lives, he could well be involved in 
inspection in London, on a national programme. 
Q: Does your programme often get interrupted, or say, changed by the 
request of the Secretary of State, or other influence? 
A: No. not really. In that sense, the Secretary of State doesn't have 
anything to do with the programme. That's part of our independence 
of the government. The actual detail of the programme is for the 
inspectorate to decide. What does happen from time to time, is that 
there is some public concerns being expressed in the press, or radio, 
television, either about a particular college or school, or other 
institution, claiming things are very bad inside this school, people 
have been politically trying to influence children, or the behaviour 
that is going on is odd; or a whole education authority is in a mess. 
Now, what the Secretary of State will say to person in my position as a 
Senior Chief Inspector, (the Senior Chief Inspector is a senior 
professional adviser), what he is entitled to say is: what is going on? 
Because he is responsible for the education in England, and he's 
getting a lot of pressure from people saying that appalling things are 
happening in X. Now, if I can answer this question because we've got 
fairly up-to-date information, I answer his question. I go to him and 
say: what we do know about this is ---. This is what's going on. If we 
haven't got information about what's going on, the only way I can 
find out is to inspect. So we do have to have flexibility in our 
programme to be able to fit in the things that we couldn't have 
planned for. Some of those might come from the Secretary of State, 
but others might come from our own information. So there has got to 
be some flexibility. Everybody isn't programmed all the time, so that 
if we had urgent things, wherever it comes from, we ought to be able 
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to try to respond. 
Q: Another question is about something particularly to the senior 
persons in the inspectorate. What is the communication channel 
within the DES, I mean, you and other civil servants and politicians? 
A: Well, First of all, the Senior Chief Inspector has direct access to the 
Secretary of State. But also, the Senior Chief Inspector is one of the 
Deputy Secretaries in the department. The senior structure of the 
department is the Permanent Secretary, and then there are now 3 
Deputy Secretaries and the Senior Chief Inspector. 
Q: So, you are in the position of the Deputy Secretary. 
A: So that the Senior Chief Inspector is involved in all the policy 
planning and discussion of the department. I am involved in that 
partly acting as a Deputy Secretary, but partly because by being 
involved in all that discussion and planning, and all that discussion 
with ministers, is one of the main ways I am able to make judgments 
what is the priority for inspection. There is no use for me starting an 
inspection today and the Secretary of State wants to know the answer 
today, because, you can see it, the inspection takes three years. I've 
got to be able to say: look, it's quite clear that the government is 
becoming more and more interested in X, I say to the Chief 
Inspectors, therefore, we must start to carry out inspections to be 
well informed about X. Similarly, for me to say to the Secretary of 
State: well, we can't tell you all the detail you want to know, but we 
will be able to do so in 12 months time. So it's an interchange. So I am 
involved at that level in all of the top meetings of the department. It 
also, the particular link is very close with the Deputy Secretary 
responsible for school and all that. That is very close because it is at 
that level that he can see that he is going to want information, advice, 
and help from HMI. So, there is a constant connection between all 
the Deputy Secretaries on this floor in the department. So we are very 
close together in that way. So that at my level, there are very close 
links. At the Chief Inspector level, they link with the heads of the 
policy branches. That's where they work most closely. So that the 
secondary Chief Inspector will have frequent meetings, formal or 
informal, with the heads of the school policy branches. Once 
particular areas of work start, then the Staff Inspectors will be 
involved. So, now the department is very much involved in the new 
Education Act, and we are working together nationally, forms of 
326 
Appendix E: Interview with Senior Chief Inspector of HMI 
assessment. Then certain Staff Inspectors who are knowledgeable on 
assessment and examining are closely involved in working with that. 
So, a lot of pieces of work are underway right now. There is a link 
built-in. So, there are very close links at that lines. And it's our job, 
all of those who linked in that line, to try to communicate the rest of 
the inspectorate what these concerns and interests are. 
Q: You said, Chief Inspectors link with the heads of policy branches, 
they two groups of people link very closely. Do you have any rough 
idea, how often they meet? 
A: It's very often, actually. I mean there isn't a formal timing, as I 
have for my on Chief Inspectors. But the frequency of meetings 
between, say, the head of school branch three and one or two Chief 
Inspectors is a great deal. Because school branch three is working 
out now all these national curriculum materials, then the Chief 
Inspector who has the particular responsibility of National 
Curriculum Council meets frequently with that person. As to the 
schools, the primary Chief Inspector and the secondary Chief 
Inspector, it wouldn't be possible to say that they meet once a week, or 
once a month, because it could be more than that. 
Q: depend on the need. 
A: But what they don't have, there isn't a regular pattern, because it is 
related to the specific interest. But anyway, it is very frequent. 
Q :The last question, just briefly. Maybe this question is very 
straightforward, I hope you don't mind. How do you view the balance 
between advice and monitoring? and say, if you receive conflicting 
expectations from the central authority and the teaching body, what 
will you do? I mean, just a very personal view. 
A. We haven't any advice to give unless we have inspected it. Because we 
are not here as a group of clever men and women, or something like 
that. We are here because we are knowledgeable and experienced. 
Therefore, when we look at schools and colleges, or higher education, 
we know what we are looking at and we come to certain judgments 
about it. It's on the basis of these judgments, on the basis of what 
we've seen, that we give our advice. So the balance is essential. If we 
are expected to advise, or we simply should advise on something, we 
must have done inspecting, and it must be fairly recent inspecting, 
otherwise we've got nothing to say, we are just expressing opinions 
like anybody else. It may well be that that inspection and its findings 
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leads us to certain things. If we are simply being ourselves and speak 
politically, we will speaking differently, because what one finds when 
you go to inspect is not always what you like to find, and your 
favourite theories and hopes might not be born out by the conclusions 
you must come to. So that our job is to report as we find, not as we 
would like to find. So that if government wants us to say things in 
certain ways, or teachers want us to say things, that isn't on. What 
we've got to say is what we think it is justifiable to say. So we will not 
have any particular interest -- 
Q: in both sides. 
A: That's right. And that isn't always set out to contradict their views, 
or to support their views. If we are now saying something that the 
government doesn't like, or the teachers don't like, that's something 
that happens, it isn't something we planned to do. In other words, we 
don't start from an apriori position, say, the teachers think like that, 
therefore -- , or the government wants it like that, therefore, -- . We 
actually go to look at what's happening. Whether it's a government 
initiative, or whether is the teachers' in schools, we come to the best 
judgments we can. They are not the last word, we haven't seen 
everything. We say: there it is, this is what we saw, this is what we 
thought of it, and this is what we think is needed to improve that, 
whatever we think isn't good enough. Now people come and say, 
(we've seen a lot of it), that it isn't like that, and if they can show that 
to be true well and good. But all too often, people haven't looked at 
what they are talking about in any great detail. They have a view 
which they are expressing. It might be a political view on education, 
or a view that favours the teachers because it comes from the 
teachers' association, or a view that favours the employers because it 
comes from the education authorities. So we are much more in a 
position of the sort of the troublesome priest, and that at times is 
difficult. Most of the time, it's not difficult. Most of the times, 
politicians and teachers take our advice and use it as sensibly. They 
like some of it and don't like some of it. That's fine. Sometimes it is 
very difficult, the views we are expressing the government today 
wouldn't like to hear. Now the position is very clear, if the 
government does not allow us to publish, we can't publish. We are 
civil servants, and we have no right to publish. So it is actually quite 
difficult, given that everybody knows the work that we are doing. It's 
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difficult for the government in Parliament to say, to stand up and 
say, we are not going to publish what the inspectors' have said, 
because of the questions that will arise. So there are times when they 
do publish material at a particular level. They would prefer not to 
have it published because it is awkward. And there are lots of time, 
when some of the teacher unions would rather we say something 
different, for example, that teachers are marvellous, and everybody is 
working hard, and it's all wonderful; or that whatever the answers 
wrong, it's not the teachers'. But you know, it isn't like that. Quite a 
lot of teachers are doing a decent job, but there is room for 
improvement. 
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Apnendix F questionnaire for School Head Teachers 
Evaluation of Inspectorate's Work and Your Expectations 
Dear Colleague, 
The last two years saw the rapid development of educational 
inspection throughout the country. With the aim of improving 
inspection work and speeding up education reform, this questionnaire is 
designed to discover your evaluation of inspectorate's work and your 
expectations of improvement. The questionnaire is divided into two 
parts: part one asks you to describe the factual practice of the 
inspectorate based on your school's experience, part two invites you to 
express your views and expectations of the inspectorate. 
This is a nationwide survey. Your answers will be strictly 
confidential. We shall be very grateful if you could return the 
questionnaire to Department of Education, East China Normal 
University before 25th, May, using the prepaid envelop. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation and wish you all the best 
with your work. 
Research Group on Education Inspection 
Department of Education 
East China Normal University 
Coordinator: Weiqian Yang 
5th. May. 1989 
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Part One: The Inspectorate and Your School 
N.B. (1): If an inspectorate has not yet been set up in your area, 
please skip over to part two; 
(2): If you encounter an unapplicable question, please skip to the 
next one; 
(3): please tick to answer questions unless otherwise stated. 
1. You are a 	  head teacher (or deputy head). 
(1) primary school 
	
(2) secondary school 
2. There are 	  inspector(s) assigned to look after your school. 
(1) no (2) one (3) two (4) three (5) more than three 
3. If there is no assigned inspector, please skip to question 4; 
If there is one inspector assigned to your school, the criterion for 
dividing the inspectorate is 
	  . 
(1) sector (2) subject (3) district (4) current task (5) other 
If there are more than two assigned inspectors, the criteria for 
dividing the inspectorate are 	  
(1) district and sector (2) sector and subject (3) district and 
subject (4) district and current task (5) other (please specify) 
4. The inspector(s) come(s) to your school 	 on the average. 
(1) weekly (2) monthly (3) termly (4) annually (5) > one year 
5. The recent visit lasted 	  
(/) 11 2 - 1 hr (2) 1-2 hrs (3) 2-3 hrs (4) half a day (5) a day 
6. When (s)he came to visit your school last time, his (her) main 
concerns were 	 . (please choose three answers and indicate 
degrees of the concerns by numbering 1, 2, 3. i.e., 1: the 
first concern; 2: the second concern; 3: the third concern) 
(1) proceeding of the implementation of a particular policy . 
(2) school management (e.g. planning) 
(3) staffing and in-service teacher training 
(4) school resources such as equipment, building, textbooks 
(5) curriculum and teaching-learning of the school 
(6) examination and records 
(7) collect schools' comments on the LEA's policies 
(8) relationship with other schools 
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(9) school attendance, dropout, discipline 
(10) political education 
(11) others (please specify ) 
7. When (s)he came to visit your school last time, (s)he spent time in 
	
 . ( please choose three answers and indicate durations by 
numbering 1,2,3, i.e.: 1: the longest ; 2: the second longest; 3: 
the third longest). 
(1) talking with head teachers only 
(2) talking with school heads and department heads only 
(3) talking with teachers 
(4) observing classes 
(5) going around the school and visiting various facilitate 
e.g., labs, library. 
(6) talking with pupils 
(7) others ( please specify) 
8. Your inspector(s) know(s) your school 	  
(1) not at all (2) a little (3) fairly well (4) quite well (5) very well 
9. Your school is formally inspected 	  
(1) termly (2) annually (3) biennially (4) > two years 
10. The team of the recent inspection was composed of 	 people. 
(1) <5 (2) 5-10 (3) 11-15 (4) 16-20 (5) > 20 
They were 	  
(1) full time inspectors only (2) PT and FT inspectors only 
(3) inspectors and administrators only 
(4) inspectors, administrators, and retired school heads 
(5) inspectors, administrators, retired school heads, and 
teachers from other schools 
(6) others (please specify) 	  
11. The recent inspection lasted 	  days . 
(1) 112 -1 (2) 2-3 (3) 4-6 (4) 7-8 (5) 9-10 
12. The results of the inspection (evaluation) 	  
(1) reflected your school's reality 
(2) were partial and subjective judgments 
(3) were only some perfunctory remarks 
(4) pointed out clearly the direction of improvements 
13. On the whole, inspectors' visits and inspections are 
	 to your 
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school's work. 
(1) of no help (2) of little help (3) of some help 
(4) quite helpful (5) very helpful 
14. Inspectors' advice and requirements are 	  influential in 
your school's decision making. 
(1) not (2) hardly (3) fairly (4) quite (5) very 
15. Your school 	  call for the help of the inspectors. 
(1) never (2) occasionally (3) sometimes (4) often 
(5) almost always 
16. Your requests and expectations of the functions and 
activities of the inspectorate are paid 
	
 attention by the 
inspectors. 
(1) no (2) a little (3) some (4) quite a lot (5) much 
17. Besides school visit and inspection, you meet inspectors when 
(tick more than one answer if applicable) 	 . 
(1) at the meeting chaired by inspectors 
(2) visit other schools together with inspectors 
(3) attend LEA's meeting and meet inspectors there 
(4) others (please specify) 
18. The contributions of the inspectorate to your school are mainly 
	
 . ( please choose three answers and indicate degrees of 
contributions by numbering 1,2,3. i.e. 1: the biggest contribution; 
2: the second biggest contribution; 3: the third biggest 
contribution). 
(1) to convey LEA policies and to keep schools informed 
(2) to collect and feedback schools' comment on LEA policies 
(3) to evaluate school performance and point our direction 
of improvements 
(4) to spread good practice 
(5) to offer professional advice to school's work 
(6) to act as trouble shooter on behalf of the LEA 
(7) to act as a liaison between LEAs and schools 
(8) to supervise and enforce policy implementation 
(9) others (please specify) 
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Part Two Your Evaluation and Expectations 
of the Work of the Inspectorate 
1. What role should the inspectors play 	  ? 
(1) representatives of LEAs (2) representatives of schools 
(3) intermediaries but inclined to LEAs 
(4) intermediaries but inclined to the schools 
2. Whether the inspectors should be given administrative power? 
(1) yes, they should (2) No. they shouldn't 
(3) they should have some power on some matters such as 
3. What role do you expect the inspectors to play? (please choose five 
answers and indicate the degrees of expectations by numbering 1,2,3,4,5. 
i.e., 1: your strongest expectation 2: the second expectation, 3: the third 
expectation; 4: the fourth expectation 5: the fifth expectation). 
(1) information collector ( i.e. report what is going on in 
schools) 
(2) conveyor of LEA's policies 
(3) supervisor of policy implementation 
(4) encourager and stimulus of school innovation 
(5) mediator between LEA and schools 
(6) facilitator of school resources 
(7) professional adviser to LEA policy making 
(8) information collector for higher level inspectorate 
(9) executive of the higher level inspectorate 
(10) disseminator of good practice 
(11) commentator or evaluator of LEA's policies 
(12) participant of teachers' appointment and promotions 
___(13) adviser of individual teachers' personal and 
professional difficulties 
(14) evaluator of schools' educational standards 
(15) professional adviser to school management 
(16) professional adviser to school teaching-learning and 
curriculum matters 
(17) LEA's trouble shooter 
4. Would you please describe the work of the inspectors assigned to 
your school, or the inspectors in your area if you don't have an 
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assigned inspector. 
5. Do schools and teachers have influence on inspectorate's planning? 
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Appendix G: Questionnaire for Administrators hi 
Educational Authorities  
Evaluation of Inspectorate's Work and Your Expectations 
Dear Colleague, 
The last two years saw the rapid development of educational 
inspection throughout the country. With the aim of improving 
inspection work and speeding up education reform, this questionnaire is 
designed to discover your evaluation of inspectorate's work and your 
expectations towards improvement. The questionnaire is divided into 
two parts: part one asks you to describe the factual practice of the 
inspectorate based on the experience of your administrative branch (or 
your education authority), part two invites you to express your views and 
expectations of the inspectorate. 
This is a nationwide survey. Your answers will be strictly 
confidential. We shall be very grateful if you could send the 
questionnaire back to the Department of Education, East China Normal 
University before 25th, May, using the prepaid envelop. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation and wish you all the best 
with your work. 
Research Group on Educational Inspection 
Department of Education 
East China Normal University 
Coordinator: Weis:tan Yang 
5th. May. 1989 
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Part One: The Inspectorate and Your Branch 
(or Your Education Authority) 
N.B. (1): If an inspectorate has not yet been set up in your area, 
please skip over to part two; 
(2): If you encounter a unapplicable question, please skip to the 
next one; 
(3): please tick to answer questions unless otherwise stated. 
(4): if you are a head of the education authority, please answer 
the questions from authority's point of view. If you are a head 
or ordinary member of an administrative branch, please 
answer the questions from your branch's point of view. 
1. You are a 	 administrator. 
(1) provincial rank (2) prefectural rank ( 3) county rank 
2. You are a 	  
(1) head (deputy head) of a branch 
(2) ordinary staff of a branch 
(3) head (deputy head) of the education authority 
3. The name of your branch is 	  
4. Your branch usually has formal work contact with 	  
members of the inspectorate. 
(1) no (2) 1 1 4 - 1 1 2 (3) 1 1 2 (4) 1 I 2 -1 (5) all 
5. Your branch and the inspectorate meet together 
	  on the 
average for the purpose of work. 
(1) daily (2) weekly (3) half-monthly (4) monthly (5) termly 
6. Normally, your branch contacts 
	  
(1) heads of the inspectorate only (2) relevant inspectors only 
(3) normally heads, sometimes relevant inspectors if necessary 
(4) normally relevant inspectors, sometimes heads if necessary 
7. The contributions of the inspectorate to your branch are mainly 
	
 . ( please choose three answers and indicate degree of 
contribution by numbering 1,2,3. i.e. 1: the biggest contribution; 
2: the second biggest contribution; 3: the third biggest 
contribution). 
(1) to provide information of the state of education in 
schools and in lower level education authorities 
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(2) to provide professional advice to decision making of the 
education authority 
___(3) to supervise and enforce the implementation of 
national and your authority's polices and decisions 
(4) to feedback schools' (lower level education authorities') 
comments on policies of your authority and your branch 
(5) to evaluate the policies made by your branch and your 
authority 
(6) to offer administrative assistance and clerical support 
(7) to liaise between your authority and schools (lower 
level education authorities) 
(8) to act as a trouble-shooter on behalf of your education 
authority 
(9) others (please specify) ____ 
8. Your branch 	 ask for the help of the inspectorate. 
(1) never 	 (2) occasionally 	 (3) sometimes 	 (4) often 
(5) almost always 
9. The most common means by which your branch contacts the 
inspectorate are 	  . (please choose three answers and 
indicate frequencies by numbering 1,2,3. i.e. 1: the most 
frequent means; 2: the second most frequent means; 3: the third 
most frequent means) 
(1) meetings between our staff and the inspectors 
(2) attending other meetings with inspectors together 
(3) memorandum and circular 
(4) visiting and inspecting schools and lower level education 
authorities together with inspectors 
(5) others 
10. Setting up inspectorate has resulted in 	
 conflict in 
responsibilities and rights between your branch and the 
inspectorate. 
(1) no (2) little (3) certain (4) quite big (5) very big 
11. The work of the inspectorate is 
	
 helpful to your branch's 
work. 
(1) not (2) hardly (3) fairly (4) considerably (5) very 
12. On the whole, the inspectorate has 
	
 influence on your 
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branch's decision making. 
(1) no (2) little (3) certain (4) quite strong (5) strong 
13. Your branch's expectations of the inspectorate have 	  
influence on its planning and work. 
(1) no (2) little (3) certain (4) quite strong (5) strong 
14. The inspectors in your authority 	  policy making of the 
authority 
(1) participate in (2) do not participate in 
	
(3) participate in some matters, such as 	  
Part Two: Your Evaluation and Expectations 
of the Work of the Inspectorate 
1. What role should the inspectors play 	  ? 
(1) representatives of education authority 
(2) representatives of schools 
(3) intermediaries but inclined to education authority 
(4) intermediaries but inclined to schools 
2. Whether the inspectors should be given administrative power? 
(1) yes, they should (2) No. they shouldn't 
(3) they should have some power on some matters such as 
3. What role do you expect the inspectors to play? (please choose five 
answers and indicate the degrees of expectations by numbering 
1,2,3,4,5. i.e., 1: your strongest expectation 2: the second 
expectation, 3: the third expectation; 4: the fourth expectation; 5: 
the fifth expectation). 
(1) encourager and stimulus of school innovation 
(2) information collector ( i.e. report what is going on in 
schools) 
(3) conveyor of LEA's policies 
(4) supervisor of policy implementation 
(5) facilitator of school resources 
(6) professional adviser to policy making of the education 
authority 
(7) information collector for higher level inspectorate 
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(8) executive of the higher level inspectorate 
(9) disseminator of good practice 
(10) mediator between employing education authority and 
schools ( and lower level education authorities) 
(11) commentator or evaluator of policies of employing 
education authority 
(12) participant of teachers' appointment and promotions 
(13) evaluator of schools' educational standards 
___(14) adviser of individual teachers' personal and 
professional difficulties 
(15) professional adviser to school management 
(16) professional adviser to school teaching-learning and 
curriculum matters 
(17) trouble shooter on behalf of the education authority 
4. Would you please describe the functions of the inspectorate in your 
education authority? 
5. Do administrative branches have influence on inspectorate's 
functions and planning? 
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Appendix Questionnaire for Inspectors 
Evaluation of Inspectorate's Work and Your Expectations 
Dear Colleague, 
The last two years saw the rapid development of educational 
inspection throughout the country. With the aim of improving 
inspection work and speeding up education reform, this questionnaire is 
designed to discover your evaluation of inspectorate's work and your 
expectations towards improvement. The questionnaire is divided into 
two parts: part one asks you to describe the factual practice of the 
inspectorate, part two invites you to express your views and expectations 
of the inspectorate. 
This is a nationwide survey. Your answers will be strictly 
confidential. We shall be very grateful if you could send the 
questionnaire back to the Department of Education, East China Normal 
University before 25th, May, using the prepaid envelop. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation and wish you all the best 
with your work. 
Research Group on Educational Inspection 
Department of Education 
East China Normal University 
Coordinator: Weiqian Yang 
5th. May. 1989 
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Part One Some Factual Information about Your Work 
N.B. Please tick to answer unless otherwise stated. 
1. Background information 
a. Sex: (1) male (2) female 
b. Age: (1) < 30 (2) 31-40 (3) 41-50 (4) 51-60 (5) > 60 
c. You are a 
	
rank inspector. 
(1) county 	 (2) prefectural 	 (3) provincial 
d. You are a 	
 inspector. 
( 1) full time (2) part time 
e. Your highest academic degree is 	  
(1) postgraduate 	 (2) undergraduate 	 (3) college 
(4) secondary education 
	
(5) primary education 
f. You were 
	 before became an inspector. 
(1) school head (2) school teacher (3) retired school head 
(4) retired administrator (5) administrator 
(6) others (please specify) 
	  
g. You have altogether 	
 years teaching experience. 
(1) 0 (2) 1-5 (3) 6-10 (4) 11-15 (5) >15 
h. You have altogether 	  years of administrative experience. 
(1) 0 (2) 1-5 (3) 6-10 (4) 11-15 (5) >15 
2. If you are a county rank inspector, you spend 	  days in 
schools every week. 
(1) < 1 	 (2) 1-2 	 (3) 3 	 (4) 4 	 (5) 5-6 
If you are a prefectural or provincial rank inspector, you spend 
	
 days in schools and lower level education authorities every 
week. 
(1) < 1 	 (2) 1-2 	 (3) 3 	 (4) 4 	 (5) 5-6 
3. You visit 	
 schools (or lower level education authorities) on 
average every week. 
(1) <1 (2) 2-3 	 (3) 4-5 	 (4) 6-7 	 (5) 8-9 
4. The recent visit lasted 
	
 . 
(1)//2 - 1 hr (2) 1-2 hrs (3) 2-3 hrs (4) half a day (5) a day 
5. Schools (or lower level education authorities) 
	  call for 
inspectors' help. 
( 1) never (2) occasionally 
	 (3)sometimes 	 (4) often 
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(5) almost always 
6. When you were visiting or inspecting schools last time, you 
were concerned with 	  . (please choose three answers and 
indicate degrees of concerns by numbering 1, 2, 3. i.e., 1: the 
first concern; 2: the second concern; 3: the third concern) 
(1) proceeding of the implementation of a particular policy 
(2) school management (e.g. planning) 
(3) staffing and in-service teacher training 
(4) school resources such as equipment, building, textbooks 
(5) curriculum and teaching-learning of the school 
(6) examination and records 
(7) collect schools' comments on the policies of the 
education authority 
(8) relationship with other schools 
(9) school attendance, dropout, discipline 
(10) political education 
(11) others (please specify ) 
	  
7. When you were visiting schools last time, you spent time in 	  
(please choose three answers and indicate durations by 
numbering 1,2,3, i.e.: 1: the longest ; 2: the second longest; 
3: the third longest). 
(1) talking with head teachers only 
(2) talking with school heads and department heads only 
(3) talking with teachers 
(4) observing classes 
(5) going around the school and visiting various facilitate 
e.g., labs, library. 
(6) talking with pupils 
(7) others ( please specify) 
8. If you are a county level inspector, your inspectorate inspect 
	  of schools in the area and visit 	  of them every 
term. 
(1) < 3% (2) 4-5 % (3) 6-10 % (4) 11-15% (5) 16-20 % 
If you are a prefectural or provincial level inspector, your 
inspectorate inspect 	 of the lower level education 
authorities and visit 	  of them on the average every term. 
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(1) < 3% (2) 4-5 % (3) 6-10 % (4) 11-15% (5) 16-20 % 
9. Your inspectorate's requirements and advice are 
influential on schools' ( lower level education authorotoes) decision 
making. 
(1) not (2) hardly (3) fairly (4) quite (5) very 
10. The contributions of your inspectorate to schools (or lower level 
education authorities) are mainly 	  . ( please choose three 
answers and indicate degrees of contributions by numbering 
1,2,3. i.e. 1: the biggest contribution; 2: the second biggest 
contribution; 3: the third biggest contribution). 
(1) to convey LEA policies and to keep them informed 
(2) to collect and feedback schools' and lower level 
education authorities' comment on LEA policies 
(3) to evaluate the performance of schools and lower level 
education authorities and point our direction of 
improvements 
(4) to spread good practice 
(5) to offer professional advice to schools and lower 
level education authorities 
(6) to act as trouble shooter on behalf of the education 
authority 
(7) to act as a liaison between employing education 
authority and schools (and lower level education 
authorities) 
(8) to supervise and enforce policy implementation 
(9) others (please specify) 
11. Please write down the name of three branches with which your 
inspectorate has the most contact. 
12. Your inspectorate 
education authority. 
(1) does (2) does not (3) partly on some matters, e.g., 
	  participate in policy making of the 
13. How often is your inspectorate asked for help by other branches? 
(1) almost daily (2) weekly (3) half-monthly (4) monthly 
(5) termly 
14. Your inspectorate's feedback and advice is 
	
 influential in 
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other branches' policy making. 
(1) not (2) hardly (3) fairly (4) quite (5) very 
15. Setting up inspectorate has resulted in 	  conflict in 
responsibilities and rights between your inspectorate and other 
branches. 
(1) no (2) little (3) certain (4) quite big (5) very big 
16. The most common means by which your inspectorate contacts 
other branches are: 	  (please choose three answers and 
indicate frequency by numbering 1,2,3. i.e.: 1: the most frequent 
means; 2: the second most frequent means; 3: the third most 
frequent means). 
(1) meeting of inspectors and staff of other branches 
(2) attending other meetings with staff of other branches 
(3) memorandum and circular 
(4) visiting and inspecting schools (lower level education 
authorities) together 
(5) others (please specify) 	  
17. The contributions of your inspectorate to your education authority 
are mainly 	 : ( please choose three answers and indicate 
degrees of contributions by numbering 1,2,3. i.e. 1: the biggest 
contribution; 2: the second biggest contribution; 3: the third biggest 
contribution). 
(1) to provide information of the state of education in 
schools and in lower level education authorities 
(2) to provide professional advice to the decision making of 
employing education authority 
(3) to supervise and enforce the implementation of national 
and authority's polices and decisions 
(4) to feedback schools' (lower level education authorities') 
comments on policies of your education authority 
(5) to evaluate policies of your education authority 
(6) to offer administrative assistance and clerical support 
(7) to liaise between your authority and schools (lower level 
education authorities) 
(8) to act as trouble-shooter on behalf of your education 
authority 
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(9) others (please specify) 
18. Your inspectorate takes 	  as your first consideration when 
making inspection plans, takes 	  as second consideration, 
and takes 	  as third consideration. 
(1) the expectations of higher level inspectorate 
(2) the expectations of your education authority 
(3) the expectations of schools and lower level education 
authorities 
19. Apart from inspections and visits, the rest of your time is spent 
on 	  . (please choose three answers and indicate the length 
of the time by numbering 1,2,3. ) 
(1) stay in office and do some administrative work 
(2) attend inspector meetings 
(3) attend meetings of other branches or the whole 
authority 
(4) attend meetings held by higher level inspectorate 
(5) attend inspector training 
(6) others (please specify) 	  
Part Two Your Evaluation and Expectations 
of the work of the Inspectorate 
1. What role should the inspectors play 
	  ? 
(1) representatives of education authority 
(2) representatives of schools 
(3) intermediaries but inclined to education authority 
(4) intermediaries but inclined to schools 
2. Whether the inspectors should be given administrative power? 
(1) yes, they should (2) No. they shouldn't 
(3) they should have some power on some matters such as 
3. What role do you expect the inspectors to play? (please choose five 
answers and indicate the degrees of expectations by numbering 
1,2,3,4,5. i.e.,1: your strongest expectation 2: the second 
expectation, 3: the third expectation; 4: the fourth expectation; 5: the 
fifth expectation). 
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(1) information collector ( i.e. report what is going on in 
schools and lower level education authorities) 
(2) conveyor of authority's policies 
(3) supervisor of policy implementation 
(4) encourager and stimulus of school innovation 
(5) mediator between employing education authority and 
schools and lower level education authorities 
(6) facilitator of school (lower level authorities) resources 
(7) professional adviser to policy making of the employing 
education authority 
(8) information collector for higher level inspectorate 
(9) executive of the higher level inspectorate 
(10) disseminator of good practice 
(11) commentator or evaluator of policies of employing 
education authority 
(12) participant of teachers' appointment and promotions 
(13) evaluator of educational standards of schools and 
educational provision of lower level education 
authorities 
___(14) adviser of individual teachers' personal and 
professional difficulties 
(15) professional adviser to school management 
(16) professional adviser to school teaching-learning and 
curriculum matters 
__(17) professional adviser on macro-administration of 
employing education authority 
(18) trouble shooter on behalf of the employing education 
authority 
4. The following table lists some possible tasks of inspectors. Please 
tick in the appropriate grid to show the time you spend. 
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tasks do not spend 
time 
spend 
little 
time 
spend 
some 
time 
spend 
quite a 
lot time 
spend 
much 
time 
1. teachers (lower LEA staff) 
appointment and promotion 
2. advise on 	 individual teachers' 
personal, 	 professional 	 matters 
3. evaluate teaching - learning 
in schools 
4. evaluate overall standards of 
schools and lower LEAs 
5. help schools and lower LEAs 
solve resource problems 
6. help schools soleve teaching - 
learning 
	 problems 
7. organise INSET 
8. travelling 	 on the road 
9. hold meetings of school heads 
and heads of lower LEAs 
10. attend meetings of higher 
level 	 inspectorate 
11. attend meetings of other 
branches 
12. discuss matters with 
inspector colleagues 
13. stay in office, do some 
administrative 	 work 
14. others 
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